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Conventionally, debate over the use of legislative history hinges on the
participants' views regarding the importance, or even existence, of legislative
intent Those who dismiss the concept of legislative intent as chimerical or view any
such intent as unimportant reject reference to legislative history. Those who believe
that discerning legislative intent serves as the touchstone of interpretation embrace
reliance upon legislative history. Professor Bell proposes a new approach, the
public justification approach, that severs the connection between legislative history
and the concept of legislative intent. He argues that legislative explanations of
statutes merit legal recognition apart from their probative value as evidence of
legislators actual subjective desires precisely because the legislature has
proclaimed those statutoryjustifications publicly. Legislatures have a normative,
perhaps even quasi-constitutional, obligation to explain the statutes they enact.
Such an obligation follows from the people's status as sovereigns and the right of
human beings to be treated as autonomous. Drawing on underenforced
constitutional norms theory, Bell argues that courts should encourage the
legislature's fulfillment of its obligation to explain by crediting legislature's public
justifications ofstatutes.
After exploring the premises of two major interpretive approaches, new
textualism and interpretivism, Professor Bell sets forth the premises underlying his
publicjustification approach. He describes a methodology in which courts may rely
upon limited portions of legislative history, primarily committee reports and
statements of the floor managers during legislative debate, to interpret a statute.
The approach rejects new textualism, arguing that the text of some legislative
history, as well as the text of the statute, is relevant, without creating the
methodological problems intentionalism has produced by its theoretical focus on
subjective intent Bell illustrates his publicjustification approach by analyzing two
major United States Supreme Court cases: (1) Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380
(1991), in which the Justices split 6-3 on whether the provisions of the Voting
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Rights Act, allowing plaintiffs to challenge the discriminatory effect of voting
practices, applied to judicial elections, and (2) the classic United States v. Holy
Trinity Church, 143 US. 457 (1892), the major case establishing the legitimacy of
referring to legislative history.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To almost everyone with legal training, the concept embodied in the title of this
Article, "legislative history without legislative intent," is surely inconceivable
nonsense. (Of course, I chose the phrase for that reason.) Legislative history seems
inextricably intertwined with the concept of legislative intent-examining
legislative history makes sense only if one wishes to determine legislative intent.
The contestants on both sides of the current battle over using legislative history may
agree on little, but they seem to agree on this point.
Those who advocate the use of legislative history argue that determining
legislative intent is the goal of statutory interpretation, and the legitimacy of
referring to legislative history seems to follow without much argument. That is,
legislative history merely serves as a tool to find illusive legislative intent, but, in
itself, lacks significance. Those who attack legislative history also view it as
inexorably coupled with the concept of legislative intent. Thus, they argue against
the use of legislative history by attempting to show that "legislative intent' does not
provide a proper basis for interpreting statutes. Alternatively, they argue that
"legislative history" provides poor evidence of "legislative intent," and thus holds
scant value because it is useful only as evidence of intent.
In this Article, I show that one can accept the arguments that legislative intent
is chimerical and that legislative history provides a poor tool for discovering any
legislative intent that exists, and yet continue to believe that some legislative history
retains an important place in the interpretive enterprise.
The reigning methodology of statutory construction involves the search for
legislative intent. As the Supreme Court has proclaimed, the touchstone of
interpretation is finding legislative intent 1 Courts initially relied not only on the text
See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (courts' objective in construing a
statute is to ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the legislative will); Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537,542 (1943); United States v. N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50,
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of the statute but also on a very limited range of legislatively-produced documents,
primarily committee reports and statements of the floor manager of the relevant
legislation, to discern legislative intent. Courts justified that approach by relying
upon a "delegation-assenf' argument-Congress delegates the task of formulating
legislation to committees and when it votes on the statute it votes to approve (or
disapprove) the work of the committee, including the committee's interpretation of
the statute.
Two problems emerged. First, judicial practice outstripped this justification for
using legislative history, and courts began to use almost anything they could find
to discover legislative intent As one author quipped, courts started "fumbling about
in the ashcans of the legislative process for the shoddiest unenacted shreds and
patches of intention."2
Second, textualists challenged the concept of legislative intent They argued
that only the vote on a statute by the legislative body had legal significance and that
such a vote expressed approval of only the statutory text, not any committee's
intent. Intentionalist scholars have not produced a terribly convincing response to
this challenge. For example, they have not provided a basis for viewing legislators
as voting on anything other than the text of the statute. This Article supplies the
missing argument, while distinguishing the types of legislative history that courts
should consider from those they should not. Members of Congress should be
viewed as having an obligation to vote on both the text of the statute and
institutional explanations of those statutes. This duty derives from the concomitant
duties of legislatures to explain statutes and avoid misleading the public.
New textualism, intentionalism, and my approach rest upon contrasting
premises that I shall set forth briefly here and elaborate upon later. The New
Textualist3 Approach rests on three premises. First, the legislature's vote on a statute
is the only significant event in the legislative process. This reflects the view that the
legislative process merely provides a forum for the expression of preferences. It also
reflects a failure to consider Congress as an institution that is greater than its
individual members. Second, the vote on a statute is a vote only on the text of the
statute. Third, rarely will members of the legislature share the same subjective intent
with respect to a statute. (New textualists believe that this third point does not
undermine their own theory of interpretation because legislators have a duty to vote
53 (1942) ('The question here, as in any problem of statutory construction, is the intention of the
enacting body."); United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534,542 (1940) ('In the
interpretation of statutes the fbnction of the courts is easily stated[;] [i]t is to construe the language
so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.").
2 CARuus P. CuRT-s, IT'S YOULAw 52 (1954).
3 William Eskridge coined the term. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REv. 621,623 (1990) (defining new textualism as the view "that once the Court has
ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant").
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based on the ordinary meaning of the text of a statute, thus differences in subjective
intent, or even in legislators' actual understanding of the text, are irrelevant.) The
new textualist methodology is objective4-it requires a determination of the
meaning that a reasonable person would accord to text, and the only legally relevant
text is the statute.5
According to the Intentionalist Approach, at least as described by its critics, the
vote on a statute is the only event of legal significance in the legislative process.
Thus intentionalism, like new textualism, seems to regard the legislative process as
nothing more than a mechanism for aggregating preferences. However, contrary to
new textualists, intentionalists view the vote for a statute as the enactment of the
subjective intent of a majority of legislators or some select smaller group of
legislators (either members of the relevant standing committee, the drafters of the
legislation, the typical legislator who helped form the victorious majority, i.e., the
typical majority voter, or the legislators whose votes were necessary for the bill's
passage but were most ambivalent, i.e., swing voters). Also contrary to new
textualists, intentionalists believe that the members of the victorious majority will
often share a subjective intent. Their methodology is subjective-at base they
attempt to discern the subjective intent of some person or group.
The delegation-assent approach seeks to expand the number of legally-
significant events beyond floor actions by according committee decisions
significance. Advocates of such an approach regard committees as agents whose
4 1 use the words "objective" and "subjective" to distinguish approaches that accord legal
significance to an actor's conduct from those that accord such significance to the actor's intentions.
See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRErATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUrES 83-85 (1975); KENT
GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECrIVITY 109-11 (1992). The former is an objective approach
because a court uses a standard that is external to the actor, such as the "reasonable person." The
latter is a subjective approach because the standard seeks to evaluate the internal motivations of
the actor. Thus, under an objective approach, the interpreter examines the text produced by the
legislature from a perspective external to the members of the legislature. For example, an objective
approach would focus upon a reasonable person's interpretation of the statutory text. Under a
subjective approach, the interpreter examines the text from the perspective of the internal
motivations of the legislators. See generally ROBERT E. KEErON, JUDGING 90, 152-54 (1990)
(comparing subjective and objective approaches). This distinction resembles that used in
discussions ofthe standard of care in torts. See 3 F. HARPERETAL, THELAWOFTORTS § 16.2, at
389-90 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing judicial reference to the "reasonably prudent person" in similar
circumstances); see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMs, THE COMMON LAW 108-10 (1881)
(discussing standards of liability); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 283, 283B (1965)
(discussing standards of conduct).
5 Nonstatutory texts may serve other functions. For example, legislative history may increase
citizens' ability to participate in government by clarifying legislative policies. Moreover, it may
enhance Congress's influence over administrative agencies by enabling Congress to recommend
policies without legally constraining agencies. Nonetheless, new textualists believe that they need
not consider these functions served by legislative history when construing statutes.
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actions are then approved by their principal-the legislature. However, their failure
to provide a convincing basis for finding such assent undermines their approach.
The approach proposed in this Article focuses on institutional obligations and
institutional actions: the responsibility of Congress as an institution to explain
statutes as well as enact them, and the actions Congress takes to explain those
statutes in the form of committee reports and floor manager statements. As a result
this approach views the vote on a statute as a vote on the text plus certain documents
comprising the "public justification" of the statute. In addition, because members
have a duty to consider the public justification of a statute when they vote, the lack
of ajoint subjective intent becomes unimportant because members can be viewed
as constructively assenting to the text of the statute and the accompanying
institutional explanatory materials. Thus, the approach is objective, like new
textualism, focusing on the reasonable interpretation of text rather than subjective
intentions of legislators. However, the approach in this Article expands the text that
must be recognized as relevant to interpretation to include institutional explanations
as well as statutory text.6
A modified version of the classic H.L.A. Hart-Lon Fuller hypothetical about a
park in which vehicles are prohibited can show the differences in the three theories.7
Imagine the following problem:
A city ordinance provides that "no motor vehicles are allowed in Founders'
Park." A court must decide two lawsuits: one seeking a declaratory judgment
allowing the operation of motor boats in the park, and the other seeking a
declaration that a war monument consisting of a World War II jeep must be
removed from the park.
6 Some scholars advocate this approach. See David B. Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation
and PoliticalAdvantage, 12 INr'L REV. L. & ECON. 217,220 (1992) ("What legitimizes legislative
history as a source of legislative intent is not so much the probative value of this history, but
instead, the democratic fiction that the history of a statute has been accepted by Congress as a
body. Congress should be understood, so this argument goes, to vote upon a legislative package
(text + history) and not merely the text alone.'); see also Edward 0. Correia, A Legislative
Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1129, 1156 (1992) (noting
"legislators view legislative 'intent' as the policies represented in the statutory text and explained
by the legislative leaders for any particular bill"); James M. Landis, A Note on "Statutory
Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 888-89 (1930) ('Through the committee report, the
explanation of the committee chairman, and otherwise, a mere expression of assent becomes in
reality a concurrence in the expressed views of another."); Jeremy Waldron, Legislators 'Intentions
and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND INTERPRETATON 355-56 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995)
(under this theory legislative history becomes like text-it matters not why the person voted for
it (even if they were mistaken), the words bind them).
7 See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630, 663 (1958); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958). See generally Bernard W. Bell, "No Motor Vehicles in the Park".
Reviving the Hart-Fuller Debate to Introduce Statutory Construction, 48 J LEG. ED. 48 (1998).
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The ordinance's adoption followed a series of accidents in which cars or
motorcycles struck pedestrians on roadways in Founders' Park. After the accidents,
a citizens' group drafted a proposed ordinance providing that "no cars, trucks,
motorcycles, vans, tour-mobiles, or other motor vehicles are allowed in Founders'
Park." A member of the city council introduced the proposal for consideration by
the council, emphasizing the series of roadway accidents in explaining the need for
the ordinance. The ordinance was referred to a committee, which amended the
proposed ordinance to generally prohibit motor vehicles, without listing specific
types of vehicles. The committee's report focuses on the ordinance as a solution to
the road accident problem.
The proposed ordinance reported by the committee was briefly debated in
council, which enacted the ordinance by a vote of eighteen to thirteen. During the
debate, the Chairperson of the Committee that had amended the ordinance said that
the ordinance would solve the problem of the accidents that had occurred. Two
supporters of the ordinance asserted that the ordinance would finally require the
removal of a jeep monument from the park because jeeps are motor vehicles. Two
other supporters asserted that the ordinance would enhance safety throughout the
park (on and off the park's roads) and, in addition, address environmental concerns
by reducing pollution caused by vehicles powered by motors, including motor boats.
One opponent asserted that such a ban on motor boats would be unwise.
Further information about the motor boat issue is revealed in an affidavit
submitted to the court by the majority leader of the council. In the affidavit she
asserts that a group often members feared that the courts might apply the ordinance
to motor boats, but the group ultimately decided not to raise the issue for fear that
the council would have rejected an amendment expressly exempting motor boats.
The majority leader's affidavit also asserts that in her judgment such a clarifying
amendment would have been defeated.
The new textualist intentionalist, and public justification methodologies
suggest three different approaches. The new textualist would urge the judge to focus
on the dictionary meaning of the words "motor vehicle" and ignore the legislative
history entirely. Discovering that "motor vehicles" are defined as "self-propelled
wheeled vehicle[s] not running on rails,"8 the judge would conclude that the jeep
must be removed, but motor boats can continue to operate.
The intentionalist would urge the judge to interpret the ordinance by seeking to
discover the council's "intent" through analysis of legislative history. The judge
might review all the materials discussed above. Having done so, he would probably
surmise that a majority of the council did not really believe that the ordinance
required removal of the jeep. He might also conclude that the ordinance prohibited
motor boats, citing the statements of the only two proponents that addressed the
motor boat issue, and noting that nothing in the legislative record, committee
8 WEBTER'S II: NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSrry DICIONARY 772 (1984).
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reports, chair's statement or sponsor's statement conflicts with the views expressed
by those two proponents. He might also consider, and cite in support, the majority
leader's affidavit.
Under the public justification approach, the judge should consider only the text
of the ordinance and the institutional statements justifying the statute, i.e., the
committee report and the committee chair's comments. A reasonable person who
reads the statute and the institutional justification would conclude that the ordinance
embodied a policy of preventing the operation of self-propelled vehicles on roads
within Founders' Park. Because that rationale applies to neither immobile nor off-
road vehicles, immobile jeeps and mobile motor boats are permitted. 9
In Part H of this Article, I shall make the case for viewing at least some
legislative history as legally significant text entitled to judicial consideration. The
argument seeks to divorce the rationale for the use of legislative history from the
attempt to determine the subjective views of all or some portion of the enacting
legislators, i.e., "the legislative intent." In particular, I will argue that legislatures
should be viewed as having a duty to explain statutes, and that statutes should be
interpreted to further publicly acknowledged, rather than undisclosed, policies. In
Part I, I will discuss the premises and methodology of new textualism and
intentionalism. In Part IV, I will discuss the premises and methodology of the public
justification approach. Finally, in Part V, I will discuss the relevance of the public
justification approach to two ongoing interpretive controversies.
II. THE DUTY TO EXPLAIN
A. The Basis of the Duty
We view legislative history as having value only as evidence of the subjective
9 These approaches all assume that courts should act as agents of the legislature and,
accordingly, effectuate its will. Under other approaches, the courts, as "readers" of statutes, may
legitimately create meaning. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,
87 MCH. L. REV. 20,20-21 (1988) (advocating'nautical" interpretation, which views statutes as
constantly undergoing transformation to account for the views of legislators and judges at the
various times the statute is interpreted, rather than "archeological" interpretation, which focuses
on a statute's original meaning); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321,325-29 (1990) (recommending a
"practical reasoning" approach that combines elements of agency approaches and evolutive
approaches); Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585,
636-46 (1996) (recommending an approach that combines elements of an agency approach and
a meaning-creating approach). However, evolutive and agency theories can be combined. See
Gonzalez, supra, at 718-29 (discussing a two-step process of interpretation involving both
"interpretative judgment and policy discretion"); Eskridge & Frickey, supra, at 321-22,345-60
(advocating a "more modest approach" to statutory interpretation that is based upon "practical
reason"). This Article assumes acceptance of agency conception.
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intent of legislators. However, statements can be accorded significance apart from
their value as evidence of the speaker's subjective intent. Promises illustrate this
point. A person making a promise creates an obligation for himself, regardless of
whether he intends to keep the promise at the moment of utterance.10 The recipient
of the promise can justifiably rely upon it without determining whether the promise
actually reflected the subjective intent of the promisor. As Kent Greenawalt notes,
"[t]he individual who promises creates social obligations for himself and confers
social claims on others;" such obligations are created and claims conferred whether
or not the promisor intended to act as promised.1' Legislative history should be
recognized as possessing significance apart from its value as evidence of legislators'
subjective intent much like promises have independent significance. In other words,
legislative explanations should have some legal effect whether or not they actually
reflect any legislator's state of mind.
A legislature's explanation of a statute itself merits recognition as an act of
legal significance. Two normative principles compel such a conclusion. First,
legislatures, like other governmental institutions, have a normative obligation to
explain, as well as enunciate, their commands.12 Second, government must not
mislead its citizens.
1. Entitlement to an Explanation
The first principle, that legislatures have a duty to explain their commands as
well as enunciate them, follows from the respect governments in the United States
owe to the public. The respect due the public has two bases. Citizens' status as
sovereigns in the United States Government (and the other governmental entities
within the United States) provides one such basis. Such respect is also required
because members of the public are affected by legislative decisions (regardless of
whether they are also viewed as sovereigns). As shown below, people, both as
citizens and individuals affected by statutes, are entitled to an explanation of
10 See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 160 (1978)
[hereinafter LYING] ("[1-n making a promise, I setup expectations, an equilibrium; should I break
my promise, I upset that equilibrium and fail to live up to those expectations; I am unfair, given
what I had promised and what I now owe to another."); SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS
OF CONCEALMENTAND REvELATION 120 (1982) [hereinafter SECRET] (discussing a promise as
an obligation that demands respect and allegiance and referencing the work ofphilosopher Hugo
Grotius). See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF
REGRETED DECISIONS 36-42 (1998) (discussing various theories explaining the binding nature
of promises).
11 See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THEUSES OF LANGUAGE 63-65 (1989).
12 See RICHARD E. FLATMAN, POLITICAL OBLIGATION 88 (1972) ("[1]t [is] obvious that we
can ask for justification as to why [laws] were passed. ... []t is clear that reasons can be given and
that we expect them to be given for or against particular legal rules").
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statutes.
First, the relationship between citizens and government imposes upon
legislatures a normative obligation to explain statutes. Citizens are sovereign within
the United States government, and government entities, including legislatures,
merely act as agents or trustees of sovereign citizens on their behalf.13 Indeed, the
Founding Fathers identified this principle as one of their major contributions to
political thought. As Cass Sunstein has noted, "[t]he placement of sovereignty in
'We the People,' rather than the government, may well have been the most
important American contribution to the theory of politics. ' 14 Indeed, Madison
argued in the Federalist Papers that popular sovereignty was the essence of
republicanisa-in a republic, "government... derives all its powers directly or
indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding
their offices during pleasure for a limited period" of time.15
Accordingly, legislators derive their authority from the populace as a whole.
The people as a whole have established a Constitution that provides for the
delegation of limited powers to Congress 16 and provides that such power can be
exercised for a limited duration until legislators again submit themselves for
election. 17
13 See THE FEDERALISt NO. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The
Federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people,
constituted with different powers and designed for different purposes."); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, The Central Meaning ofRepublican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and
the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 749, 761-66 (1994) (discussing the strong
element of popular sovereignty in the Constitution); Gonzalez, supra note 9, at 636-46 (explaining
the central idea of popular sovereignty is that "the people are the one and only sovereign in civil
society'); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTruONAL LAW § 1-2, at 2 (2d ed. 1988) ("That
all lawful power derives from the people and must be held in check to preserve their freedom is
the oldest and most central tenet of American constitutionalism."). See generally ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSfIUTrIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 11, 15, 18-19,
36, 60, 70, 75, 84-85, 106 (1948) (asserting the proposition that "[w]e are the sovereign and the
legislature is our agent," and elaborating upon the implications of that proposition for freedom of
expression).
14 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, at xvi (1993).
15 ThE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 240-41 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
16 See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 313-14 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("[Tihe people are the only legitimate fountain ofpower, and it is from them that the constitutional
charter, under which the several branches of government hold their power, is derived."); see also
TRIBE, supra note 13, § 5-2, at 298 (discussing how the final version of the Constitution
specifically enumerated the powers to the national government); see, e.g., United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 552, 566 (1995) ('The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated
powers.").
17 See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (We the People... do ordain and establish this Constitution for
the United States of America."); Id. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
[Vol. 60:1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
As citizens' agents or trustees, government institutions at least owe a duty to
explain to those citizens the basis for action taken in their name. 18 By refusing to
explain its actions to citizens, a government entity, in effect asserts superiority over
and lack of accountability to the citizenry.' 9 The significance of the citizenry's
status as the source of the government's authority can be appreciated by contrasting
two situations. In one, a command is given or an action taken by someone who does
not derive their power from the person commanded or affected by the action. In the
second, the person giving the command or taking action derives his authority from
the person being commanded or affected.20
For instance, a military officer ordinarily has no obligation to explain an order
to a subordinate because he does not derive his authority from the subordinate.21
the Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the states, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."); THE FEDERALIST No. 39,supra note 15, at 241 ("[W]e may define arepublic to be... a
government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people
and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure for a limited period").
18 See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITunON: THE SUPREME COURT'S
OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTON AS SOMETHING WE THE PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND
5-6 & n.*, 19-20, 76-78, 114, 118 (1992). See generally Burke Marshall, Foreword, in
GOLDSTEIN, supra, at xvii, xix-xx (Goldstein's book"takes the sovereignty of the people literally
and seriously, and derives from that their right to be told what is going on, and why, in the judicial
branch."). Goldstein argues that the U.S. Supreme Court has an obligation to explain its
constitutional decisions in written opinions, rather than merely announcing a constitutional rule.
See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra, at 19-20, 118. For instance, he argues that in the second Brown v.
Board ofEducation, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I), addressing remedial issues, the Court had
an obligation to justify its decision that African-American victims of segregated school systems
had no right to immediate desegregation. See GOLDSTEIN, supra, at 76-78, 127. Goldstein rests
this obligation to explain on the citizenry's sovereign status. See id. at 5-6 & n.*, 19-20. See
generally William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 739 (1949) ("[Tjhe court
was... faithful to the democratic tradition [when it wrote] in words that all could understand why
it did what it did. That is vital to the integrity of thejudicial process.").
19 See Burt v. Blumenauer, 699 P.2d 168, 175 (Or. 1985); ALVIN W. GOULDNER, THE
DIALECTIC OF IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY 102-03 (1976); MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLmCS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT ExPREsSION IN AMERICA 20-22
(1983); Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American Law and
Lif, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237,243 (1987).
20 See Carl J. Friedrich, Authority, Reason, and Discretion, in NOMOS I: AUTHORITY 28,
30-31,35-36,40-42,44-45,48 (1958); see also CARLJ. FRiEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECrIVE 203 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW]; Charles
W. Hendel, An Exploration of the Nature ofAuthority, in NOMOS I: AUTHORnY, supra, at 3, 17;
Mark E. Warren, Deliberative Democracy andAuthority,90 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 46-48, 55, 57
(1996).
21 See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 90 & 92(b), 10 U.S.C. §§ 890(2), 892(2) (1994);
see also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 299-300 (1983) (In denying enlisted personnel a
Bivens remedy against their superiors, the Supreme Court said: "'le inescapable demands of
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Similarly, a parent may refuse to explain commands to a minor child, particularly
a relatively young child, because the child is not the source of the parent's
authority.22 Moreover, prison inmates have a limited entitlement (if any) to an
explanation of the rationale of prison regulations because the authority to
promulgate those regulations is not derived from the inmate.23
Alexander Meildejohn provided an example from a more political context: in
a country controlled by an occupying power, such as post-World War II Germany
and Japan, the citizens are not entitled to an explanation of the occupying powers'
dictates.24 While asserting that there is no obligation to justify any command under
those circumstances may be extreme, certainly the governing authorities have less
of an obligation to provide such explanations than they would if they derived their
authority from the citizens as a result of elections (rather than having attained their
position by military power).
By contrast, in some relationships one can demand explanations. If a couple
hires a babysitter, who allows the child to stay up past the child's bedtime, the
parents are entitled to an explanation. Corporate officers have an obligation to
justify corporate actions and corporate expenditures to shareholders.2 5 Federal
military discipline and obedience to orders cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of immediate
compliance with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with no time for debate
or reflection."); cf MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 13, at 84-85 (no freedom of speech in the military
because it is not a community governed by all of its members); ALFRED LORD TENNYSON, The
Charge of the Light Brigade, in SELECTED POETRY 118 (Norman Page ed., 1995) ( Their[s is] not
to reason why, their[s is] but to do and die.").
22 See THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 20, at 204. Tort law also reflects such
extraordinary parental authority over children. In particular, parents have traditionally enjoyed
immunity from suit by their children for tortious acts committed in the course of raising or
supervising them. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESC RELATIONS IN THE UNIED
STATES § 10.2, at 375 (2d ed. 1988); W. PAGEKEETONETAL., PROSSERANDKEETONONTHELAW
OF TORTS § 122, at 904-05 (5th ed. 1984). This immunity has in part been based on a concern
about infringing upon parents' discretion with respect to child-rearing. See CLARK, supra, at 377.
23 Cf MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 13, at 85 (Where there is control without consent, such as in
prisons and asylums, there is "no political ground for the demand that discussion within the
institution shall be free from abridgement.").
24 See id. at 85. Of course, this assumes, presumably, that the occupation of the country is
consistent with international law.
25 Such an obligation is not judicially enforced (except that shareholders may bring suits that
at least require management to show that they exercised due care in their actions on behalf of the
corporation). Nevertheless, "[a] shareholder has a fundamental right to be intelligently informed
about corporate affairs," 5A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ETAL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2213, at 335 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1995). Moreover, shareholders
generally have rights to access to corporate records that nonshareholders do not share-a right that
can be traced to the principle that corporate directors and officers are agents who owe their
authority to shareholders. See id. at 336; see also RussELL B. STEVENSON, JR., CORPORATIONS
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agencies have an obligation to explain their actions to Congress-they ordinarily
cannot refuse to send representatives to testify at congressional hearings or refuse
to discuss their reasons for actions.26 Individual legislators surely have an obligation
to explain their votes to their constituents.27 In each of these instances, the person
taking action derives his authority from the person due an explanation.28
Moreover, a government that refuses to disclose information to the public treats
citizens as outsiders. As Joseph Vining has argued, "disclosure, absence of
deception, almost defines what it means to be inside rather than outside an entity."2 9
The same notion was captured by Woodrow Wilson, in complaining about the
AND INFORMATION: SECRECY, AccEss, AND DISCLosURE 152 (1980) ('The right of inspection
grew originally out ofjudicial feelings that shareholders, as equitable owners of the assets of their
corporations, were entitled to know how the directors who had been appointed to run the business
were conducting its affairs."); see, e-g., Parsons v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 426 SE2d 685, 688 (N.C.
1993).
26 Indeed, the legislature's right to control administrative agencies may justify compelling
agencies to assert reasons for their actions and adopt standards to govern their exercise of authority.
See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 759 (D.D.C. 1971); Sun-Ray
Drive-In Dairy, Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 289,294 (Or. Ct. App. 1973);
see also Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(d) (1994) (The Freedom of Information Act
"is not authority to withhold information from Congress."). Of course, there is controversy
regarding the degree to which agencies can withhold information from Congress at the behest of
the President, who is a constitutional officer independent of Congress. See PETER M. SHANE &
HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS: CASES AND MATERIALS 311-37 (1996); Neal
Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal-Do Nothing,
48 ADM. L. REV. 109,111 (1996).
27 See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966); Common Cause v. Bolger, 574 F. Supp.
672,677,679,683 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd 461 U.S. 911 (1983); Bowie v. Williams, 351 F. Supp.
628, 631 (E.D. Pa. 1972); MEIKEUOHN, supra note 13, at 75; YUDOF, supra note 19, at 46-47; 2
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 312 (Richard Doane ed., 1837); Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion
and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth of Self-Rule with an Attorneyship Model of
Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 477,554-58 (1994).
28 The government's duty to provide information is particularly evident with respect to
financial expenditures. Thus, the Statement and Account Clause of the Constitution requires the
executive branch to render accounts periodically. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 198-201 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v.
Richardson, 465 F.2d 844, 850-51 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Richardson, 465
F.2d at 871-72 (Adams, J., dissenting); 3 THE DEBATES iN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS,
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrITTON A RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 460 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (statement of
George Mason), reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERs' CONsTnrrTON 292-93 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lemer eds., 1987).
29 JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND TE AUTHORITARIAN 43 (1986); see also
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 18, at 116. See generally Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of




secrecy of congressional committee proceedings. He wrote:
I say that until you drive all those things into the open, you are not connected with
your government; you are not represented; you are not participants in your
government Such a scheme of government by private understanding deprives you
of representation, deprives the people of representative institutions. It has got to be
put into the heads of legislators that public business is public business.30
Indeed, the Framers of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 noted this duty to
explain legislative provisions explicitly, including in that Constitution a requirement
that "for the more perfect satisfaction of the public, the reasons and motives for
making laws shall be fully and clearly expressed in the preambles." 31
Some First Amendment theorists have grounded the protection of free speech
in the sovereignty of the people and the consequent need to ensure that the people
can learn about government activities. 32 Such arguments support a duty of
explanation. Alexander Meildejohn was one of the most systematic exponents of
such a theory.3 3 Meildejohn argued that American government is controlled by "the
people"34 and that to intelligently control the government, the electorate,35 not
3 0 WOODROWWILsoN, TRHNEw FREEDOM 85 (William E. Leuchtenburg ed., 1961) (1913);
see also id. at 82-86; JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 19 (1964).
31 PA. CONST. of 1776, Plan or Frame of Government § 15.
32 Some of these theorists argue that the First Amendment's sole purpose is to facilitate self-
government. See MEKLEJOHN, supra note 13, at 79. One can recognize other bases for the First
Amendment, see GREENAWALT, supra note 11, yet still accept the implications of Meildejohn's
argument that Govemment should have extremely limited power over speech because of the First
Amendment's role in self-governance. See Martha I. Morgan, The ConstitutionalRight to Know
Why, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297,311 n.55 (1982).
33 See MEKEOHN, supra note 13, at 79; Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is
an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 253-55 [hereinafter First Amendment is an Absolute];
Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. 1 523,
554-58; Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 860, 862--64 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,726-27 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). In Saxbe, Powell bases
the right of media access to news sources on "the ability of our people through free and open
debate to consider and resolve their own destiny." Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 862. Because "public debate
must not only be unfettered... [but] informed," the First Amendment implicates the right to
receive information as well'as disseminate it. See id. at 862-63. However, Powell was not
addressing any affirmative governmental obligation to provide information. See id. at 861. In
Branzburg, Justice Stewart grounded the immunity ofnews reporters from testifying about their
sources on the "[e]nlightened choice by an informed citizenry... upon which an open society is
premised," and the consequent need to protect the ability to gather information as well as
disseminate it. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 726-27 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Thus, like Justice
Powell in Saxbe, Justice Stewart did not view the journalists' claim in Branzburg as one requiring
the provision of information by the government.
34 MEIKLFEOHN, supra note 13, at 11-15, 18-19,36, 60.
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merely government officials, must have access to all important information and
debate.36 Meiklejohn noted that the protection of speech is integral to any
government in which the people exercise sovereignty.37 However, Meilejohn
primarily focused on challenging the doctrine that a "clear and present danger"
could justify suppressing private citizens' speech.38 Thus, he envisioned a limited
affirmative role for government with respect to speech. The government could act
as moderator, controlling the "time, place, and manner" of discussion so that the
discussion did not devolve into a cacophony of meaninglessness. 39 The government
should also encourage discussion by both providing citizens a general education, so
that they can take part in governing, and establishing fora in which the citizenry can
discuss public issues.40 Meiklejohn does not discuss any governmental duty to
explain its acts.4 1
Cass Sunstein makes a similar argument when he relates the First Amendment
to the needs of citizens as governing sovereigns.4 2 In his view, the First Amendment
requires the government to do more than refrain from interfering with
communication between private parties regarding matters of government; it imposes
an affirmative obligation on the government to publicize its activities 43 Concurring
and dissenting opinions in cases involving media access to prisons and courts,
35 See id. at 27 ('The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the
program of self-government."); see also id. at 26,75.
36 See id. at 75.
37 See id. at 55-56, 75.
38 See id. at 29-77.
39 See id. at 24-27.
40 See id. at 19-20; First Amendment is anAbsolute, supra note 33, at 245, 257,260-61.
41 Indeed, Yudof argues that Meiklejohn concentrates only on private communications and
does not sufficiently consider the danger of the government "falsifying consent' or "falsifying
majorities." See YUDOF, supra note 19, at 155-56.
42 See SuNsTEiN, supra note 14, at xvii, 18-22,34-35, 37.
43 See id. at 105-07; YUDOF, supra note 19, at 10. Ultimately, Sunstein contends that the
rejection of the view that the First Amendment limits a government's ability to withhold
information is justified by the limited institutional capacity of the courts. See SuNSrEIN, supra note
14, at 106-07. In particular, he argues that "courts have singularly poor tools for deciding when
secrecy is appropriate" aId. Indeed, this appears to be at least in part the reason the Supreme Court
refused to establish a right of access to govemment institutions and information. See Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703-06 (1972) ('The
administration of a constitutional newsman's privilege would present practical and conceptual
difficulties of a high order."). Interestingly, Mark G. Yudof comes to a similar conclusion about
restraining government manipulation of information-while such manipulation has implications
for democracy, institutional considerations suggest that the political branches of government, not
thejudiciary, should limit such practices. See YDOF, supra note 19, at 179, 188-90. See generally
id. at 178-90.
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particularly Justice Stevens's dissent in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,44 rely upon a
similar argument Justice Stevens and others have argued that the public has a right
to discover the manner in which the government operates public institutions, such
as prisons. Therefore, government officials should not have absolute discretion to
prevent the public and media from entering such institutions to observe their
operation.45 Justice Stevens and others derive this right of access from the people's
role in self-governance.
These theories, like my argument that legislatures have a duty of explanation,
are grounded in citizens' status as sovereigns and their right to learn about their
government's activities 4 6 In other words, these theories incorporate a view of the
importance of information about government in a democracy. A subtle difference
remains between those theories and mine. Meiklejohn's, Sunstein's, and Stevens's
arguments focus upon government either divulging information that already exists
or allowing others to observe government operations or proceedings that will
actually occur, they do not require the affimative development of explanations (or
the production of anything that would not otherwise exist).47
Thus, the people could have a right of access to all legislative proceedings and
all of the facts that served as a basis for legislative deliberation, without a legislature
providing any coherent rationale setting forth its collective explanation for its
action.48 However, drawing such a line makes little sense-the populace is no less
44 438 U.S. at 18-40.
45 See id. at 31-32, 35-38 ("Without some protection for the acquisition of information
about the operation of public institutions ... by the public at large, the process of self-governance
contemplated by the Framers would be stripped of its substance"); Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,586-87 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
46 Indeed, some have argued that the legislature's role in publicizing government activities,
its informing function, is more important than its legislative role. See WooDRoW WImSON,
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 198 (2d ed. 1885). See generally id. at 195-98; JOHN STUART
MI CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENATIVE GOvERNMENT 81-84 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1958).
47 See supra note 33.
48 Indeed, some have suggested that a competition between the public and government is
enshrined in the Constitution-the government cannot prevent the public from learning
information that a nongovernmental source wants to divulge, but the government has no obligation
to make any information public. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974); ALEXANDER
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 79-83 (1975); Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 631,636 (1975).
I reject this argument, in part for reasons stated by Cass Sunstein. See SUNSTIN, supra note
14, at 106-07. The nature of the information, rather than whether a private party or a government
agent has control over it, is the relevant issue. It is problematic to say that the First Amendment
prohibits a party from publishing harmful government information known to be stolen, but that
the First Amendment provides no protection for the person providing the document to the
publishing party. If the First Amendment is, at least in part, intended to ensure democratic
govemrnment, some minimal access is necessary, as courts have held with regard to trial
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entitled to know the rationale for decisions than the facts underlying governmental
actions or the statements made by representatives during legislative dehberations 4 9
Indeed, there may be no sharp distinction between rules and their justifications-the
latter are really intertwined with the former.50
Moreover, there may be little practical difference between the right to
information, the right of access to proceedings, and the right to an explanation of
government policy. To the extent that there are institutional reasons for action, and
government policy is not merely a coincidental confluence of separate interests, the
proceedings. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577-78 (1980).
Moreover, whether information should or should not be in the public domain should hardly turn
on such a random calculation as which institutions are most clever-the government in keeping
information secret or private institutions, such as the news media, in ferreting out information. That
is, -whether information is public, should not turn on such things as whether a particular
government program includes a government employee who is disgruntled enough to risk criminal
prosecution. For instance, it is difficult to imagine that whether crucial military information can
be published turns on whether it happened to get into the hands of private media, or whether
important information with no harmful effects is available to the public turns on whether the
government official in control of the information is proficient at keeping it secret.
Moreover, even if the government-media competition theory is right as a purely constitutional
matter, it should be rejected as a normative principle governing the conduct of legislatures and
other governmental institutions. Indeed, Congress has recognized that openness in government is
good as a normative matter (apart from any strict First Amendment requirements of access). See
Government in the Sunshine Act § 2, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) ("It is hereby
declared to be the policy of the United States that the public is entitled to the fullest practicable
information regarding the decisionmaking process of the Federal Government."). For example,
Congress recognized such an open government principle by passing the Freedom of Information
Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994)), the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. App. 2 §§ 1-15 (1994)), and the Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409,
90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1994)). The House and Senate have adopted
rules requiring committee proceedings be open to the public. See S. Rule XXVI, cl. (5)(b) (1991)
(visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http'//www.senate.gov/-rules/srules.htm>; H.R. Res. 5, 106th Cong.
(1999) (enacted) (visited Mar. 24, 1999) <http'//www.lcweb.loc.gov/globalegislative
/hrules!l06/rulel0.htm> (House Rules X, cl. 4(aX1XC) & XI, cl. 2(g)(1)).
49 Indeed, Congress enacted the Sunshine Act to make possible greater knowledge of
government decisions and their underlying rationales than made possible by the Freedom of
Information Act. See S. REP. No. 94-354 (1976), reprinted in SENATE CoMMrrr ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND HousE COMMITEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSmNE Acr: SOURCE BOOK: LE3ISLATrvE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OnhE
DOCUMENTS 200-01 (1976) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK]; H.R. REP. 94-880, at 33 (1976),
reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra, at 544; President's Remarks Upon Signing S.5 into Law, 12
WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1333 (Sept. 13, 1976), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra, at 831.
50 The tenuousness of such a distinction is clear with regard to law established by courts in
judicial opinions. Perhaps the distinction is somewhat less tenuous with regard to statutory law,
but even in that context the difficulty of making such a distinction does not disappear.
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reasons motivating legislators become similar to a fact that exists, rather than an
affirmative obligation to formulate an explanation that would not otherwise have
been developed.51
A duty to explain also follows from the principle that people affected by a
governmental decision deserve some explanation of that decision. Treating another
fairly requires explaining decisions that adversely affect that person's interests. For
instance, Laurence Tribe notes that:
[B]oth the right to be heard from, and the right to be told why, are analytically
distinct from the right to secure a different outcome; these rights to interchange
express the elementary idea that to be aperson, rather than a thing, is at least to be
consulted about what is done with one.52
Similarly, Jerry Mashaw states that "a reason must be provided as a constitutional
minimum," otherwise an individual "is treated as a being for who reasons are
unimportant-an obvious affront to his self-respect. '53 Frank I. Michelman makes
a similar point. In discussing certain procedural demands upon government
51 Civic Republicans argue that deliberation may often lead legislators to adopt statutes based
on rationales for which a fairly broad consensus exists. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE W. 1539, 1548-51 (1988). For those who believe that a majority
of legislators actually share certain purposes when enacting legislation, the argument that
legislatures should not be allowed to mislead the public has particular power-requiring an
explanation only requires legislators to divulge something that already exists (albeit not necessarily
in written form).
52 TRIBE, supra note 13, § 10-7, at 503 (emphasis added). Additionally, Tribe has
commented:
[Laws, unlike naked commands, must be understandable to those affected. A citizen whose
basic liberty is subject to control is always entitled to some answer (as a matter of minimum
rationality-substantive due process) when she asks why the control is being enforced at all,
just as she is entitled to be told (as a matter of procedural due process) why the control applies
to her.
Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 302 (1975)
(emphasis added); see also Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State,
133 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 571 (1985); Henry J. Friendly, Some rind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1267, 1292 (1975); Morgan, supra note 32, at 348 ("Requiring legislators to explain their
actions to affected individuals would also show greater respect for citizens as persons [-] [ilt is
not only frustrating but also dehumanizing to be subjected to legislative mandates which are
unstported by explanations."). The concern about treating people as ends in themselves, rather
than means, appears in Kant's writings. See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENrALPRNCnILES OF THE
MErAPHYsICs OF MoRAis § 245 (1785).
53 Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Questfor a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.
L. REv. 885, 928 (1981).
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including the provision of explanations, he notes:
[A] demand for [such] procedures might issue from a certain kind of ideal
conception of social relations and political arrangements, expressing revulsion
against the thought of life in a society that accepts it as normal for agents
representing the society to make and act upon decisions about other members
without full and frank interchange with those members, a kind of accountability to
them, even if not legal accountability.54
Similarly, Kadish and Kadish note:
[T]he principle that people must justify undertaking an action when others are
affected is based on a system of values and not on logical necessity[;] [i]t flows
from an underlying commitment that other people are entitled to be treated as
autonomous and free beings rather than as manipulable things--a commitment that
has informed ... the entire Western liberal tradition.55
Many have made similar arguments.5 6
54 Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in
NOMOS XVTI: DUE PROCESS 126, 128 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977).
55 MORTnVtnRR. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 12-13 (1973).
56 See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at 154 ("The litigants in legal cases, especially
losing ones, have an important stake in reasonedjustification. So also do the participants in other
branches of government and the community at large." (emphasis added)); John Ladd, The Place
of Practical Reason in Judicial Decision, in NOMOS VII: RAnIONAL DECISION 126, 144 (Carl J.
Friedrich ed., 1964); Hans A. Linde, Due Process in Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197,206 (1976)
("The sense of obligation to justify an exercise of power is essential in a democracy."); Frederick
Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 658 (1995) ("[G]iving reasons is still away of
showing respect for the subject.").
The view that respect for citizens imposes upon government in general, and legislatures in
particular, a duty to explain commands has a long history. Plato can be read to suggest such a point
in discussing the importance of preambles. See PLATO, THE LAWS 178-88 (Trevor J. Saunders
trans., 1970). On the surface, Plato argued that providing a justification for a command, such as
a statute, in addition to giving the command itself; increases obedience. In other words, a law that
sets forth its justification will be more effective. See id.; KADISH & KADISH, supra note 55, at 633,
658. However, the example he uses to illustrate the point suggests that dignity is also an important
aspect of government authorities providing justification. Plato contrasts the manner in which a
doctor provides treatment to a slave and a fee man. To the slave, a person who is presumably not
entitled to full dignity, see DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 14, 23 (1987), the doctor
obtains the required information, makes his diagnosis, and then without providing any explanation
of his reasons for the treatment, merely tells the slave patient the treatment he prescribes. In
ministering to the free person-a person who is entitled to full dignity-not only does the doctor
prescribe a treatment, but he discusses with the patient the reasons for the treatment. This
difference certainly suggests that the need to explain can be viewed as a dignitary issue as well as
one involving the efficiency of government. Ultimately, however, Plato leaves to the lawgiver the
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Indeed, in some situations, the respect due those affected by a decision may
provide a more cogent justification for a duty to explain than the concept of popular
sovereignty. Because courts, and to a lesser extent administrative agencies, are
subject to only indirect popular control, in those contexts a popular sovereignty
argument for a duty to explain seems somewhat strained. The argument for an
explanation based on respect, however, fully applies to courts and agencies,
regardless of the attenuated nature of popular control.57
Thus, even when decisionmakers do not derive their authority from the consent
of those over whom they have authority, some obligation to explain their decisions
remains. Accordingly, even in the parent-child, jailor-inmate, and occupying power-
occupied country situations discussed above, some normative obligation to explain
exists.
2. The Right Not to Be Misled
A second argument for the political significance of institutional explanations
of statutes can be made from the premise that government should not mislead the
governed, at least in a democracy.58 Even if governments must possess some
authority to keep limited secrets, their power to mislead the general public is surely
limited.59 An open refusal to divulge information is surely a less serious affront to
the public than the intentional provision of erroneous information.60
Lying shows an even greater disrespect for the status of citizens as sovereigns
than does refusing to supply an explanation at all. Moreover, governmental
deception can produce "falsified consent" 61 Democracy is legitimate only ifpeople
decision as to whether to provide an explanation, indicating that he has not accepted the dignitary
theory. See PLATO, supra, at 188.
57 Nevertheless, Professor Goldstein makes an argument for an obligation to explain based
on popular sovereignty even with respect to the Judiciary. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 18, at 6-7,
115-16.
58 See ALExANDERM. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURTAT
THE BAR OF POLrmcs 95 (2d ed. 1986); Douglas, supra note 18, at 754.
59 Obviously government agents may lie to individuals in conducting undercover criminal
operations, but such reasons for lying rarely apply to general statements to the general public. See
LYING, supra note 10, at 186-87 (even undercover techniques should be openly debated and
decided upon in advance).
See generally id. at 174-91 ("[O]nly those deceptive practices which can be openly debated
and consented to in advance are justifiable in a democracy." (emphasis omitted)); DENNIS F.
THOMPSON, POLunCALETI-ics ANDPuaucOFFICE 11-33,38-39 (1987); Bernard W. Bell, Secrets
and Lies: News Media and Law Enforcement Use ofDeception As an Investigative Tool, 60 U.
PrIT. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 1999).
60 See LYING, supra note 10, at 186-88; SECRETS, supra note 10, at xv, 27.
61 See Burt v. Blumenauer, 699 P.2d 168, 175 (Or. 1985) ("[Tlhe legitimacy of[a] chosen
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vote or otherwise consent based on their true preferences, rather than those
manufactured by government manipulation of information. Of course, citizens
themselves do not vote on proposals and exercise only indirect control over
government-they vote on representatives only periodically. Thus, citizens, in their
capacity as sovereigns, do not ordinarily directly rely on rationales provided by
government. However, citizens are expected to influence legislatures between
elections by communicating with government officials.62 If citizens do not know
the reasons for governmental actions, they cannot effectively lobby government.
Moreover, the true explanations of legislative decisions may affect people's
attitudes toward the structure of the governmental process in general. For instance,
the populace's perception of the reasons that generally motivate a majority of
legislators to act might shape their attitudes with respect to the desirability of
altering the campaign finance system or the rules governing lobbying. In short,
where a government has reasons for taking certain actions, that government has an
obligation to avoid misleading the public by misstating the rationale for its action.
Accordingly, the courts should not condone a legislative practice of acting for
one reason, but publicly proclaiming another.63 Thus, when private reasons differ
from public ones, the public reasons should receive more respect precisely because
they are public. Proclaiming reasons is a public act that has significance beyond
what it reveals about the secret motivations of legislators. We should not condone
legislative deceit. Thus, if government offers official justifications that vary from
the real reasons for government action, the official statements should be privileged
over the actual purposes because they have a better democratic pedigree.
Thus, if a legislature really enacts a statute to protect a particular industry, but
publicly presents it as a consumer-protection statute, such deception should not be
honored in the course of interpreting the statute.64 If courts are to effectuate any
policy rests on the consent, if not the consensus, of the governed, excessive or questionable efforts
by government to manufacture consent of the governed call the legitimacy of its action into
question."); YUDOF, supra note 19, at 15, 145, 152-57; LYING, supra note 10, at 179, 182 (stating
that lying allows "power bypassing the consent of the governed" and gives government leaders
"free reign to manipulate and distort the facts and thus escape accountability to the public").
62 The contemporary understanding is that this is the essence of the right to petition the
government See U.S. CONST. amend. 1. But see Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The
History and Significance ofthe Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153 (1998) (describing
petitioning as a specialized form of seeking sovereign action that should be distinguished from
contemporary communications between representatives and voters).
63 Similarly, a government should not claim it is acting on a coherent rationale for its action
when there is none. If a decision merely results from the accidental confluence of completely
independent and possibly conflicting desires (as public choice theory suggests most legislative
decisions are), proclaiming a coherent rationale is misleading.
64 Some argue that such deceit occurs frequently. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING
THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 44, 51-52
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purposes, they should effectuate the publicly-offered purposes, not the private ones,
even if the private rationale served as more of a motivating factor for legislators. For
example, to take a slightly modified version of the facts underlying a noted case,65
suppose a legislature enacts a statute prohibiting optometrists from conducting eye
examinations. The legislature may publicly justify the statute, in the legislative
history, as a public health measure, even if most legislators really wished to shield
ophthalmologists from competition. Disregarding the publicly-stated purpose and
acting on the basis of the secret reasons motivating the legislature furthers this
legislative deceit. The court would not condone such deceit if, instead, it acted on
the basis of the publicly-stated justification. Thus, in interpreting that statute, a court
should accord more weight to the public health justification, than to the secret
economic justification.66
This contrasts with the approach Professor (now Judge) Easterbrook
recommends. Easterbrook argues that the statutory text more likely captures the
essence of the actual secret deal between various groups interested in a piece of
legislation. Any public explanation merely provides a facade. Courts should honor
the text because the actual secret intentions of the parties to the legislation deserves
more respect than their publicly-expressed intentions.67 Thus, in the example above,
the text of the statute more likely reflects the actual legislative agreement, and thus
the text, and not the publicly-stated consumer protection purpose, deserves the focus
ofjudicial attention. If an ambiguity arises, the interpretation of the statute should
not turn on the consumer protection rationale. Easterbrook's approach should be
rejected because even if institutional explanations are a form of deceit,
Easterbrook's approach condones that deceit.68 While less true to legislators' actual
(1992); SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 243-44; Jonathan R. Macey, PromotingPublic-Regarding
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223,
232 (1986).
65 See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
66 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRiCKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITCAL
INTRODUCrON 82 (1991).
67 Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV.
4, 14-18 (1984).
68 Indeed, one note writer's argument highlights the difference in views based on a concern
about deceit. The note writer, who advocates ignoring legislative history, argues that Congress
should not have the burden of disavowing legislative history. See Note, Why Learned Hand Would
Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1023 (1992) [hereinafter Why
Learned Hand]. The note writer argues:
Because it is possible to put statements in these records without winning majority support,
Congress must statutorily negate statements in the legislative histories to ensure that those
sentiments do not help mold the development of the law. Removing the burden from
Congress of effectively having to "veto" legislative history fully respects the time constraints
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intent, interpretation that exalts public rationales would avoid condoning deceit.69
(Similar problems, in which the focus on descriptive accuracy may lead to
normative concerns of condoning the undesirable, arise in tort law.)70
In short, the official explanation of legislative action should have a legal
significance of its own, apart from being mere evidence of intent. Whether or not
the public explanation is congruent with the legislators' private motivations, that
official statement itself is entitled to respect and can provide a basis for adjudicating
difficult questions of interpretation.
B. Governmental Recognition of an Obligation to Explain
Government entities generally act as if they have an obligation to explain their
that limit Congress's ability to generate statutory directives.
Id The author's view reflects his lack of concern about the discrepancy between the public
explanation of statutes, and the statutes themselves. Valuing public justification requires exactly
the opposite approach: Congress should have the burden of negating statements in legislative
documents, and such endeavors are a valuable use of time.
69 Public choice theorists may argue that the above argument assumes that statutes have
purposes. They view such an assumption as fatal because public choice theory asserts that group
decisions lack coherent purposes. My "duty of candor" argument does not assume that public
purposes exist. Public pronouncement of purposes justifying legislation that lacks coherent
purposes (but rather merely reflects the coincidental confluence of the interests of independent
groups), is also misleading. The argument that misleading the public is wrong applies when there
are reasons for actions as well as when there are no reasons for actions.
70 Calculations of life expectancy of African-American plaintiffs provide one example. Such
calculations can be based on race-based tables showing a shorter life expectancy for African-
Americans relative to Caucasians. Such a calculation may be more accurate, but results in different
damage awards for otherwise similar persons based solely on race. Use of general life expectancy
tables would be less accurate, but would not condone treating people differently on the basis of
race (and would not accept shorter life expectancies that are likely tied to racial discrimination).
See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use ofRace-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data
in Tort Litigation: A ConstitutionalArgument, 63 FORDHAML. REV. 73, 81-83, 95-97, 111-16
(1994). For a recent study linking the quality of medical care to race, see Kevin A. Schulman et
al., The Effect of Race and Sex on Physician's Recommendation for Cardiac Catherization, 340
N.E. I OF MED. 8 (1999). See generally Nightline:Amerim in Black and White-Health Car4 The
Great Divide (ABC television broadcast Feb. 24, 1999), available in 1999 WL 6416286. The
same issue arises with regard to whether certain false statements should be treated as actionable
defamation. If a person falsely asserts that someone is African-American or gay, should the subject
of the statement receive damages? Providing damages may compensate the subject of the
statement for real harm to the subject's reputation among her peers, but condones racist or anti-gay
attitudes of the "victim" and her peers. See Lyrissa Bamett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and
the Myth of Community, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1, 24-25, 26, 29, 33-35, 37, 39, 48 (1996). See
generally Note, The Community Segment in Defamation Actions: A Dissenting Essay, 58 YALE
L.J. 1387 (1949).
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actions. Congress has explicitly imposed such an obligation on agencies. Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, agencies, when promulgating regulations, must
provide "a concise general statement" of the "basis and purpose" of the regulation.71
Congress, likewise, often provides explanations of statutes in legislative history72
and in formal preambles. Moreover, Congress appears to recognize that some
legislative documents, such as committee reports, provide to the public Congress's
justification for the statutes it enacts.73 The judiciary clearly views itself as having
an obligation to justify final judgments and significant subsidiary rulings.74 Indeed,
71 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c) (1994); see also id. § 555(e) (decision in agency adjudication denying
relief must be accompanied by "a brief statement of the grounds for denial"). Admittedly, the
requirement is not solely based on a desire to show respect for citizens. Legislators have many
other reasons to require agencies to explain their actions. See Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy, Inc. v.
Oregon Liquor Control Comn'n, 517 P.2d 289,293-94 (Or. Ct. App. 1973).
72 Schauer asserts that legislative drafters "typically" give no reasons. See Schauer, supra
note 56, at 636-37; see also MARKV. TUsHNEr, RED, WHrrEAND BLUE: A CRmnCALANALYsIS
OF CONSTTIONAL LAw 210 (1988) (referring only to state and local legislative bodies). Yet
Schauer's assertion seems erroneous because with respect to federal legislation, Congress provides
a great deal of explanatory material.
73 Judge Wald argues that legislative history "is not gossip from the back corridors[;] it is the
materials in which Congress institutionally explains to its members, to the public, and to judges what
it thinks it is doing."Interbranch Relations: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on the Organization
of Congress, 103d Cong. 81 (1993) [hereinafter Interbranch Relations] (testimony of the
Honorable Patricia M. Wald). I will argue below that the courts increasingly view as legislative
history those materials that cannot properly be considered "institutional" explanations. See infra
note 263 and accompanying text.
At least Congress recognizes such use of legislative history and has taken no steps to
discourage it (such as declaring legislative history an inappropriate basis for construction of
statutes). See EDWARD F. WiLET, JR., How OUR LAWS ARE MADE 15 (1990) ("Committee
reports are perhaps the most valuable single element of the legislative history of the law. They are
used by courts, executive departments and agencies, and the public generally, as a source of
information regarding the purpose and meaning of the law."); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 871-72 (1992).
74 For instance, most lawyers and scholars agree that courts must explain their decisions. See
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 n.4 (1952); CAss R. SUNSTIN, LEGALREAsONING AND
POLmcAL CONFLICr 51 (1996); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the
Interpretation ofFederal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARYL. REV. 827,839 (1991); Wiliam T. Mayton,
Law Among the Pleonasms: The Futility andAconstitutionality ofLegislative History in Statutory
Interpretation, 41 EMORY L.J. 113, 139 (1992); Robert B. Seidman, Justifiing Legislation: A
Pragmatic Institutionalist Approach to the Memorandum of Law, Legislative Theory, and
Practical Reason, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 7 n.15 (1992). The need of the deciding court to
provide a basis for further review, see Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S 339,345 (1981), does not fully
explain this obligation because even courts of last resort have such an obligation. Indeed, ipse dixit,
ajudicial statement that lacks reasoning to support its conclusion, is disfavored. See Michael Dorf
Dicta andArticle 1ff, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997,2022 (1994). Nevertheless, there is no judicially
enforceable constitutional requirement that courts explain their decisions. See Harris, 454 U.S. at
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judicial explanations of rulings possess legal significance-courts will ordinarily
adhere to the crucial reasoning set forth in the decision, as well as the decision itself,
in future cases.75
Of course, some federal government institutions do not provide explanations,
at least with respect to some of their actions. Such failures to explain do not
undermine the proposition that federal government institutions, in general, and
Congress in particular, explain their actions. The situations in which government
institutions do not explain their decisions differ significantly from the act of passing
legislation or promulgating rules of significance that govem future conduct.
Frederick Schauer has noted several instances in which government decisionmakers
do not offer any justification for their actions (yet are generally considered to be
acting properly).76 I will discuss the two examples Schauer provides that might
appear to be the most troubling-the practice ofjuries not offering reasons for their
verdicts, and the Supreme Court's practice of denying petitions for certiorari
without explanation.
The practice ofjuries rendering verdicts without explanation may be attributed
to our view that jury verdicts neither control a wide range of cases nor set forth
binding standards of behavior. Ajury verdict does not have a formal legally-binding
effect on subsequent decisionmakers, except with respect to the same controversy. 77
344 & n. 11; Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458,467 (1981) (administrative
agencies); id. at 472 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Morgan, supra note 32, at 322-24, 333-38
(administrative agencies).
7 5 Notwithstanding the lack of a formal reason-giving requirement, the "reasons statements"
provided by courts, i.e., opinions, are not only considered part of the judicial decision, but are also
considered a part of the law. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial
Interpretations ofStatutes, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 105 (1994); Dorf, supra note 74, at 2035-37 &
nn.142-45 (stating "courts do not accept the facts-plus-outcome view of holdings," but also
acknowledging contrary views); Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?,
66 CFH.-KENT L. REV. 441,443 (1990); Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative
Power: The Case for a Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1, 25-28 (1988);
Victoria R Nourse, Making Constitutional Doctrine in aRealistAge, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1401,
1435-47 (1997) (suggesting the legal community currently overemphasizes "reasons statements"
in derogation of the decisions themselves). For informative discussions of the legal effect and the
importance ofjudicial opinions as statements of reasons, see Dorf, supra note 74, at 2022-24,
2029-30; Schauer, supra note 56, at 633.
76 See Schauer, supra note 56, at 634; see also SUNSTE]N, supra note 74, at 136.
77 In addition, jury decisions are not viewed as creating law. Rather, juries find facts, or, at
most, apply the law to the facts of a particular case. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486
(1935); Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REV.
1867, 1867 &n.1 (1966). Of course, juries do make some findings of mixed law and fact, such as
whether an alleged tortfeasor's act departs from the standard of care. See KEETON Er AL., supra
note 22, § 37, at 235-38. The practice ofhaving jurors render verdicts without explanation can also
be explained by the burden a reason-giving requirement would impose upon the laypeople that
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Thus, the failure to provide explanations ofjury verdicts does not undermine the
citizenry's ability to control government in the way that failing to justify generally-
applicable statutes does.
The denial of certiorari can be viewed as a decision because the Court leaves
in place the lower court's judgment. However, it is really a refusal to exercise
authority to decide a case.78 In addition, a denial of certiorari has no binding legal
effect (and thus it too does not undermine citizen control of government).79
C. The Nature of the Duty to Explain
The legislative duty to explain, which I posit, finds support in several
constitutional principles. The proposition that legislatures must justify their actions
follows, as a corollary, from the constitutional principle that the people are
sovereign and the government is their agent 80 The proposition may also be implicit
in the Equal Protection Clause.81 Arguably, the Clause requires all government
entities to justify the distinctions they make between citizens. Indeed, some have
argued that the courts should enforce such a principle by requiring explicit
justification of statutory classifications.82 The Due Process Clause, too, may well
provide a basis for an explanation requirement, as one of the procedural protections
implicit in due process.83 However, to date courts have rejected such an argument
in both the legislative84 and the judicial context.85 The right to petition government
comprise juries.
78 See ROBERTL. STERN ETAL., SUPREME COURTPRACICE § 5.7, at 239 (7th ed. 1993).
79 See id.; see, e.g., United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482,490 (1923). Many of Schauer's
other examples of decisions for which governmental decisionmakers need not offer reasons, see
Schauer, supra note 56, at 634, can be explained by the limited significance of the decisions.
Routine evidentiary rulings, which trial judges often do not explain, generally do not resolve cases
(much less impose general obligations on the populace). Other situations, such as summary
appellate orders, may involve significant decisions, but essentially incorporate reasons given
elsewhere, as when an appellate court summarily affirms a lower court decision for the reasons
given by a lower court.
80 See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
81 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
82 See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
83 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 587-92 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Morgan, supra note 32, at 344-53; supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
84 See United States 1.R. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980); In re Baldwin, 70 BR. 612,
615 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI.
LEGALF. 179, 193. Indeed, in reviewing the constitutionality of legislation under the rational basis
test, the Court disregards the importance of the legislative explication of a statutory rationale. The
Court will uphold a statute on the basis of hypothetical reasoning not relied upon by the legislature
or evident in the legislative history. See TRIBE, supra note 13, § 8-7, at 582; Gerald Gunther,
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may support such a requirement-as suggested earlier, citizens may find it difficult
to petition effectively if they lack the right to demand an explanation of a statute's
justification.86 The First Amendment also supports a requirement of explanation,
if one takes a structural view of the provision;87 however, such a conclusion would
Foreword: In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a Changing Court, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,21,33,47
(1972). However, the Court sometimes conducts more stringent review. See TRIBE, supra note 13,
§§ 17-2, 17-3, at 1681, 1684; Gunther, supra, at33.
85 There is no judicially enforceable constitutional requirement that courts explain their
decisions. See Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 472 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339,344 & n.11 (1981); Morgan, supra note 32, at 333-38.
Nor, for that matter, does the Due Process Clause require administrative agencies to explain their
decisions. See Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 467 (Brennan, J., concurring); Morgan, supra note 32, at
322-24.
86 The Journal Clause ofthe Constitution, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5, ci. 3, requiring that "[e]ach
House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same," may
support a duty to explain, or at least may give legislative history constitutional stature. See Murial
Morrisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 585, 588
n.14, 598 (1994) ("The Constitution requires the development and publication of congressional
proceedings; it is, therefore, difficult to justify prohibiting judicial use of legislative history, which
has become the contemporary manifestation of constitutional publication mandates."); 1 FRANCIS
NEWrON THORPE, THE CONSTTIIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1765-1788, at 501 (De
Capo Press 1970) (1901).
This argument suffers from three problems. First, the Journal requirement may have been
devised merely to help ensure the accountability of individual legislators, not Congress as an
institution. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 840, 841, at 610-11 (William S. Hein & Co., 5th ed. 1994) (1833) (' The object ofthe whole
clause is to insure publicity to the proceedings of the legislature, and a correspondent responsibility
of the members to their respective constituents). The Constitution's enumeration of the matters
that must appear in the Journal, the "ayes and nays" on regular bills, see art. I, § 5, cl. 3, and veto
overrides, and presidential veto messages, see art. I, § 7, cl. 2, suggests that the focus of the Clause
is on the accountability of individual elected official for their votes. If the Journal Clause is focused
on the responsibility of individual legislators, the Clause could not easily be read to require
Congress to generate an institutional justification for the statute. Second, the early Congressional
journals did not provide much of an explanation, only a record of proposals and the votes on those
proposals. A review of the Senate and House Journal for the First Congress shows the sketchy
nature of the information recorded in the journals. See 1, 3 Documentary History of the First
Federal Congress ofthe United States of-America (Linda Grant DePauw ed., 1972) (reprinting the
Senate journals from March 1789 through March 1791 and the Journal of the House of
Representatives from March 1789 through March 1791). Indeed, proceedings in the Senate were
initially secret. See Gerald L. Grotta, Philip Freneau's Crusade for Open Sessions of the U.S.
Senate, 48 JOURNALISMQ. 667 (1971). Third, for most ofthe nation's first one-hundred years, the
Court considered the use of legislative history illegitimate to interpret statutes. See Hans W. Baade,
"Original Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1001, 1025-
33, 1064-68, 1079-84 (1991).
87 See supra notes 32-45.
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seem to conflict with the Supreme Court's view of the First Amendment's scope.88
In any event, the duty I posit need not be viewed as an explicit constitutional
mandate. Indeed, the duty should operate differently from constitutional rules.
Rather than authorizing invalidation of statutes, it should operate as an
underenforced constitutional norn 89-the duty I posit forms a basis for interpreting
statutes.
Courts refuse to directly enforce some constitutional principles because of
institutional competence concerns, but may encourage observance of those
constitutional principles by the manner in which they interpret statutes. For instance,
the Court encourages sensitivity to the potential unfairness of retroactive lawmaking
by employing certain clear statement rules in interpreting statutes.90 Thus, while
Congress possesses broad power to enact retroactive legislation, the Court will not
construe a statute to operate retroactively unless Congress clearly so states its
intent.91 Indeed, courts sometimes leave unenforced explicit constitutional
88 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1978) (plurality and Stewart, .,
concurring); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,834-35 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post
Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849-50 (1974). The Court's rejection of a right to access in Houchins and
Saxbe presumably precludes the Court from finding that the First Amendment requires the
government to explain its actions. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
89 The concept of "underenforced constitutional norms" was popularized by Professor
Lawrence Sager. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1978). The concept is now widely
discussed. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 286-87
(1994); SuNsTEiN, supra note 74, at 107; TRIBE, supra note 13, § 17-1, at 1674; William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 57, 62-67 (1997).
90 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 89; see also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 70
n.22 (discussing underenforced.constitutional norms). Several clear statement canons further
federalism concerns. See Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96,96
(1989) (holding that a federal statute will not be construed to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court, unless the statute clearly provides for such
abrogation); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,242 (1985) (same); Board of Educ.
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 190 n.11 (1982) ("Congress, when exercising its spending power, can
impose no burden upon the states unless it does so unambiguously."); Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (holding federal statutes will not be construed as
imposing a condition on a grant of federal money to the states, unless Congress clearly states in
the statute that it is imposing a condition on the grant).
In Law and Public Choice, Farber and Frickey note that underenforced constitutional norms
"may well be binding upon legislators, administrators, and judges but because of institutional
differences has far more practical relevance outside the judiciary." FARBER& FRICKEY, supra note
66, at 70 n.22.
91 See Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,285-86 (1994) (finding "no clear
evidence of congressional intent that section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should apply
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provisions, like the Republican Form of Government Clause, because of
institutional competence concerns.92 Yet, judicial nonenforcement does not absolve
Congress from its duty to comply with the Republican Form of Government Clause
or other unenforced constitutional provisions.
Two institutional competence concerns counsel against establishing a
judicially-enforced reason-giving requirement.93 First, requiring legislators to state
their reasons for enacting statutes may lead to intrusive judicial review of the quality
of those reasons. Indeed, precisely such intrusive review developed after Congress
required agencies to provide "a concise general statement" of the "basis and
purpose" of each regulation promulgated.94 Enforcement of this Administrative
Procedures Act reason-giving requirement for informal rulemaking has led to
rigorous review of the substance of agency decisions and imposed a means-ends
to cases arising before its enactmene'); DANIELE. TROY, RErRoACrIvELEGIsLATIoN 27-28,
32-33,40-43 (1998).
92 The Constitution requires that Congress guarantee each state a "republican form of
government," but the judiciary invokes the "political question" doctrine to dismiss, without
consideration, claims that Congress has breached that duty. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912); see also Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42-45 (1849).
Thus, for institutional reasons, namely the judiciary's inability to address particular types of issues,
courts do not enforce some constitutional obligations. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 107, 151;
TRIBE, supra note 13, § 3-13, at 99, 101.
Indeed, most legal obligations established by constitutional or other rules of legislative
procedure are notjudicially enforced. Courts often cite the Rules Provision of the Constitution in
support of their refusal to review such alleged violations of the procedural rules governing the
legislative process. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings... ."); see, e.g., United States v. Durenberger, 48 F.3d 1239, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539,549 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F2d 1166,1173
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in
Interpretive Theory (unpublished manuscript on file with author). Nevertheless, the courts' refusal
to entertain procedural challenges to legislative proceedings does not absolve Congress from its
political (rather than legal) obligation to comply with the procedural requirements imposed by the
Constitution, statutes, and congressional rules.
For an argument that even textually-documented constitutional obligations relating to
separation of powers or federalism should not be judicially enforced, see JESSE H. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REvIq AND THE NAnONAL POLMCAL PROCESS (1980). Also, for an argument that
courts must sometimes take this approach to protect their own integrity as principled adjudicators,
see BICKEL, supra note 58.
93 Moreover, a constitutional argument for an explicit requirement would be vulnerable to
the claim that it requires judicial creation of rights that are not anchored in the text of the
Constitution. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971); William Rehnquist, The Notion ofa Livng Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV.
693,698 (1976).
94 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994).
1999]
OHIO STATELAWJOURNAL
reasoning approach on agencies 5 Second, the judiciary can add little to the political
process (which itself leads legislators to proclaim reasons for enacting statutes).
Thus, John Hart Ely agrees that legislatures should publicly justify to citizens the
legislation they enact, thereby fostering the democratic process. He rejects the
argument that courts should establish and enforce a reason-giving requirement
because the judiciary will probably not improve upon the pressures the normal
political process places upon legislators to provide explanations. 96 However, these
institutional competence concerns about judicial enforcement of a reasons-giving
requirement do not mean that Congress has any less of a duty to justify statutes.97
Thus, the duty to explain statutes would be used solely for purposes of statutory
interpretation. Some theorists have argued that legislatures should be required to
provide justifications for statutes and legislate consistently with such justifications,
on pain of having all or part of the statute judicially-invalidated. Gerald Gunther and
Susan Rose-Ackerman have advanced such theories. Gunther bases his argument
on the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. He argues that courts should uphold
statutory classifications against equal protection challenges only upon the reasons
explicitly stated by an authoritative governmental institution or official (such as a
95 See JERRY A. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM 457,480, 717 (3d ed. 1992); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial
Deference to Agency Interpretations ofAgency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 662-63 (1996);
Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation andLegal Culture: The Case ofMotor Vehicle
Safety, 4 YALEJ. ONREG. 257,262-63,289-90,293-94,308-09 (1987); Shapiro, supra note 84,
at 184-89; Paul R. Verkuil, Crosscurrents in Anglo-American Administrative Law, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 685,705 (1986).
96 See JOHNHARTELY, DEMOCRACYANDDTRUST 125-31 (1980); see also Linde, supra
note 56, at 230-32 (stating that a requirement of articulation of reasons will lead to hypocrisy and
reasons invented solely to satisfy courts). Mark V. Tushnet believes that an articulated reasons
requirement is unworkable because frequently legislators enact statutes solely to facilitate their re-
election to the same office or election to a higher one. See TLSHNET, supra note 72, at 210.
97 'Me approach to statutory interpretation argued here is strikingly similar to Peter Tiersma's
description of some courts' approach to interpreting a principal's silence when advised of actions
an agent took in his name. See Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1,
41-42 (1995). Tiersma says:
[IThere are some cases in which courts identify a "duty to speak" but without creating or
enforcing an obligation, as evidenced by the fact that a "breach" of this duty does not directly
entitle the plaintiff to recover damages. Rather, the "duty to speak" is crucial here primarily
because the behavioral norm is used to interpret the silence of the person in question. In other
words, violating such a norm does not directly lead to legal sanctions, but the courts




statement of the legislature in enacting the statute).98 Gunther argues that making
every statute's constitutionality depend upon the reasons given for its enactment
will improve the legislative process by ensuring that legislators consider the burdens
or costs of their actions. 99
Rose-Ackerman argues that courts should ensure that statutes correspond with
their stated purposes.'00 In particular, she argues that courts should insist upon two
types of consistency in legislation. First, if legislatures produce statements of
purpose, courts should insist that the provisions of the statutes be consistent with
those publicly-stated purposes. If they are not, the court should invalidate any
provision of the statute that conflicts with the statutory statement ofpurpose.' 0 ' This
proposal for what Rose-Ackerman calls "internal consistency" is designed to
encourage more informed debates about policy trade-offs and publicize legislative
efforts to further the interests of narrow interest groups. 102 She also suggests a
second form of consistency, "budgetary consistency," whereby courts would
address the conflict between statements of purpose and budgetary appropriations. 0 3
Thus, if Congress passed a statute requiring the government to remove all lead-
based paint from public housing projects by January 1, 2002, and appropriated
insufficient funds to satisfy such a goal, a court would invalidate the statute.104 Such
invalidations, or the prospect thereof, will encourage legislative candor so that
beneficiaries and taxpayers "know what has been agreed upon by the legislature."
In addition, such an approach will encourage deliberation by forcing legislators to
98 See Gunther, supra note 84, at 21,28,32, 44-46. Justice Brennan perhaps embraced such
an approach in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981), and United
States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fitz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). See TUsHNEr, supra note 72, at 210 &
n.56. Hans Linde has argued that this is merely another form of judicial imposition of value
judgments upon the political system that are not based in the text of the Constitution. See Linde,
supra note 56, at 252-53. But see FARBER& FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 123.
99 See Gunther, supra note 84, at 44-47. However, under Gunther's approach, the statute's
rationale need not be set forth by the legislature; the executive branch can explain the statute's
purpose. See id at 47.
100 See RosE-ACKMAN, supra note 64, at 43-79; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law
and Economics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 352 (1988). Rose-
Ackerman's approach does not appear to be Constitution-based.
101 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 64, at 44-62; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 100, at
352.
102 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 64, at 46 (arguing that her approach will "assure
that information about legislative bargains is more widely available to the electorate"); Rose-
Ackerman, supra note 100, at 352.
103 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 64, at 63-79; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 100, at
353.
104 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 64, at 70; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 100, at 353.
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confront the fiscal consequences of their actions.' 05 In short, "[e]ach consistency
test attempts to increase the accountability of the legislature to the voting public and
to improve deliberation within Congress."'106
Unlike the Gunther and Rose-Ackerman approaches, the duty to explain would
not provide a basis for invalidating statutes. 107 It would merely serve as a basis for
ascribing legal significance to any explanation offered. 108
Reliance on a duty to explain accords proper respect to congressional
judgments. Courts have traditionally shown respect for legislative judgments
regarding substantive issues, by according deference to those judgments. Legislative
judgments regarding legislative procedures are also entitled to similar respect.10 9
Thus, courts should adopt only hesitantly interpretive methods that exhibit
disapproval of Congress's mode of legislating.110 The new textualist approach
105 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 64, at 70, 72-74 ("My focus is then on whether
representatives have misrepresented to voters the policy commitments implied by [certain]
statutes.'); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 100, at 353.
106 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 100, at 354.
107 By requiring judicial invalidation of statutes, the Gunther and Rose-Ackerman theories
create problems. Given the seriousness of the judicial invalidation of statutes, their theories will
presumably take effect only when the substantive provisions of statutes and their stated effects
wildly diverge. See Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law,
96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1324-25 (1998). Thus, in many cases, the Gunther and Rose-Ackerman
approaches may have little direct effect-except perhaps to lead to more honest preambles. The
approach I suggest will assume relevance in a broader range of cases. Whenever questions about
the reach of a statute arise, the publicly-presented rationales will influence the statute's
construction more than the secret rationale of the statute.
Moreover, the Rose-Ackerman budgetary consistency principle threatens to frustrate
majorities who support the broad purposes set forth in the statute by allowing legislative minorities
to repeal (or significantly revise) statutes by obstructing efforts to fund the program. Thus, those
who oppose the purposes enunciated in the statute can secure its repeal without having to
overcome the obstacles that those wishing to repeal statutes must ordinarily confront
108 Jonathan Macey makes a purely instrumental argument for privileging publicly-stated
explanations of statutes-privileging such statements will most often lead to interpretations that
favor the interest of the whole public rather than narrow interest groups. See Macey, supra note
64; see also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 82 (endorsing Macey approach). Macey accepts
public choice theory and recommends privileging publicly-stated explanations to discourage
narrow self-interested legislation. Macey never suggests that public explanations have any greater
intrinsic worth than private ones. Unlike Macey, I argue that public explanations have a better
democratic pedigree than undisclosed motivations-thus my argument is not an instrumental one.
(For a discussion of the relative merits of instrumentalist and essentialist theories of statutory
interpretation, see Bemard W. Bell, Metademocratic Theory and Separation ofPowers, 2 N.Y.U.
J. LEG. & PuB. POL'Y 1, 3-20 (1998)).
109 See Bell, supra note 108, at 29-33.
110 See Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use ofLegislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term ofthe United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277,306-07
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shows disrespect for congressional judgments regarding the legislative process. 111
For instance, new textualists dismiss the use of committee reports because of the
level of staff irivolvement in the preparation of those reports, even though Congress
has clearly made a judgment that staff involvement does not undermine the
usefulness of committee reports.' 12
At the same time, legislative judgment regarding the legislative process and the
significance of various documents does not, by itself, provide a sufficient basis for
interpretive theory. 113 First, legislators' beliefs or preferences regarding interpretive
methodology cannot be reliably discerned. Indeed, members of Congress may not
have given great thought to the subject. Thus, reliance on perceived congressional
desires or preferences regarding interpretive methodology will inevitably result
either in courts adopting the interpretive methodology they think best (because
reasonable legislators would presumably prefer the best interpretive methodology)
or continuing to apply current judicial practices (because Congress has arguably
acquiesced to those practices). Second, the judiciary has some legitimate interest in
interpretive methodology. Purporting to base decisions about interpretive
methodology solely on legislative practice or preferences does not acknowledge this
judicial interest.
The duty to explain that I propose avoids both of these extremes--the duty is
consistent with legislative practice but is not based solely on intuiting legislators'
view of appropriate legislative process or proper interpretive method. Certainly
Congress has not disavowed any obligation to explain statutes (and generally has
acted somewhat consistently with such an obligation). 114 Thus, adopting this
principle certainly shows no disrespect for legislative judgment On the other hand,
the arguments set forth above show that the obligation to explain rests on more than
mere acceptance of Congress's view of appropriate interpretive theory.
D. Objections
At least three objections can be raised to my claim that courts should view
(1990); Bell, supra note 92.
111 See Wald, supra note 110, at 306-07; Bell, supra note 92.
112 See Wald, supra note 110, at 306-07.
113 See Bell, supra note 108, at 34-36.
114 In 1976, the House and the Senate changed their rules so that congressional committee
proceedings would be open, asserting the belief that citizens were not merely entitled to knowledge
of statutory enactments, but also to the reasons for those statutory enactments. See S. REP. No. 94-
354, at 5-6, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 49, at 200-01. Congress is aware of, and has
allowed to progress unchecked, reliance by courts and the public on legislative history, and
particularly committee reports, as authoritative explanations of statutes. See infra note 327 and
accompanying text.
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legislatures as having a duty to explain statutes and interpret statutes in light of that
duty. First, imposing such a duty on legislatures equates the legislature with the
judiciary, that is, it suggests that legislatures should operate like courts. Because
legislatures and courts serve different functions, imposing a court-type duty of
explanation upon legislatures is arguably inappropriate. Second, legislatures can
provide no explanations for statutes because institutional reasons for statutes almost
never exist, i.e., group choice will often lack a coherent rationale. Third, even if
legislatures have an obligation to explain statutes, such explanations should be set
forth in the statute, not in other documents. Otherwise, legislatures can encroach
upon the judicial power. I will address each of these three objections in turn.
1. Turning Legislatures Into Courts
First, courts and legislatures arguably should make decisions on different
bases-courts should act on principle and legislatures should act on preferences or
expediency. 115 Reason-giving serves to constrain the judicial decisionmaking
process so that judges' own individual policy preferences do not dominate their
decisionmaldng.116 Legislatures, which should act on the basis of preferences need
no such constraint.1 17 Indeed, if legislatures act on preferences, they may be unable
to satisfy any duty to explain.118 As Mark Tushnet observes, reason-giving
requirements seek to transform "legislators who are assumed in general to be
115 See BICKEL, supra note 58, at 95 ('The system... encourages each institution in acting
as it does-on principle in one institution, often on interest and expediency in [ ]others... ."); see
also Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1979).
116 Judges should not base their decisions on their individual predilections, and must base
their decisions on principle rather than expediency. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that judicial branch can only exercise'judgment,"
not "will"); BICKEL, supra note 58, at 24-28, 68-69, 95; SUNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 59, 82;
GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at 153-54. Indeed, a central feature of judging, captured by the
concept of judicial restraint, is that judges make decisions largely based on the preferences of
others, embodied in precedents, constitutions, or statutes, and attempt to avoid making decisions
based on their own preferences. See Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of
Retrospective Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REv. 941,979 (1995); Correia, supra note 6, at 1132-
33; J. Harvey Wilkinson, The Role ofReason in the Rule ofLaw, 56 U. CIII. L. REV. 779, 792-809
(1989); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 593, 597 (1995) (describing the conventional conception of
judicial restraint and suggesting its fancifulness). Reason-giving effectuates such a constraint See
Doff, supra note 74, at 2029, 2040 ("As we have seen, judicial accountability and legitimacy
derive from judicial rationality, which in turn will be found in the rationales offered by courts to
justify their decisions."). See generally Schauer, supra note 56, at 651-59.
117 Unlike courts, legislatures may make decisions that need not be fully consistent with each
other. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 64, at 47-49.
118 See TUSHNET, supra note 72, at 213.
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creatures of will" into beings of reason.1 19 Such a concern may be dismissed. We
require an element of reasoned decisionmaking even in the legislative process.120
Legislation is legitimate only if it has some principled rationale.121
Judicial decisions construing the Constitution require that statutes reflect the
judgment of the legislature, not merely the legislature's unreasoned will or
preferences. Statutes must have some rational design. Thus, the Supreme Court has
held that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution requires that every statute have
a "rational basis," i.e., some rational relationship to a public purpose.122 The Court
has explained that legislation must be an "exercise ofjudgment," not "a display of
arbitrary power."' 23 Indeed, the Court has, on occasion, invalidated statutes under
this "rational basis" test.124
119 Id. at 213. Linde describes the legislative process that would exist if legislatures took
seriously a requirement that they act in accordance with 'means-ends" rationality, and argues that
such an altered legislative process is undesirable and not required by the Due Process Clause. See
Linde, supra note 56, at 222-24,226-28.
120 See GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at 153-54; Owen Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofJustice,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1979).
121 Indeed, this concept that statutes should reflect some coherent principle, rather than an
arbitrary deal worked out by legislators, is a major tenet of civic republicanism. See Richard H.
Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value
Pluralism, andDemocratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2193 (1990); Sunstein, supra note
51, at 1544. The view that legislation must reflect a coherent principle need not rely on civic
republicanism. Farber and Frickey agree that legislatures must act with some deliberation. See
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 123, 138; see also RONALD DWORK]N, LAW'S EMPIRE 93,
178-84 (1986) (analyzing "checkerboard statutes"); Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional
Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TULANE L. REV. 849, 851, 867 (1980)
(arguing that the Constitution as a whole requires legislation that is public-regarding-legislation
that can make a coherent and plausible claim to serve some public, rather than merely private,
interest).
122 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 547-48 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting); Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976); JOHNARTHuR, WORDS THATBIND:
JuDIcIAL REVIEW AND THE GROUNDs OF MODERN CONsTrrUTONAL THEORY 174-75 (1995);
TRIBE, supra note 13, § 8-7, at 582-83. The Court has also grounded this rationality requirement
on the Equal Protection Clause in the Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See TRIBE,
supra note 13, §§ 16-2, 16-5, at 1439-43, 1451.
123 Mathews, 429 U.S. at 185 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,640 (1936)); see also
ARTHUR, supra note 122, at 175; Bilionis, supra note 107, at 1323-27.
124 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,633-36 (1996); City of Clebume v. Clebume
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,446-47,450 (1985); Hooper v. Bemadillo County Assessor, 472 U.S.
612, 618-23 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see also TRIBE, supra note 13, § 16-3,
at 1444. See generally Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court
from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357 (1999).
Of course, this requirement rarely results in the invalidation of statutes. See TRIBE, supra note
13, § 8-7, at 582. Hovever, the feebleness of the restraint reflects no lack of allegiance to the
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Moreover, when statutes inplicate fundamental rights, such as freedom of
speech and freedom of religion, or when statutes implicate suspect or semi-suspect
classifications, such as race and gender, the courts demand more than mere
rationality.125 In such cases, statutory provisions that implicate fundamental rights,
suspect classifications, or semi-suspect classifications must substantially further the
statutory purpose. In particular, the Court generally applies "strict scrutiny," under
which the legislative provision must further a compelling state interest by the least
restrictive means.126 In such circumstances, legislatures obviously have an
obligation that extends far beyond that implicit in public choice theory; a legislature
has an obligation to agree on purposes and consider whether the means they have
adopted are more restrictive than necessary to achieve those purposes.127
principle that statutes must have public purposes, but rather a concern that the judiciary is an
inappropriate institution to determine what should be considered a public, rather than a private,
purpose-that is, courts are not the appropriate institution to determine the proper goals of
government. See id. §§ 8-7, 16-2, at 582-84, 1440; Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of
Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 682-83 (3d Cir. 1991); Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities
Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enteprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV.
1373, 1412 (1978); Linde, supra note 56, at 207-22. Indeed, the Founding Fathers believed that
the political processes they had established would ensure that laws would have some purpose. See
infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
125 SeejAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WrIH STATUTEs 99-102 (1982); TRIBE, supra
note 13, §§ 16-6, 16-7, 16-13, 16-14, at 1451-54, 1465-74.
126 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235-37 (1995); see also
JOHN E. NOWvAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrTTONAL LAW § 14.3, at 601-02 (5th ed.
1995).
The Court also engages in "intermediate scrutiny" in which the Court's scrutiny of the
legislative classification is more rigorous than that under the "rational basis" test, but less rigorous
than that under "strict scrutiny." SeeTRIBE, supra note 13, § 16-33, at 1610; Kathleen M Sullivan,
Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297-
301 (1992).
127 Many state constitutions more explicitly require that legislation must be an exercise of
judgment rather than an exercise of arbitrary power. The constitutions of some states require that
legislation or public expenditures have a public purpose. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1); N.D.
CONsT. art. IV, §§ 43,44; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 5; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 26. Occasionally, state
courts invoke such constitutional provisions to invalidate state laws. See, eg., Stanley v.
Department of Conservation & Dev., 199 S.E.2d 641, 653, 655-58 (N.C. 1973), overruled by
Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 SJE2d 615,620-23 (N.C. 1996); WilliamD. Popkin, The
Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 556 & n. 67 (1988)
[hereinafter The Collaborative Model]. Some state constitutions contain other provisions that
preclude groups from obtaining advantages by using raw political power to enact legislation, such
as provisions that prohibit or limit special legislation (legislation that applies to a limited number
of citizens), forbid the use of government credit for private purposes, outlaw the provision of
government gifts, and proscribe non-uniform taxation. See id. at 555-56; WILLAM D. POPKIN,
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 813-25 (2d ed. 1997). States have also attempted to structure the
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Indeed, the Framers' design of the legislative and executive branches embodies
the judgment that legislation should rest on some principled basis-the Framers
structured the electoral and legislative processes to induce enactment of rational
laws.128 For instance, they designed the electoral process in such a way that more
learned citizens would moderate the passions of the electorate. 129 The Framers,
most notably Madison, also relied upon the size of the country, and the consequent
diverse interests of legislative constituencies, to preclude agreement on
unprincipled, expedient statutes and allow the enactment of only well-considered
statutes designed to further the public good.130 In short, viewing legislatures as
having an obligation to explain statutes does not compromise the legislative
function of resolving preferences.
2. Statutes Lack Purposes
A second criticism of the proposed duty of explanation, based on one of public
choice theory's teachings, rests upon the theory that group choice often cannot
embody any coherent underlying purposes.13 1 If group choice often cannot embody
political process so as to ensure that legislation has some rationale, rather than merely being an
exercise of political power. See, e.g., State v. Paulus, 688 P.2d 1303, 1309 (Or. 1984); The
Collaborative Model, supra, at 553-59.
128 See THE FEDERAL=sT No. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE
FEDERALISrNO. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); CASSR. SUNSTEIN, THE
PARTIAL CONsTrroN 22,24 (1993). But see James A. Gardner, Shut Up and Vote: A Critique
ofDeliberative Democracy andtheLife of Talk, 63 TENN. L. REV. 421,434-36 (1996) (disputing
theory that Framers contemplated and intended a "deliberative democracy").
129 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE
FEDERAL=SrNO. 49, at 317 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("Mt is the reason alone,
of the public, that ought to control and regulate the government... [t]he passions ought to be
controlled and regulated by the Government!); GARY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE
FEDERALISTS 226 (1981); Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1559-60; see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATTON OF THE AMERICAN REPuBUc 506-18 (1969).
130 See THEFEDERALISTNOS. 10, 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); JACK
N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTTUTION 51--
52 (1996). In addition, bicameralism and presentment were designed so that laws were not merely
an expression of preferences driven by passion, but were reasoned, deliberate decisions. See
Manning, supra note 95, at 649-50. The Senate in particular was supposed to lead to more
reasoned and deliberate decisions. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 359 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937); Tl-E FEDERALIST No. 162, at 379-80 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); Terry Smith, Rediscovering the Sovereignty of the People: The Case
for Senate Districts, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1, 23 (1996).
131 Another aspect of public choice theory, interest group theory, advances the proposition
that legislatures are more likely to respond to the preferences of small groups united by a common
interest, than larger, more diffuse groups. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 21-33. 1 do
1999]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
any coherent underlying purpose, then requiring legislatures to provide explanations
for statutes will require legislators to mislead the public, because the explanations
would falsely imply the existence of a coherent policy. If the legislature merely
wishes to establish the rights and obligations stated in the statutory text it enacts,
then any explanatory text will invariably state the "legislative purpose" less
accurately than the statutory text itself I will first outline the public choice argument
for the proposition that group choice often inherently lacks a coherent underlying
rationale, and then argue that such public choice concerns do not undermine my
theory.
Public choice theory purports to show that group decisionmaking cannot
systematically reflect the preferences of the individual members of that group. 132
Ifparticipants have at least three different sets ofpreferences, arrayed in a particular
manner, one of two scenarios will arise. First, the group may never adopt any
proposal because each proposal can always be defeated by a competing proposal
(even if that competing proposal has previously been rejected). Endless "cycling"
will occur; that is, the group will perpetually consider and vote for each of the
proposals in turn, never ultimately agreeing on any of them. Alternatively, the group
can reach a decision if someone first establishes an agenda that determines the order
in which competing proposals will be voted upon (thus precluding the resurrection
of rejected proposals). For instance, if the group must choose between three
proposals, the group will first select between two of the proposals, and then would
select between the most popular of the first two proposals, and the third proposal.
Though the group avoids the cycling problem, this solution creates a new
problem-the group's decision will be determined by the order in which the
proposals are considered. Thus, the person who sets the agenda (the "agenda-
setter") can manipulate the group.' 33
The conclusion that outcomes depend on the order in which a group considers
proposals has other implications. It implies that statutes lack purposes, that is,
statutes are not crafted to pursue some underlying legislative purposes. 134
not discuss interest group theory. However, Jonathan Macey has shown that a practice of
privileging legislative history and refising to effectuate secret deals is, at the very least, consistent
with "interest-group" theory. See Macey, supra note 64, at 230-33.
132 See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 38-42; Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow's
Theorem: Ordinalism andRepublican Government, 75 IOWA L. REv. 949, 950-52 (1990); Pildes
& Anderson, supra note 121, at 2128-40. The seminal work in the field of public choice theory
is KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDuAL VALUES (rev. ed. 1963).
133 Members of Congress recognize the power of agenda-control. See WALTER J. OLESZEK,
CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 11-12 (4th ed. 1996).
134 See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 40-42; Pildes & Anderson, supra note 121,
at 2138-40, 2205 (setting forth the argument that because collective choice lacks meaning, statutes
lack meaning, and thus statutes should be construed literally); Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public
Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading ofStatutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
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Legislatures do not enact statutory text because that text reflects any coherent
legislative view of statutory ends and means. Rather, statutory text is adopted only
because the vote happens to be held in a particular order. If the vote were held in a
different order, a different, possibly conflicting, statute pursuing different aims of
a different coalition of legislators, would emerge.135 Thus, the process does not
reflect means-ends reasoning, i.e., setting goals and then determining the means to
achieve those goals; statutes are merely the serendipitous result of the order in
which the legislature voted upon the various statutory proposals, and the
combinations of various groups' desires regarding those proposals.136
Thus, according to public choice theorists, group choice is unintentional and
accidental-something that no one designed. The typical legislative majority
consists of a random coalition of smaller groups whose votes happened to coincide
without any agreement on their part (except for the fortuitous coincidence of the
groups voting for the same statute).137 Some scholars suggest that such haphazard
legislative decisionmaking makes reference to legislative history inappropriate.1 38
The public choice view that statutes lack purposes should be rejected for two
51 (1991); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a "They, " Not an "It". Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239,244 (1992).
135 See FARBER & FRCKEY, supra note 66, at 40; Eskridge, supra note 3, at 642-43; Pildes
& Anderson, supra note 121, at 2135-36, 2138-39; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,447 n.148 (1989).
136 Thus, the enactment of a statute has no more meaning than the election of Jane Smith as
governor of a state. Few would suggest that the "purpose' of the candidate's election was to pursue
a particular policy that the candidate advocated (at least if the election was not dominated by one
overarching issue). Indeed, it is possible for a candidate to win an election even if a majority of
voters opposes each of the positions she took in the campaign. See ROBERTA. DAHL, A PREFACE
TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 127-28 (1956); STEVEN H. SHIFFRN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 63-64 (1990).
137 This argument challenges the Legal Process School. The Legal Process School asserted
that legislatures were rational, in the sense of identifying goals and crafting statutes to pursue those
goals, and that accordingly courts should construe statutes to further the statutes' underlying
purposes. See HENRYM. HART, JR. & ALBERTM. SACKs, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378-79 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 332-33; Sunstein, supra note 135, at 434-35.
A contemporary of Hart and Sacks makes a similar point See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed,
3 VAND. L. REv. 395,400 (1950) ("A statute merely declaring arule, with no purpose or objective,
is nonsense."). Currently, Ronald Dworkin takes a similar position. See DWORKN, supra note 121,
at 342-45 ("A community of principle does not see legislation the way a rulebook community
does, as negotiated compromises that cany no more or deeper meaning than the text of the statute
declares.).
138 See Pildes & Anderson, supra note 121, at 2138-40, 2205 (noting the views of some
scholars that, because collective choice lacks meaning, statutes lack meaning, and therefore,
statutes should be construed literally); Shepsle, supra note 134, at 249.
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reasons: 139 (1) public choice theory assumes that the preferences of individual
legislators do not change as a result of their participation in the legislative process,
and (2) public choice theorists' factual predictions, namely that cycling will
constantly afflict legislatures, have proven wrong.
First, public choice theory assumes that the preferences of representatives,
which will determine their votes on legislation, are fully formed and unchangeable
before they participate in the legislative process. 140 Thus public choice theory
assumes that no aspect of the legislative process-such as hearings, mark-up
sessions, floor debates, party caucuses, and informal contacts with other members-
will affect any legislator's preferences.
The assumption that preferences are exogenous to the legislative process, i.e.,
fully formed and unchangeable before the legislative process begins, deserves
skepticism. Indeed, many have argued that participation in the legislative process
does affect the preferences of individual legislators, and thus may affect their
votes.141 Public choice theorists and civic republicans have, for years, joined issue
over this question.142
Second, the public choice prediction that legislatures will be beset by cycling
majorities has proven erroneous. Cycles do not seem to occur frequently in the
139 Moreover, even if the 'legislative irrationality" or "chaos" prong ofpublic choice theory
were accepted, preferences will often be arrayed so that cycling will not occur even in the absence
of agenda control. See Hovenkamp, supra note 132, at 967.
140 In other words, public choice theorists view legislator preferences as "exogenous" to the
legislative process. See Jerry Mashaw, As IfRepublican Interpretation, 97 YALE LJ. 1685, 1700
(1988); Pildes & Anderson, supra note 121, at 2176, 2179, 2190. Thus, public choice theorists
dismiss legislative debate and deliberation as "inconsequential" "mood music?' Kenneth A.
Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Positive Theories of CongressionalInstitutions, 19 LEGIS. STUD.
Q. 149, 152 (1994).
141 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 246-47; Pildes & Anderson, supra note 121, at
2175-83.
142 See Pildes & Anderson, supra note 121, at 2175-83; Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1574-
75. Civic republican theorists posit that there is a public interest, or at least it is possible to have
a consensus about the public interest, and that such a consensus can be reached through
deliberation. See Gardner, supra note 128, at 428-31; Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1550, 1554-55.
In particular, during deliberation, representatives hear other perspectives that may alter their views.
See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1549, 1574-75. Indeed, Richard H. Pildes and Elizabeth S.
Anderson argue that agreement on the rationale of the statute is ordinarily essential to enacting a
statute. See Pildes & Anderson, supra note 121, at 2178, 2199. Pildes and Anderson acknowledge
that at times decisions must be made even though legislators can reach no agreement on principles.
They note that some statute's memorialize an agreement to disagree. See id at 2166-71. See
generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 36, 39-40. Thus, deliberation is a crucial element of the
legislative process-not inconsequential "mood music"-and the legislative process should be
structured to foster deliberation. See Sumstein, supra note 51, at 1539, 1581-82; Sunstein, supra
note 135, at 457-58, 471,476.
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legislative process. 143 For instance, Congress rarely cycles through radically
different alternatives. Of course, this absence of cycling could reflect the exercise
of agenda control by the House and Senate leadership.144 If so, those believing that
statutes have purposes cannot take comfort in the paucity of cycling because the
"purposes" underlying the statutes would be those of the agenda-setter, not those of
a majority of the legislators. 145 However, several theorists have identified other
reasons for the rarity of cycles.
Preferences may not be arrayed in ways that produce cycles because
representatives take into account the preferences of others and make judgments
about which options best advance the welfare of the country or, at the very least, the
welfare of their own constituents. 146 This contrasts with public choice theorists'
assumption that representatives consider only the subjective preferences of their
constituents.147 The view that legislators do more than express constituent
143 See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 47-48; Bernard Grofinan, Public Choice,
Civic Republicanism, andAmerican Politics: Perspectives of a "Reasonable Choice" Modeler,
71 TEx. L. REV. 1541, 1553-54 (1993); Hovenkamp, supra note 132, at 956 & n.14.
144 The House leadership (particularly the Speaker of the House) and the Rules Committee
have considerable agenda-setting power. Perhaps the most powerful agenda-setting tools are
special rules governing debate, which may prohibit all amendments to a bill, limit the amendments
to a bill, set the order in which amendments will be considered, or adopt certain unusual
procedures concerning the timing and effect of voting. See OLESZEK, supra note 133, at 138-50.
These rules, however, are subject to a vote by the membership, see id at 150-51, 165, but here too
the Rules Committee and the House leadership set the agenda-they decide the details of the
special rule that will be submitted. The House leadership certainly uses these agenda control
devices, and, indeed, employs them with increasing frequency. See id. at 142 tbl.5-4; BARBARA
SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKiNG: NEV LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 20-
26 (1997) (describing use of special rules as agenda control); STEVEN S. SMrH & CHRISTOPHER
J. DEERING, COMMrrEEs IN CONGRESS 183-89 (2d ed. 1990).
The Senate leadership has fewer agenda control devices. Limiting the amendments that can
be offered requires the consent of every member of the Senate (i.e., "unanimous consent!). See
OLESZEK, supra note 133, at 213, 238. However, unanimous consent agreements rarely impose
such limitations, see id at 214, and limiting debate requires the vote of a supernajority-the votes
of sixty Senators are needed to limit debate to an additional thirty hours. See id. at 254,259.
145 Farber and Frickey argue that avoidance of cycles by legislative leaders' exercise of
agenda control is not problematic. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 50 & n.25.
146 As noted earlier, cycles only occur when the preferences of competing subgroups are
arranged in a particular manner. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
One scholar has also asserted that ideological issues tend not to produce preferences that
cycle. See Grofman, supra note 143, at 1555-59.
147 See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 22-23; Hovenkamp, supra note 132, at 954.
However, public choice theorists also argue that interest group competition dominates the
legislative process because legislators must satisfy interest groups to win reelection. See FARBER
& FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 23. To the extent that such a theory has merit, interest groups may
coordinate the preferences of members across electoral district lines. See Hovenkamp, supra note
1999]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
preferences more accurately reflects political theorists' and legislators' view of the
role of democratic representatives 1 48 Often then, each representative votes not
merely on the basis of his constituents' subjective preferences (formed with only
their own individual interests in mind), but on a judgment about the welfare of his
constituents (or perhaps even the country as a whole). 149 Such judgments about
welfare tend to produce preferences that are less likely to result in cycles than
preferences that reflect subjective desires, i.e., tastes. 150
132, at 965-66.
148 Theorists have long debated whether representatives should act upon their constituents'
preferences or interests. See GERHARD LOEWENBERG Er AL., HANDBOOK OF LEGIsLATIVE
RESEARCH 99-100 (1985); J. Roland Pennock, Political Representation: An Overview, in
NOMOS X: REPRESENTATION 13-18 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1968);
Hanna Fenichel Pitltn, The Concept of Representation, in REPRESENTATION 17-22 (Hanna
Fenichel Pitkin ed., 1969). Rarely do theorists conclude that the representative has a duty to pursue
only one of the competing conceptions of legislators' duties. Rather, most theorists conclude that
the representative should pursue some combination of the two approaches. See Pitkin, supra, at
14-16. See generally THOMPSON, supra note 59, at 99-111.
Legislators' behavior appears to combine both perspectives. Legislator voting behavior
cannot be explained solely by constituency desires. See LOEWENBERG ET AL., supra, at 491-96
(reviewing the literature as of the early 1980s). While constituency preferences do appear to play
some role in legislators' voting behavior, see id at 492, 495, party affiliation and the personal
views of legislators also appear to have a role (indeed, more of a role than constituency
preferences). See id. at 492. See generally SAMUEL C. PATTERSON ET AL, REPRESENTATIVES AND
REPRESENTED 138-53 (1975) (presenting study of Iowa legislature). Anecdotal evidence supports
these conclusions. See, e.g., ELIZABETH DREW, SENATOR 113-15 (1979).
149 A member of Congress may have an obligation to pursue the good of the nation, and not
merely his constituency. See United States Term Limits Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 803-05
(1995) ("In that National Government, representatives owe primary allegiance not to the people
of a State, but to the people of the Nation ... Representatives and Senators are as much officers
of the entire union as is the President'); see also SUNsTEIN, supra note 14, at 242. See generally
Pennock, supra note 148, at 21-24; Pitkin, supra note 148, at 215-18. If members of Congress
feel an obligation to give substantial weight to the interests ofthe country as a whole, they are even
more likely to agree on policies, because, presumably, some of the differences in legislators'
preferences are related to differences in their districts.
150 See Hovenkamp, supra note 132, at 954-62. See generally, Grofiman, supra note 143,
at 1547-51 (distinguishingjudgments from tastes).
For instance, suppose a group of forty acquaintances can spend an afternoon together at either
a movie, an amusement park, or an art museum. An individual's own preferences among the
choice of outings may differ from his position regarding the type of outings the group should
select. The individuals will more likely take into account the desires of others and be amenable to
a discussion of the choice if the issue is what the group should do rather than what he wants to do
individually. Indeed, the individual's decision about what he wants to do is the type of decision
one would make in a 'market," and the individual's decision about what the group should do is
more like the type of decision we view as political. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 52;
KADISH & KADISH, supra note 55, at 15-17, 18-20 (1973) (arguing that the roles an individual
[Vol. 60:1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In addition, legislators may make decisions about voting on particular proposals
in order to avoid cycles or prevent undesirable outcomes.1 51 A group of legislators
may decide to vote for their second-choice policy rather than their first-choice in
order to form a majority for the second-choice policy. They may do so because they
wish to avoid one of two undesirable results: (1) further cycling, or (2) the group's
selection of their third choice (as a result of the order of the voting). In this situation,
the legislative outcome is not random; it is not an accidental result that no one
designed. The majority vote for the winning policy reflects agreement on policy
among the majority of the legislators, not just an agreement on the text of the
statute.15
2
For some, the above considerations may not provide a full answer to the public
choice critique. Even legislator preferences that have been influenced by legislative
deliberation and which reflect considerations of public welfare (rather than mere
constituent desires), may be arrayed in a manner that produces cycles. Some may
argue that such preferences are no less likely to produce cycles than "exogenous"
preferences based on subjective desires.153 Nevertheless, the considerations set forth
above do provide a sufficient basis to entertain serious doubts about the public
choice critique, and thus allow us to put aside that critique. In short, public choice
theory should not lead to a rejection of the argument that legislatures must explain
statutes.
3. Any Statement ofPurposes Should Be Included in Statutory Text
A critic might argue that even if the legislature has a duty to provide a
plays determine the reasons that the person can consider to justify action); SuNSTEiN, supra note
14, at 246.
Moreover, to the extent that a representative votes on the basis of his constituents' interests,
and not their preferences, his votes are more likely to reflect judgments that are subject to
deliberation and verification by facts. Preferences, which are purely a matter of taste, are much less
subject to change by others. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 132, at 955-62.
151 See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 52; Grofinan, supra note 143, at 1566-68;
Hovenkamp, supra note 132, at 963-65.
152 Admittedly, a substantial number of legislators comprising the majority would have
chosen another policy if those who shared their preference had been numerous enough to form a
majority, and, thus, there were no need to compromise with others to obtain some of their goals.
This does not disprove the existence of an agreement on more than the text of the statute between
legislators who initially had different preferences. Rather, it shows that legislators sometimes agree
on "second best" preferences, in light of the divurgent "first choice" preferences of all the
legislators in the chamber.
153 See, e.g., POPKIN, supra note 127, at 108; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CRISIS AND REFoRM 242 (1985).
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justification for statutes, that justification must appear in the text of the statute.154
Certainly, many statutes contain preambles, and those preambles can set forth
statutory purposes and interpretive guidance. 155 Of course, preambles are
notoriously vague and much less helpful than committee reports and statements of
committee chairs.156 Because words are indeterminate and legislatures cannot
envision all future situations, 157 legislatures are entitled to provide rationales for
statutes to guide courts interpreting those statutes, without making such principles
legally binding. Legislatures' lack of prescience means that legally-binding
explanations might not aid the courts in deciding a large number of cases, yet
compel decisions that the legislature did not desire.158 Thus, for instance, Ronald
154 See Why Learned Hand, supra note 68, at 1021.
155 See I NORMAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.03, at 322-24
(5th ed. 1992); 2A SINGER, supra, § 47.04, at 145-50; Note, Legal Effect of Preambles-Statutes,
41 CORNELL L.Q. 134, 134-38 (1955) [hereinafter Legal Effect of Preambles]; Why Learned
Hand, supra note 68, at 1021 &n.77. And indeed, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 required
that statutory justifications appear in the preamble of every law. See supra note 31, at § 15.
Courts accord preambles some interpretive weight. See, e.g., Legal Effect of Preambles,
supra. However, because preambles customarily precede a statute's enacting clause, they have no
binding effect. See id.; SENATE RULENO. 14.8, 102D CONG., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1992
SENATE MANUAL 13 (requiring separate vote on preamble).
156 See Felix Frankfirter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, in 2 THERECORD 232
(1947); ELY, supra note 96, at 128; Linde, supra note 56, at 231. Moreover, preambles themselves
must be interpreted. See Anthony D'Amato, Can Regulators Constrain Judicial Interpretation of
Statutes, 75 VA. L. REV. 561,570 n30, 582 n.54 (1989); see also Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying
Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. Li. 1, 1-2 (1986); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L.
REv. 379,406-07 (1985). Of course, sometimes committee reports are vague or do little more than
repeat the statutory language.
157 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, 3., dissenting);
DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 154; JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 203-04
(Thomas Cook ed., Hafner Publ'g Co. 1947) (1690); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES 36 (1991); SUNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 125; Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A
StructuralReinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1248 n.6 (1996); Manning, supra note 95,
at 647; Mayton, supra note 74, at 127.
Indeed, an archetypal example of the problems produced by excessive specificity is the
Delaney Clause barring the sale of foods that contain potential carcinogens. See Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, §§ 706, 706(b)(5)(B), 52 Stat. 1058 (1938) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 379(e) (1994)). The law not only prohibits foods containing substances that induce cancer
in human beings, but also prohibits all food containing substances that might cause cancer in
laboratory animals. As a result, the statute appears to require the FDA to ban many beneficial
substances, such as saccharine. The problems with specificity are also shown by the line of cases
in which the Supreme Court has employed irrebuttable presumption analysis. See Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441 (1973); TRME, supra note 13, § 16-34, at 1618-25. See generally SUNSEIN, supra
note 74, at 133-34, 141-43 (discussing the Court's irrebutable presumption analysis).
158 See LOCKE, supra note 157, at 204; SUNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 184; JAM. Balkin,
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Dworkin and Alexander Bickel have noted the usefulness of providing nonbinding
guidance when text is necessarily indeterminate.159 William N. Eskridge, Jr. argues
that several iypes of information "fit" much better in committee reports than in the
statute.160 In addition, at least the process of approving statutory commentary is
subject to a democratic process-legislators and chief executives can assent or
dissent on the basis of such commentary. The altemative--unelected interpreters,
such as courts or administrative agencies, attempting to intuit legislative policies-
is not democratic. The political branches of government cannot overturn such
judicial or administrative intuitions unless they can overcome inertia and pass a
second statute. 161
Some argue that allowing legislatures to provide nonstatutory interpretive
guidance to courts violates the separation of powers doctrine by allowing
legislatures to exercise both legislative and judicial powers.162 Under the doctrine,
allowing any governmental institution to exercise more than one of three powers-
the legislative, the executive, or the judicial-threatens the rights of individual
citizens. 163 Thus, a legislature should not possess the authority to exercise both
Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 777 (1987); Colin S. Diver, The
Optimal Precision ofAdministrative Rules, 93 YALEL.L 65,73 (1983).
159 See BICKEL, supra note 58, at 104 (stating that the Founding Fathers, in drafting the
Constitution, concentrated on 'may" rather than "must"); DWORKIN, supra note 121, at 344-45
(describing the difference between promises and statement of intentions, and noting that both are
legitimate).
160 See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration ofJustice ofthe House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 71, 84 (1990) [herein after Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of
Legislative History] (testimony of William N. Eskridge).
161 See McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. LJ. 705,735-36 (1992). McNollgast shows that failureto overrule a court
or agency decision can occur even if a majority of legislators disagrees with the decision. See id
162 See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 (1988); OFFICE OF LEGAL POL'Y, U.S.
DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATivE HISTORY 5, 33-34, 39-40 (1989)
[hereinafter USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 157;
M.LC. VILE, CONMT ONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 37,43-44, 63-64 (1998);
Eskridge, supra note 3, at 673; Felix Frankfurter, Foreword: A Symposium on Statutory
Construction, 3 VAND. L. REV. 365, 366-68 (1950); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory
ofInterpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 279,355-56 (1985).
Legislative and judicial power must be separated. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); 1 WIIAMBLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *58-59 (1765);
MONTESQUIEU, TM SPHUTOFTELAWS 77, 150, 152, 158 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949); VILE,
supra, at 44; Manning, supra note 95, at 638-48.
163 See THEFEDERALISTNO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); W.B.
GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 11,104 (Tulane Studies in Political Science
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legislative and judicial functions.164 But allowing legislatures to provide
nonstatutory interpretive guidance when they enact statutes does not create the
dangers that the Framers of the Constitution sought to avoid by separating judicial
power from legislative and executive powers.
First, preventing legislators from exercising judicial powers preserves the rule
of law, i.e., the impartial administration of the law.165 Governments must enact
general rules that apply to all citizens to ensure equal treatment of all citizens.166 At
the same time, governments must apply general rules to specific individual
controversies. General rules should be established by political branches of
government accountable to the electorate, but if these same politically accountable
institutions also apply the general principles to particular cases, they may begin to
apply the rules arbitrarily in response to political pressure. 167 Thus, the legislature
should act in generalities and courts should resolve specific controversies. 168
Secondly, legislatures may not exercise judicial power because the rules of
conduct should be established before a citizen acts. The resolution of a particular
case should not give the rulemaker an opportunity to alter the relevant rules on a
basis not disclosed before the person acted.169 Thus, the separation of judicial and
legislative power reflects concerns about retroactivity. 170
Vol. IX 1965); Manning, supra note 95, at 640-41,674-75.
164 See USING AND MasUsiNG LEGISLATIVEHIsTORY, supra note 162, at 33-34, 39-40.
165 See GwYN, supra note 163, at 127-28 n.1; see also UsING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 162, at 35-36,42-43,56,71, 106-07, 118.
166 See GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at 142-43; F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSITUTION OF
LIBERTY 153-54 (1960); JOSEPHRAZ, THEAurHORITY OF LAW 215-16 (1979); SCHAUER, supra
note 157, at 135-37; SUNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 112-13; Mayton, supra note 74, at 135.
167 See RA, supra note 166, at 216-17.
168 See FRANZNEUMAN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND ThE AUTHORrrARIAN STATE 28-31,34-36,
42 (1957); VILE, supra note 162, at 23, 44, 63-64 (discussing the views of Aristotle and John
Locke); WOOD, supra note 129, at 454; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56
U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1176 (1989). Indeed, many state constitutions prohibit legislatures from
enacting "special laws," i.e., laws regarding particular individuals or small groups of individuals,
or severely limit the power of legislatures to enact such special legislation. See POPKIN, supra note
127, at 819-22; 2 SINGER, supra note 155, § 40, at 186-335.
169 See GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at 142; GWYN, supra note 163, at 71, 74; LOCKE, supra
note 157, at 190-91; RAZ, supra note 166, at 214; SUNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 21,44, 104; VILE,
supra note 162, at 329; Manning, supra note 95, at 669-70; see also NEUMAN, supra note 168,
at 36-37.
170 If any institution is to have this power to resolve controversies retroactively, it should be
an institution that does not make the rules and is not politically accountable. See Cass, supra note
116, at 951,963, 968-69, 994-95.
However, legislatures have broad powers to enact retroactive statutes, as long as those
retroactive statutes do not change criminal statutes or abrogate contracts. See Usery v. Tumer
Elkhom Mining Corp., 428 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1976); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610-11
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Provisions of nonstatutory legislative guidance do not compromise the
legitimate distinction between legislative and judicial functions. Typically, the
interpretive guidance provided by legislatures in legislative history is broad-based,
covering a wide range of cases, and both promulgated and made publicly available
before a controversial situation arises. Legislative history generally addresses broad
categories of behavior, not the specific circumstances of particular individuals.
Thus, the provision of legislative guidance tends not to implicate "rule of law"
concerns. Moreover, the nonstatutory legislative guidance presents no retroactivity
problem. Ordinarily, legislatures promulgate nonstatutory interpretive guidance
before cases are adjudicated under the statute, and make such guidance available to
those affected by the statute as well as the public in general. Thus, citizens face little
danger of suffering adverse legal consequences merely because of the unknown
subjective views of the legislature; the judiciary determines legal rights and
obligations on the basis of text-albeit not just statutory text-available to those
subject to the statute. 171
In any event, courts need not disregard legislative history to retain the
adjudicatory power. Even though the judiciary currently accords weight to
legislative history, the judiciary continues to apply the law to particular factual
controversies. Moreover, legislative history merely provides guidance, the judiciary
makes the ultimate decision as to: (1) whether the statutory text contains sufficient
ambiguity to justify reliance on legislative history, and (2) whether, even in light of
the legislative history, the statutory text can bear the construction that Congress's
explanation suggests. Thus, the legislature's provision of interpretive guidance
separate from the statutory text does not impermissibly encroach upon the judicial
power.
(1960). See generally TROY, supra note 91, at 47-82; The Committee on Federal Legislation,
Retroactive Application ofFederal Legislation, in 51 THE RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF
THE CrrY OF NEW YORK 836 (1996) (discussing the constitutional limits of Congress's power to
enact retroactive legislation). The Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses prohibit retroactive
ciriminal statutes, see, e g., Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 n28 (1994) (discussing
the Ex Post Facto Clause); Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468
U.S. 841,847-51 (1984) (discussing Bill of Attainder Clause), and the Contracts Clause restricts
legislative abrogation of contracts, see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 126, § 11.8.
171 While some have questioned the availability of certain esoteric aspects of legislative
history, see W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation
Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383,408-09 (1992); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations
About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L. 371,377-78; Allison C. Giles, Note, The
Value ofNonlegislators' Contributions to Legislative History, 79 GEO. L.J. 359, 377-80 (1990),
committee reports and statements made in debates are easy to obtain, see FARBER & FRICKEY,
supra note 66, at 93 n.1 1.
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III. NEW TEXTUALISTS VERSUS INTENTIONALISTS
The duty to justify statutes now allows us to reexamine the two major
interpretative approaches, namely textualism (and more particularly new textualism)
and intentionalism; and, ultimately, that reexamination will provide a basis for a
third approach.
A. New Textualism
Led by Justice Antonin Scalia, a group ofjudges and scholars, dubbed "the new
textualists," have urged the courts to abandon the use of legislative history in
interpreting statutes. 172 As noted earlier, textualism rests upon three premises. First
the only significant element of the legislative process is the vote of each legislative
chamber on proposals before it (and, of course, the signing or veto of legislation by
the chief executive). Second, legislators vote only on the text of the statute, not any
accompanying explanatory materials or their own subjective intent. Third,
legislative majorities rarely, if ever, share a common subjective intent regarding the
statutes they enact. Though the new textualist methodology has been challenged, as
leading to stilted interpretations of statutes and increasing the discretion of
interpreters relative to lawmakers, these three premises have remained
unchallenged.
Nevertheless, the first two premises are problematic. The first premise ignores
the institutional nature of Congress. More particularly, it fails to recognize that
Congress has an institutional obligation to explain statutes and may act as an
institution in ways other than holding votes on legislation. The second premise
conflicts with the normative principle that legislatures have an obligation to explain
statutes as well as enact them. Moreover, the third premise, while sound, can be
turned against the textualist-a majority of legislators will be no more likely to
know the precise language of a proposed bill and agree on its meaning than share
the same subjective intent. However, the manner in which new textualism can avoid
such an argument by positing a duty to vote on statutes based upon their reasonable
meaning, points the way to an alternative approach founded upon legislators'
obligation to base their votes upon the explanations of statutes as well as their text.
172 See, eg., Conroy v. Aniskofft 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Chisom
v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,404-05 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach.
Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring); Shepsle, supra note 134; Starr, supra note 171, at 371.
Bradley Karkkainen provides an extensive list of Scalia opinions applying the new textualist
approach. See Bradley S. Karkkainen, Plain Meaning, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994).
The new textualist credo is based, at least in part, on public choice theory.
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1. New Textualist Premises
a. The Only Significant Action in the Legislative Process Is the Vote ofEach
Chamber on Legislation
New textualism, as well as public choice theory, assumes that the only
significant element of the legislative process is the vote of each legislative chamber
on proposals before it.173 Early public choice scholars viewed legislatures merely
as arenas in which individual representatives assembled and registered their
preferences. 174 The legislature merely aggregated those preferences.175 Thus, public
choice scholars viewed the legislative process very much like the electoral
process-the process by which citizens "gathered" to express their preferences by
voting.176 Accordingly, such theorists did not view legislatures, like Congress, as
institutions that existed apart from elected representatives. Thus, the early public
choice models did not examine legislative committees, legislative leadership
structures, or behavioral norms.177
This focus on individual representatives rather than the legislature as an
institution 78 requires an exclusive focus on voting in legislative chambers. In a
democracy, the preferences of all representatives, like the preferences of all voters
173 See generally Wald, supra note 110, at 307 (New textualism "assumes that Congress can
act in its official capacity only when a majority formally assents to a product or even a process by
means of a formal vote.").
174 See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 44; JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN,
REDISCOVERING INSTrrUtroNs: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OFPOLrriCs 4-5 (1989); Shepsle &
Weingast, supra note 140, at 151.
175 See Frank Easterbrook, Method, Result, andAuthority: A Reply, 98 HARV. L. REV. 622,
627 (1985); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics ofPolitics and the Understanding ofPublic Law,
65 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 123, 134 (1989); Pildes & Anderson, supra note 121, at 2144,2176,2178-
79,2190; Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1543, 1548.
176 See Oregon Educ. Ass'n v. Phillips, 727 P.2d 602, 612-14 (Or. 1986); Julian Eule,
JudicialReview of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1555-56, 1568 (1990); Sager, supra
note 124, at 1414-15. Of course, this view oversimplifies the electoral process; elections follow
a nominating process and political campaigns, which limit the electorate's choices and ultimately
influence their votes.
177 See MARCH & OLSEN, supra note 174, at 4-5; Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 140, at
151. Now, the models do incorporate committee structures, see infra note 186, but this
development has not been incorporated by the new textualists, see id.
178 Public choice also disregards the institutional existence of legislatures in another way, by
positing that the legislatures largely translate the preferences of competing interest groups into
political power. See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTEREST AND
AMEICAN DEMOCRACY 402 (1986); Easterbrook, supra note 67, at 14-18,22; Macey, supra note
64, at 227-33.
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in elections, must be accorded equal weight; thus, the majority rules.179
Representatives are equal only when they vote.1 80 In the preliminaries to the vote,
members of a legislature wield very unequal influence.1 81 For instance, members
of legislative committees will have greater influence over the shape of proposals
than other legislators, and the power of some members to prevent a vote altogether
will afford them greater influence over the proposals presented to the chamber. 182
Accordingly, to the new textualist the process by which a particular legislative
proposal is selected over others for consideration of the chamber should be
irrelevant to the interpretive project. For the new textualist, in other words,
identifying the drafter of the proposal and determining his views are irrelevant, as
is ascertaining the collective understanding of a legislative committee, which
studied and perhaps modified the legislative proposal. Indeed, under public choice
theory, those who frame issues for voting by the legislative chamber, such as
drafters and congressional committees, are "dictatorial" agenda controllers that
possess the power to manipulate the members of the chamber and thus defeat
democratic choice.183 Accordingly, giving special weight to the views of legislators
who crafted the proposal submitted to the chamber would give additional power to
agenda-setters, whose control over the legislative agenda already ensures them a
degree of power inconsistent with democracy. 184
179 See ARTHUR, supra note 122, at 54-55; DAHL, supra note 136, at 31,34-35,64,67 &
n.3 (1956); FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 61 (stating that under Arrow's theory, "the
fundamental assumption is 'democracy = majority rule"); H.B. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO
DEMOcRATIc THEORY 62-64, 67, 125-26, 178, 182 (1960); PETER SINGER, DEMOCRACY AND
DISOBEDIENCE 29, 32, 35 (1973); Pildes & Anderson, supra note 121, at 2133-34 & n.39.
180 See DAHL, supra note 136, at 66; SMrrH & DEERING, supra note 143, at 10, 171;
McNollgast, supra note 161, at 707-08 &-n.5, 720-21,724-25.
181 See DAHL, supra note 136, at 66.
182 See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 56 (discussing committees as "gatekeepers");
McNollgast, supra note 161, at 707,720-21,724-25 (discussing "veto players" and "veto gates").
183 See DAHL, supra note 136, at 43,66,69,70,73; Hovenkamp, supra note 132, at 950-51;
Mashaw, supra note 175, at 126-27, 134-35; Pildes & Anderson, supra note 121, at 2131-32,
2137-38; Shepsle, supra note 134, at 245-47.
184 Though the new textualists have not expressly articulated the above logic, it is implicit
in their approach, as reflected in their focus on voting members' reasonable understanding of the
statute, not the understanding of the drafter (whether a legislator or a private citizen) or the
members of the committee that revised the legislation. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490
U.S. 504,528 (1989). For example, in Green v. Bock Laundry, Scalia asserted:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of which
meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the Members of
Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is ... most in accord with context and
ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress which
voted on the words of the statute.
[Vol. 60:1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The focus on individual legislators, which seems to require disregarding all
activities other than voting in the legislative chamber, is problematic. Institutions
matter. Congress is an institution greater than the sum of 535 individual
Representatives and Senators who serve in the House and Senate at any one time.
In particular, analyzing the House of Representatives as 435 members taking a
series of votes that express their own individual preferences, without considering
legislative debate, party structure, the committee system, standard operating
procedures, and institutional norms, is flawed and unrealistic. These structures form
an integral part of congressional behavior. Moreover, Congress must perform some
functions as an institution-institutional responsibilities separate from the
responsibilities of individual legislators. Of these institutional functions, two of the
most relevant for our purposes of evaluating competing theories of statutory
interpretation are Congress's acquisition of information and refinement of
legislative proposals. Congress performs these functions by delegating to
committees the task of obtaining information needed to legislate and formulating
coherent proposals, subject to the approval of the entire legislative chamber. Under
this view, the work of congressional committees deserves special weight.185
In Part IV, I will show that the duty to justify statutes, which I have discussed
previously, is an institutional duty, and that Congress does routinely act as an
institution to fulfill that duty.186
Id. (emphasis added). In short, the view of a member who drafted the legislation or participated
in the detailed study of the legislation in committee is worth no more than that of any other
member.
This contrasts with the Supreme Court's approach. In Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186
(1969), the Court explained that committee reports merit more attention than individual legislators'
statements during floor debate because the committee engaged in the study and drafting of
legislative proposals. Accord HURST, supra note 125, at 42 & n.27.
185 See SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1935); HURST, supra note
125, at 37; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a
Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1344-47 (1990). See
generally Breyer, supra note 73, at 858-60, 863-64.
186 More recent scholars in the public choice tradition, positive theorists, have added
sophistication to their models to begin to take account of the above described neo-institutional
critique. See, e.g., Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 140. The new textualists do not appear to
incorporate these insights and thus seemingly do no really address the neo-institutionalist critique
of public choice. However, one can presume their response. The goals of political science and law
differ. Political scientists (at least positive theorists and their neo-institutionalist counterparts) seek
to describe the operation of the legislative process. Thus, for instance, they seek to determine
whether some legislators exercise more influence than others. For such purposes obtaining a
realistic view of Congress holds importance. Law, on the other hand, seeks to determine the legal
obligations that the legislature has created. A legislature can create law only by a vote among
equals, and such votes take place only on the floor of the legislative chamber. Nevertheless, the
new textualists have not made a compelling case that interpreting statutes requires adoption of their
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b. A Vote Is Only a Vote on the Text of the Statute, Not the Explanatory
Materials
New textualists argue that the text of a statute forms the only valid basis of
statutory law and that the subjective desires of legislators, even a majority of
legislators, do not constitute binding law.187 If an opinion poll revealed a common
desire among a majority of legislators, that desire would not be law.188 Rather, the
new textualists note, the Founding Fathers designed the legislative process so that
even legislative majorities would encounter difficulty in tansforming their
subjective intentions into binding statutory law.189 New textualists emphasize the
requirements of bicameralism and presentment as obstacles to translating legislative
desires into binding law.190 Desires become legally binding only when
memorialized in a statutory text that is approved by both the House and the Senate
and then either signed by the President or, if vetoed, approved by two-thirds of the
House and the Senate.191 Legislative history lacks legitimacy because it does not
undergo this constitutionally-mandated enactment process.' 92
unrealistic view that legislatures are merely the sum of their members.
187 See Conroy v. Aniskoff 507 U.S. 511,519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The greatest
defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of
legislators."); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,30-31 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Sunstein, supra note 135, at 429-31; Zeppos, supra note 185, at 1313 & n.70.
188 See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) ("An
opinion poll revealing the wishes of Congress would not translate to legal rules. Desires become
rules only after clearing procedural hurdles, designed to encourage deliberation and expose
proposals (and arguments) to public view and recorded vote"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 538-39 (1983). Presumably, even if a statute were enacted, an
opinion poll showing the interpretation of the statute shared by a majority of the representatives
would not create legal obligations.
189 See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1342-44; United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326,345-46
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); USING AND MISUSiNG LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 162, at
47-49; Easterbrook, supra note 75, at 445.
190 However, new textualists rarely mention numerous other hurdles to enacting legislation
such as the power of committee chairs, the House Rules Committee, the congressional leadership,
and the availability of the filibuster. Perhaps the new textualists ignore these procedural hurdles
because they make their argument in constitutional terms. However, the focus is fully consistent
with their belief that floor votes are the only important legislative events.
191 Many state constitutions provide that "law" can be made only byway of a"bill" With
respect to the federal government and the other states, one can argue by negative implication that
the only means for the legislature to enact law is by a "bill." See DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 10
&n.9.
192 Though some argue that the Constitution proscribes the use of legislative history, most
reject that view. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 670-76 (the argument that courts must ignore
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However, this argument assumes that the vote on a statute is a vote only on the
statute's text. Committee reports do in a sense undergo the
constitutionally-mandated bicameralism and presentment processes. Committee
reports can be, and often are, considered by the various legislative actors (i.e., the
House, the Senate, and the President), and could become the focus of the various
legislative actors' consideration of a proposed statute. Either branch of Congress can
refuse to pass a bill based on statements in the legislative history explaining the
bill's provisions.193 The President can refuse to sign a bill whose text he finds
acceptable if he objects to statements in the committee report regarding the statute's
meaning.194 Indeed, many have suggested that legislators are often more likely to
focus on the committee report and the bill manager's statements than the text of the
statute.195
Thus, the new textualists' argument really rests on their view of the meaning
of legislative votes. If the vote on a statute merely constitutes the approval of the
text of the statute, then only the text has undergone the constitutional process of
bicameral approval and presidential consideration. If the vote on the statute
constitutes approval of the text and certain documents or statements explicating the
statute, then both the text and the expository materials have undergone the
constitutional process.
For example, W. David Slawson argues that legislative history lacks democratic
legitimacy because "[w]hat most legislators think they are considering, most of the
time, is just a bill's language." 196 Slawson and the new textualists provide no
empirical support for such a proposition. Indeed, given the frequent use of
legislative history by administrative agencies and courts, legislators probably vote
legislative history fails as a pure constitutional argument); Breyer, supra note 73, at 863-64; Why
Learned Hand, supra note 68, at 1007. Nevertheless, even if the use of legislative history is not
proscribed by the Constitution, perhaps the Constitution's bicameralism and presentment
requirements suggest that the Court should disregard legislative history in interpreting statutes.
193 See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA.
L. REv. 423,457 (1989).
194 See id.
195 See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 215-16 (1967); ERIC REDMAN, THE DANCE OF
LEGISLATION 140 (1973); Brudney, supra note 75, at 28, 53, 57, 58 & n.230, 63; Farber &
Frickey, supra note 193, at 448; Spence, supra note 86, at 599 & n.73; Zeppos, supra note 185,
at 1311-14; Jerrold Zwim, Congressional Committee Reports, 7A GOv'T PUBLICATIONS REV.
319, 320 (1980). Indeed, there are occasions where the text has been misleading because the
chamberrelied upon the report, not the text ofthebill. See ARTHURMAASS, CONGRESS ANDT{E
COMMON GOOD 115-16 (1982).
196 Slawson, supra note 171, at 405; see also DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 159; Jeremy
Waldron, The Dignity ofLegislation, 54 MD. L. REV. 633, 645 (1995); Why LearnedHand, supra
note 68, at 1007.
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on the basis of the statute's legislative history as well as its text.197 In any event the
more important question is whether legislators should vote only on the text of a
statute without regard to key aspects of the legislative history.
As I will argue in Part IV, the existence of an obligation to explain suggests that
legislators should not view their vote as an expression of assent or dissent regarding
only the text of the statute.198 If the legislature has an obligation to explain and
provides an official explanation, the legislators have a corresponding duty to vote
based on those explanations. Thus, their votes should constitute not only approval
of the text of the statute, but also institutional explanatory materials, such as
committee reports and floor manager statements.
The contrasting views regarding whether a vote on the statute constitutes a vote
on the text or a vote on the text and explanatory materials produce contrasting views
of legislators' obligations in voting on a bill. Under the view that legislators merely
vote on the statutory text a representative may responsibly vote for a statute without
acceding to the institutional explanations in documents like the corresponding
committee reports. 199 Under the philosophy that legislators vote on the text and the
institutional explanations of the statute, such a representative should at least publicly
197 See RiCHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRsIS AND REFORM 269 (1985); Wald,
supra note 110, at 307.
Slawson also argues that judicial reliance on text rather than legislative history is justified
because statutory text is available to legislators and legislative history is not. See Slawson, supra
note 171, at 404-05, 408. First, the text of the statute or pending amendments may not be available
at the time of the vote. See Chadha v. INS, 462 U.S. 919, 926 (1983) (citing 121 CONG. REC.
4080) (noting the resolution requiring deportation of Chadha not available to members when it was
voted on); Congressional Control ofthe Administration of Government: Hearings, Investigations,
Oversight, and Legislative History (Pane111I), 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 595,614-15 (1990) [hereinafter
Congressional Control ofthe Administration of Government] (statement by L. Gordon Crovitz);
Roger H. Davidson, What Judges Ought to KnowAbout Lawmaldng in Congress, in JUDGES AND
LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 90, 111 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988);
Raymond Hemandez, Cryfor Help: 'Paul, How Do I Vote?', N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1996, § 1, at
24 (the New York legislature); Statutory Interpretation and the Uses ofLegislative History, supra
note 160, at 143 (noting that text of late-session onmbus bills sometimes unavailable). Second,
committee reports, sponsor statements, and floor manager statements are often available as well
as the text of statutes. See infra notes 311-12 and accompanying text.
Slawson also argues that legislators cannot keep all of a complex statute's legislative history
in their heads-but they also cannot remember everything in a 1000 page statute; in fact, it may
be easier for them to remember the more readable legislative history.
19 8 See Breyer, supra note 73, at 864 (stating from an institutional point of view the legislator
has no different responsibility with respect to committee reports, floor statements, or statutory text).
199 Pildes and Anderson argue that a legislator could not vote on a public policy without, of
necessity, assuming some view of the policy's rationale. See Pildes & Anderson, supra note 121,
at 2147-58, 2178, 2181, 2183, 2193-96, 2199-2200. Generally, however, the new textualist
position regarding legislator's responsibilities set forth above is not disputed.
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dissent from the institutional justification presented in support of the statute.200
Thus the new textualists' argument depends upon their conception of the vote
on a statute as merely an approval or disapproval of the statutory text; if the vote on
the statute should be viewed as the approval or disapproval of something more, the
new textualists' arguments lose force.
c. It Is Unlikely That There Will Be One Subjective Intent Regarding the
Statute Shared by a Majority ofLegislators
New textualists argue that a majority of legislators will rarely share a subjective
intent regarding a statute's meaning. They rely on two cogent arguments. 201 First,
most legislators give little thought to any particular statute, and certainly do not
formulate a position on the numerous specific issues that will confront courts and
agencies in applying the statute.202 Often members focus on the general principles
embodied in the bill. Moreover, members vote based on the recommendations or
votes of others. Many members of Congress vote on the basis of "cues" or
"referents"203-- such as the position of the relevant committee chair, party leaders,
200 Subsumed in the new textualist view that legislators vote only on the text of the statute
is a view that Congress's lawmaking power includes only the power to create text that others will
interpret, see supra note 162; Congress may not set forth principles of guidance that interpreters
must consider, except by enacting legally-binding statutory text This also suggests that in enacting
legislation Congress simply has the responsibility to issue commands, not explain them. The
following advice regarding statutory preambles exemplifies such an approach: 'Tor a law should
be brief, in order that the uninitiated may grasp it all more easily... Warn me, tell me what you
wish me to do! I am not learning but obeying." 6 SENECA, AD LUCUIUM EPSTJULAEMORALES 36
(Richard M. Gummere trans., 1917).
Some recognize that such interpretive guidance is appropriate, but only as "political"
instructions backed up by political sanctions Congress can use against agencies, and that such
"political" instructions should have no 'legal" effect, i.e, should not be considered legally binding,
and thus should not constrain the courts in interpreting the statute. See Intemational Bhd. of Elec.
Workers v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 716-17 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J., concurring); POPKIN,
supra note 127, at 419-21; see also Congressional Control of the Administration of Government,
supra note 197, at 615 (citing a statement by Davidson); Zwim, supra note 195, at 320-21.
201 They also rely on the public choice analysis noted earlier. See supra text accompanying
notes 131-38.
202 See Karkkainen, supra note 172, at 416.
203 See MAASS, supra note 195, at 40,42; Brudney, supra note 75, at 27 & n.102; Correia,
supra note 6, at 1157; Donald R. Matthews & James A. Stimson, Cue-Taking by Congressmen:
A Model and a Computer Simulation, in THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENTARY BEHAVIOR 247-73
(William 0. Aydelotte ed., 1977); Abner J. Mlkva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend
the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587,609 (1983). For a practical account ofthe manner in which
legislators decide to vote, see BERNARD ASBELL, THE SENATE NOBODY KNOWS 35-36, 267-68
(1975).
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or the Administration.204 Members who vote on the basis of such cues or referents
will ordinarily constitute a majority of the chamber.
In addition, many members vote on bills for reasons that have little or no
relationship to their view of the bills' merits.205 A member might vote for a statute
in exchange for a colleague's vote on another measure. The member might vote for
the statute to gain favor with his party's leadership.20 6 The member might also vote
for the statute because the electorate favors it, while secretly hoping either that the
statute will not be enacted or will prove ineffective.207 Thus, with respect to
virtually any issue that arises under a statute, it is highly unlikely that a majority of
the enacting legislative body thought about the issue, voted based on the merits of
the bill, and agreed on the resolution of the issue.
However, precisely these same arguments can be made with respect to
legislators' consideration of the statutory text.208 Few, if any, legislators read all of
a statute before they vote on it; indeed, often they do not read any of it.209 Members
will more likely rely on descriptions of the bill's provisions, provided in the
committee report or by members of their staff, than read the text of the bill and form
their own judgments about the text's meaning.2 10 In addition, many members may
give little thought to the text of the bill because they will vote based on the positions
of others-those colleagues or others they use as cues or referents. 211 Moreover,
even if members read the text, they would probably understand the terms of the
statute differently.2 12
204 See Diver, supra note 52, at 557; Larry Evans et al., Congressional Procedure and
Statutory Interpretation, 45 ADM. L. REV. 239, 247-57 (1993).
2 05 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,636-38 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Breyer,
supra note 73, at 864-66; Diver, supra note 52, at 558; Mayton, supra note 75, at 144-45 & n.99;
Shepsle, supra note 134, at 244, 248-50.
206 See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2 07 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 121, at 322-24. See generally ARTHUR, supra note 122,
at 35.
208 See Wald, supra note 110, at 307; Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative
History, supra note 160, at 60 (citing a question by Chairman Kastenmeier to Judge James
Buckley).
209 See Interbranch Relation, supra note 73, at 90, 91 (citing testimony of former
Congressman Robert Kastenmeier and Eleanor Holmes Norton); MAASS, supra note 195, at 115-
16 (reciting an instance in which a Senate Conmmittee misled the Senate by adding appropriate
language to the report but not putting the language in the bill itself); Congressional Control ofthe
Administration of Government, supra note 197, at 614-15; Statutory Interpretation and the Uses
ofLegislative History, supra note 160, at 33, 111 (citing statements ofthen-Circuit Judge Stephen
Breyer and Stephen F. Ross).
210 See supra note 195.
211 See supra notes 203-04.
212 For instance, to use the Founders' Park example, a member of the legislative body might
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The new textualists do not appear to address these problems in great detail, but
their response can be surmised. Legislators' failure to form an understanding of the
text (either because they do not read the statute or because they follow others' cues)
and their potentially divergent interpretation of words are unimportant because each
legislator has a duty to become aware of the text of the statute and ascertain the
meaning of that text to a reasonable person. Legislators have a duty to the populace
subject to the law, not just their own constituents, to enact determinate and easily
understandable statutes.213 If a legislator wants a statute to reflect his subjective
intent, and the text of the statute, as interpreted by a reasonable person, does not
reflect that intent, he must attempt to change the statute so that the statute conveys
his intent to the reasonable reader. No legislator who votes for a statute (even one
who casts the decisive vote) could reasonably expect the courts to give the statute
the meaning he subjectively ascribes to it if that subjective understanding departs
dramatically from the customary meaning of the words used in the statute.214
Because of the duties outlined above, the new textualists conclusively presume2 15
that all of the legislators knew the meaning the reasonable person would attach to
the statutory text and voted for or against the statute on that basis.216 With such a
interpret the term "motor vehicle" to mean any one of the following: (1) all motorized vehicles,
(2) all motorized vehicles that operate on the surface of the earth (land or water), (3) all motorized
vehicles that operate on land (but not those that operate on water), (4) all motorized vehicles that
operate on land except trains, (5) all motorized wheeled vehicles, and (6) all motorized wheeled
vehicles that are used primarily for transportation (excluding, for instance, riding lawnmowers).
213 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451, 453, 458 (1939); USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 162, at 51-
52; Robert H. Jackson, Problems of Statutory Interpretation, 8 F.R.D. 121, 124-25 (1948);
HURST, supra note 125, at 39, 54-55; SUNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 102-03. See generally 1A
SINGER, supra note 156, § 21.16, at 138-70; 2A SINGER, supra note 156, § 45.08, at 33-42.
2 14 See Charles B. Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REV. 509,
516-17 (1940). Thus, virtually all courts refuse to consider affidavits from legislators regarding
the meaning they intended statutes to have. See Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 860 F.2d 1434,1439
(7th Cir. 1988); Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to Improve the Legislative
Process: Can It Be Done in the Post-Chevron Era, 13 J.L. & POL. 105, 109 n.17 (1996). There
are other reasons for refusing to accept such statements, such as their unreliability. See, e.g., Bread
Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm., 455 U.S. 577, 582 n.3 (1982).
215 Perhaps it would be more accurate to say new textualists "virtually conclusively
presume" because when faced with absurd results (and perhaps obvious typographical errors), new
textualists may be willing to give a statute something other than its ordinary meaning. See, e.g.,
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach., 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
216 Indeed, Judge Buckley made the sort of argument outlined above when confronted with
the assertion that the criticisms the new textualist lodge against the use of legislative history can
also be lodged against reliance on statutory text.
Mr. Kastenmeier Let us assume that in a decade we have a new series of judicial
1999]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
conclusive presumption based on duties arising out of the responsibilities of
legislators, legislators' failure to read the statute or recognize the ordinary meaning
of the statutory text become failures to acquit their responsibilities rather than a
problem that undermines new textualist theory.217
This is a cogent response. However, as I will argue in Part IV, a similar
argument supports the recognition of the parts of legislative history that constitute
the legislature's explanation of the statute. In particular, because the public
justification of statutes is important, courts should view individual legislators as
having a duty to contribute to that public justification and thus presume that they
activists ... that... have not only little respect for legislative history, they have little respect
for the legislative language itself, for the same reasons.
Judge Buckley- Well, one begins with the assunption that printed law is the law of the
land. And one has to work from there backwards. One has to assume, if we are to have an
orderly society, that one can impute the meaning of the language to the majorities in the
House and the Senate that vote for it And this is a pure, textual approach to the interpretation
of laws.
Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, supra note 160, at 60 (colloquy
between Chairman Kastenmeier and Judge James Buckley). Similarly, in United States v. Taylor,
487 U.S. 326 (1988), Justice Scalia asserted:
The text is so unambiguous on these points that it must be assumed that what the Members
of the House and the Senators thought they were voting for, and what the President thought
he was approving when he signed the bill, was what the text plainly said, rather than what a
few Representatives, or even a Committee Report, said it said.
Id. at 345 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia argued that such an assumption fosters the democratic
process.
217 See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511,528 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The language
ofthe statute is entirely clear, and if that is not what Congress meant then Congress has made a
mistake and Congress will have to correct it!") (emphasis added).
Indeed, the new textualists (and the Supreme Court in general) place on Congress the
responsibility for becoming aware of certain judicial doctrines, such as judicially-created clear
statement rules. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. In following such clear statement
rules, courts interpret statutes as if Congress were aware of the need to expressly override the clear
statement rule. Any evidence that Congress was unaware of the clear statement rule when dmfling
legislation is simply irrelevant. Congress's failure to consider such a canon can simply be
dismissed as a dereliction of duty.
Moreover, syntax canons (and other interpretive canons) also constitute presumptions about
legislative behavior that do not appear to have an empirical basis and perhaps reflect judicial
judgments about how Congress should legislate, i.e., the obligations of members in considering
and voting upon legislation. See Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 1989);
Edwards v. United States, 814 F.2d 486,489 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.). See generally Bell, supra
note 214, at 156 n.261.
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vote on the basis of the text and the public justification.
2. New Textualist Methodology
The new textualist's methodology is simple.2 18 Courts should interpret statutes
based on the ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute and various rules of
grammar2 19 and syntax, such as the interpretive canon that a court must interpret a
statute so as to give every word some effect 220 If the ordinary meaning of the words
and the syntax and grammatical devices do not yield an interpretation, the court
should fit the statute into the corpus of the law.221 Ordinarily, a court should not
refer to legislative history when interpreting a statute.222
Stated alternatively, the new textualists place no reliance on legislators'
subjective understanding of a statute at the time they vote on it, but rely only on the
objective meaning of the text of the statute, i.e., the understanding of the statute that
the reasonable person would adopt 223 The only relevant text to be construed in this
objective manner is the text of the statute-the text of various elements of the
legislative history lack relevance because according such documents any legal effect
is illegitimate.224
New textualism has undergone a fearsome counterattack.2 25 However, this
counterattack rarely contests the validity of the three premises underlying new
textualism outlined above. Rather, critics argue that new textualism cannot yield
2 18 The approach outlined above is that of Justice Antonin Scalia, the leading new textualist.
See Green, 490 U.S. at 527-30 (Scalia, J., concurring). See generally Why Learned Hand, supra
note 68, at 1005-06. Many pursue a similar approach. However, Judge Frank Easterbrook, who
shares with new textualists a belief in public choice theory and a skepticism about legislative
intent, does use legislative history. In part this appears to stem from his view that the text of
statutes is ordinarily indeterminate. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power
of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PU13. POL'Y 87,89,91 (1984).
2 19 See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 169-70 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220 See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 257-58 (1993) (Scalia, J.); Church of
Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 156-57 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.), aff'd, 484 U.S. 9 (1987).
For a general statement of the rule, see POPKIN, supra note 127, at 276; 2A SINGER, supra note
155, § 46.06, at 119-26.
221 See POPKIN, supra note 127, at 276; see also Karkkainen, supra note 172, at 408-11.
222 See, e.g., Conroy, 507 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v.
Mortier, 501 U.S. 597,621-23 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Green, 490 U.S. at 527-30 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
223 See Correia, supra note 6, at 1156 & n.94.
224 See Conroy, 507 U.S. at 519 ("The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy.
We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.").
225 See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses ofLegislative History, supra note 160; infra
notes 226, 229-40 and accompanying text.
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results in difficult cases, regardless of its basis in constitutional or political theory,
and unduly increases the power of interpreters relative to lawmakers.
First, critics argue, because words lack any precise inherent meaning outside
the context in which they are used, heavy reliance on text to interpret statutes will
produce unreasonable, stilted, and erroneous interpretations of statutes. Words have
meaning only within the context in which they are used, and thus context must be
considered in interpreting statutory text Legislative history forms a crucial part of
that statutory context. In attempting to construe words without considering context,
new textualists misconstrue those words.226
Indeed, the most elementary reason for rejecting new textualism, and perhaps
the one that most motivates the courts, is that more information is better than
less. 227 When faced with difficult questions of statutory interpretation, courts
naturally seek as much guidance as possible, and legislative history can provide
such guidance.228 At least legislative history is produced by the body that enacted
the statute.
Second, new textualism allegedly increases the power of interpreters, namely
courts and administrative agencies, at the expense of lawmakers, such as Congress
and the President,229 by increasing the likelihood that the relevant interpreter will
find a statute ambiguous.2 30 A court must decide a case even when confronting an
22 6 See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 669; Karkkainen, supra note 172, at 421-22. See generally
Alienikoff, supra note 9, at 23; Breyer, supra note 73, at 848-61; McNollgast, supra note 161, at
718,738; Stephen A. Plass, The illusion andAllure of Textualism, 40 VIL. L. REV. 93, 107-08,
125, 127 (1995); Sunstein, supra note 135, at 416-17, 423-24,431 n.96.
227 See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor, 501 U.S. at 611 n.4 (White, J.) ("As for the propriety of
using legislative history at all, common sense suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing
additional information rather than ignoring it"); William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, The Article
I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. LJ. 523,533 &n.86 (1992); see also Colloquies: What TheyAre and
What They Do, 33 TAX NOTES 128, 128 (1986) (reporting the statement of a former Internal
Revenue Service Commissioner that "[i]f the statute is not clear, you look for anything you can
find'); Statutory Interpretation and the Uses ofLegislative History, supra note 160, at 67 (citing
the testimony of Judge Patricia Wald: "And somehow to suggest that I should not look at
legislative history, not just the reports, but even the whole length and breadth ofit, makes me feel
like somebody is tying one hand behind my back in getting at congressional intent').
228 This point can also be stated negatively: courts rely on legislative history to avoid the
difficult intellectual work. See DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 138 & nA, 164; Slawson, supra note
171, at 399.
229 The President has a dual role: he participates in lawmaking through the exercise of the
veto and in interpreting law through his supervision of administrative agencies. See Bell, supra
note 214, at 117 n.66.
230 See Sunstein, supra note 135, at 430 & n.91; Eskridge, supra note 3, at 675-76; Michael
Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1663, 1682 (1991); Karkkainen, supra note 172, at 475; Plass, supra note 226, at 125. See
generally Bell, supra note 214, at 106-07, 121, 126-27, 135-45. But see Orrin S. Kerr, Shedding
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ambiguous statutory text.2 31 Under new textualism, if a court finds a statute
ambiguous after it has considered the ordinary meaning of words and various
grammar and syntax rules, it must essentially make policy judgments to resolve the
interpretive question,232 or, under Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,233 allow agencies to do so. 34 New textualism rejects sources
produced by electorally responsible institutions explicating the policies underlying
the statute, namely congressionally-produced legislative history, that could help
courts and agencies resolve ambiguities before having to make their own policy
judgments. Such an expansion ofjudicial and agency discretion has implications for
the relative powers of governmental institutions. If most judges could resolve most
issues based on text, as Justice Scalia asserts that he can,235 new textualism might
well reduce judicial discretion and return power to elected legislators and chief
executives.2 36 If, as is more likely, most judges view text as largely
indeterminate, 237 new textualism will instead more often require judges and
Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the US. Courts ofAppeals, 15
YALE J. REG. 1, 2 (1998). At the very least, Scalia's approach is no more determinate than
conventional interpretive techniques. See Karkkainen, supra note 172, at 423-24; Schacter, supra
note 116, at 593, 644.
231 See Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 382;
Sunstein, supra note 135, at 430.
232 See Karkkainen, supra note 172, at 407, 411-14; Statutory Interpretation and the Uses
of Legislative History, supra note 160, at 67.
233 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
234 In Chevron, the Court suggested that administrative agencies, in resolving such
unresolved questions, rely on their own policy preferences or those of the political branches of
government, see id. at 865, without attempting either to determine how the enacting legislature
would have resolved the issue or to discern the enacting legislature's policy preferences. See, e.g.,
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance ofPower in the Administrative State,
89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 502, 525 (1989); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Elem ent ofthe Separation ofPowers, 17 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 881, 897 (1983).
235 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKEL.J. 511,521. Many observers question Justice Scalia's conclusions that the statutes at issue
in recent cases are unambiguous. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 172, at 401, 444-45,475-76;
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hyperexaualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and
Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 749, 752, 778-79 (1995).
236 Even the "dictionary" meaning of a word is not determinate, and it may provide a court
with substantial discretion. The Supreme Court has used a variety of dictionaries-27 between
1988 and 1994-in determining the "plain meaning" of statutory terms. See Note, Looldnglt Up:
Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1437, 1437-39 (1994). See
generally Ellen P. Aprill, The Law ofthe Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30
ARIZ. ST. LJ. 275 (1998).
237 See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407,418 (1992);
Easterbrook, supra note 218, at 98; Farina, supra note 234, at 460-6 1.
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administrative agencies to resolve cases by relying upon their own policy views
without any guidance from Congress. Such a preference for unguided judicial and
agency policymaking (albeit, in the case of administrative agencies, influenced by
the current President and Congress)238 over expressions of policy by the legislature
that enacted the statute seems inconsistent with the principle that the courts and
agencies should act as agents of Congress.239
Notice, however, that neither of these attacks contests the three premises of new
textualism analyzed above.2 40 Rather, they suggest that new textualism will lead to
erroneous interpretations based on the indeterminate nature of language and will
increase the discretion and thus the power of courts and agencies at the expense of
Congress.
B. Intentionalism
Intentionalism requires the interpreter to construe a statute according to the
"intent" of the enacting legislature; the interpreter must determine which
interpretations the enacting legislature wanted it to adopt, or would have wanted it
to adopt had the relevant issue been brought to the legislature's attention.
Ascertaining this "legislative intent" requires not only an examination of the text of
the statute, but, in addition, the statute's "legislative history," because sometimes
legislatures, like individuals, use words that do not reflect their intentions.
Two intentionalist approaches, simple intentionalism and imaginative
reconstruction, should be distinguished. Simple intentionalism requires the
interpreter to determine the intent the members of the legislature actually possessed
when enacting the statute. Thus, simple intentionalism will aid the interpreter only
if the members of the legislature had a particular situation in mind, e.g., if the
238 Of course, the preferences of the current Congress and President may conflict with the
preferences of the enacting Congress. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYrON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 608 (1993); Diver, supra note 52, at 579-81, 584; Pierce, supra note 235,
at 765.
239 See DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 7-9; HURsT, supra note 125, at 33, 40; William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331,
408 (199 1); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 325-26; Gonzalez, supra note 9, at 636-46.
240 There is yet a third argument for rejecting textualism. Legislative history makes cases
somewhat easier to decide. See Slawson, supra note 171, at 399. Frederick Schauer makes this sort
of argument with respect to focus on text. See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the
Coordinating Function ofPlain Meaning, 1990 SuP. Cr. REv. 231,253-56 (1990). Schauer also
argues that this is an advantage ofrules, see SCHAUER, supra note 157, at 145-49, 229-33. Instead
of having to determine the relevance of the corpus of the law and fit the statute within it, one can
narrow the issues by examining legislative history. See generally SUNSTErN, supra note 74, at 42
(discussing the importance of lack of time for judicial decisionmaking and noting that precedent
is liberating by allowing courts not to constantly revisit first principles).
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councilpersons that enacted the Founders' Park ordinance actually had the
inoperable jeep in mind when enacting the ordinance. If the legislators did not have
the relevant specific situation in mind, they could not have formed any intent
regarding that situation. "Imaginative reconstruction" adapts intentionalism to this
situation. A legislature can have an "intenf' even on unforeseen issues-the
interpreter determines this intent by intuiting the response legislators would have
provided had the issue been brought to their attention.241 Thus, based on the text and
legislative history of a statute (as well as the general circumstances leading to the
statute's enactment and the values and attitudes common during that period in
which the legislation was enacted),242 the interpreter seeks to draw conclusions
about how the legislature would have voted on the issue if it had arisen.243
In general, the courts seem to have adopted intentionalism-at least simple
241 See Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280,285 (1933) (Cardozo, J.); Friedrich v. City of
Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1989); Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALEL.J.
167, 171 (1947) ("[The task] is no less than to decide how those who have passed the 'enactment'
would have dealt with the 'particulars' before [the judge], about which they have said nothing
whatever."); Win-Chiat Lee, Statutory Interpretation and the Counterfactual Testfor Legislative
Intention, 8 LAW & PHIL. 383, 393-94 (1989); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983).
242 See Posner, supra note 241, at 818.
243 The primary proponent of this approach is Judge Richard Posner. See, e.g., id. at 817;
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 103-05,273-76 (1990). The approach
is subject to powerful critiques. See WLLiAm N. ESKRIDGE & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 101 (Supp. 1992); see also Easterbrook, supra note 188, at 537-39;
Lee, supra note 241, at 397-401.
Because of the difficulty of truly applying "imaginative construction," in practice it is little
different from the Hart and Sacks "Legal Process" approach, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 365, 392-95 (1990); Sunstein, supra note 135,
at 434-36; supra note 137. The Legal Process approach focuses more on what a reasonable
Congress with the enacting Congress's overall statutory goals would have wanted. Some argue
that because of the difficulty in discerning such a hypothetical intent, those who engage in
imaginative reconstruction really base their conclusion on their views of what the legislature
should have intended, not what it would have intended. See George A. Costello, Average Voting
Members and Other "Benign Fictions" The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor
Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 63-64; see also Frank
Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
59,59 n.1 (1988); USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVEHISTORY, supra note 162, at 43.
Furthermore, "imaginative reconstruction" as advocated by Judge Richard Posner ignores
institutional issues. Before an issue is addressed by a legislature, it must go through many steps
in which some legislators wield more power than others. For instance, the House Rules Committee
may have prevented the particular issue from coming up before the House of Representatives.
Surmising the outcome of a hypothetical vote on the issue, assuming both that the issue would
have come before the chamber and that the legislators would have cast their votes based on their
views of the merits of the issue, ignores the institutional realities of the legislative process.
1999]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
intentionalism.244 Unfortunately, intentionalism has not been rigorously defined by
scholars who find it convincing. Instead, the approach has, in large measure, been
defined by those who find it deficient. I will discuss the assumptions underlying
intentionalism and the unfortunate methodological consequences intentionalism has
produced.
1. Intentionalist Premises
Three premises that underlie intentionalism and correspond to the three
previously discussed premises underlying new textualism merit discussion. First
at least as seen by its critics, intentionalism is individualistic and non-institutional;
it ignores the role of legislative institutions. Second, intentionalists do not view the
vote on a statute as the approval of statutory text; they view such a vote as an
enactment of the subjective intent shared by a majority of the legislature. Third, the
intentionalist approach implicitly incorporates the belief that a majority of
legislators will often share an intent regarding many of the issues that arise (or at
least would have had the issues been broached). These assumptions are problematic,
and lead to unfortunate methodological consequences.
a. The Significant Action in the Legislative Process Is the Vote ofEach
Chamber on Legislation
In the view of its critics, intentionalism, like new textualism, focuses on
legislatures as collections of individuals rather than as institutions. Intentionalists
aggregate the intentions of individual legislators-in particular, the intentions of a
majority of the individual legislators form the foundation of statutory law. The
subjective intent that a majority of legislators either shared, or would have shared
had a particular issue been raised, constitutes the legislative intent that governs
interpretation of the statute.2 45 Dean Paul Brest's description of the intentionalist
244 See DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 137; FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 89; Balkin,
supra note 158, at 772-73 & n.87; infra note 259. The courts characteristically assert that the
interpretive task requires determining legislative intent, and then canvass both the text and
legislative history to ascertain that intent. See id. The Supreme Court has not explicitly approved
"imaginative reconstruction" as an interpretive approach, and has sometimes explicitly rejected
it, see West Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1991) (Scalia, J.); Tennessee Valley
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978) (Burger, C.J.).
245 See DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 87-88; DWORKIN, supra note 121, at 320-21; Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 212-13
(1980); Eskridge, supra note 243, at 380; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 326; Heidi M.
Hurd, InterpretingAuthorities, in LAWANDINTERPRETAION: EssAYs IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 405,
422 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995); Moore, supra note 162, at 348.
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approach highlights this aspect of intentionalism.2 46 He observes that intentionalists
not only examine the text of a statute, but also accord each legislator an "intention-
vote."247 By counting these intention-votes, one can determine the legislative intent
regarding a particular issue.248
A focus on individual legislators rather than the legislature as an institution, in
conjunction with the democratic requirement of equality among legislators, would
seem to demand that no one legislator's intent be considered more important than
that of any other.249 However, such an approach ignores institutional obligations
and institutional actions. 250 Indeed, the more cogent intentionalists build a theory
based upon the special institutional position of committees. As an institution,
Congress delegates to committees the responsibility of determining legislative
policies, subject to the review and consent of the chamber as a whole.2 51
Accordingly, the views of the committee and its representative in floor debates, i.e.,
the floor manager,252 which are in effect ratified by approval of the committee's
recommended statutory text, should receive special weight. However, judicial
practices go far beyond the approaches that this delegation-assent theory would
246 See Brest, supra note 245, at 212-13. Brest discusses the intentionalist approach in
preparing to attack the "original intenf' approach to Constitutional interpretation. See id.
247 See id. at 212.
248 See id at 212-13. Brest applies this intention-vote technique to the question of whether
the Hart-Fuller "no vehicles in the park" ordinance prohibits operation ofmopeds within a park
See id at 213. The "intentionalists" must determine the intent of each member of the city council
on this "moped" issue when the council voted on the ordinance. See id If a majority of members
did not intend to ban mopeds, the statute would not prohibit mopeds from the park. Brest
acknowledges the abstract nature of the discussion and acknowledges that those who focus on
legislative intent do not use the intention-vote methodology, but he properly notes that the
"different, and much cruder ways of determining adopters' intentions" used in the real world
"assume[ ] the existence of an attainable ideal which is fairly described by" the intention-vote
metaphor. See id.
24 9 See supra text accompanying notes 179-84. If the members were secretly polled and a
majority agreed on the meaning of a statute with regard to a particular issue, that majority
interpretation would constitute the intent ofthe legislature. Each intent, whether expressed publicly
in legislative documents viewed as authoritative, expressed privately, unexpressed, or unformed
at the time of the vote, counts equally.
250 See Breyer, supra note 73, at 866.
251 See SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1935) (Hand, J.); Correia,
supra note 6, at 1157-58; Hurd, supra note 245, at 423; Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Legislative
Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 778-81, 783 (1966); James E. Westbrook, A Comparison of the
Interpretation of Statutes and Collective Bargaining Agreements: Grasping the Pivot of Tao, 60
Mo. L. REV. 283, 312 (1995); Zeppos, supra note 185, at 1345-47; see also Breyer, supra note
73, at 858-60, 863-64 (delegating work to staff).
25 2 The floor manager is a delegate of the comnittee. See United States v. Wrightwood Dairy
Co., 315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942); SMrrH & DEERG, supra note 144, at 129.
1999]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
permit-courts, with the blessing of many scholars, use elements of legislative
history that do not merit recognition under a delegation-assent theory2 53 Moreover,
delegation-assent theorists rarely offer a theoretical justification 254 for imposing on
legislators the obligation to either voice disagreement with committee reports or
consider themselves bound by them.255
As we shall see, intentionalism's focus on Congress as merely the sum of
individual legislators creates insurmountable methodological problems. Viewing
legislatures as institutions avoids those methodological problems. More particularly,
one can ground the justification for the use of legislative history upon the belief that
legislatures, as institutions, have a duty to explain statutes and that individual
legislators have a corresponding duty to address those explanations.
253 For instance, courts give weight to: (1) statements of sponsors of legislation (who surely
have not been delegated any power), see Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and
Significance of Presidential "Signing Statements," 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 209, 221 & nn.74-75
(1988); Giles, supra note 171, at 367, (2) testimony of witnesses at congressional hearings, see id
at 366 nn.46-55, 385-88 (illustrating in an appendix the use ofnonlegislator contributions in U.S.
Supreme Court cases), and even (3) preliminary reports prepared by executive branch officials or
private groups before submitting proposed legislation, see generally Kosak v. United States, 465
U.S. 848, 856-57 & n.13 (1984) (relying on report drafted by a Department of Justice official
fifteen years before the enactment of the relevant statute); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal
Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205,221-22 & nn.30, 32 (1979) (relying on the report of National Association
of Insurance Commissioners). Sometimes the Court provides no evidence that Congress endorsed
the nonlegislator statements on which they rely. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohrn & Haas Co., 448
U.S. 176, 204-12 (1980); Giles, supra note 171, at 360, 375-76. Surely a delegation-assent theory
does not justify such practices.
254 Ronald Dworkin does explore the theoretical justifications of considering legislative
history in Law's Empire. He argues that statutes regarding moral issues must embody consistent
principles. See DWORKIN, supra note 121, at 178-84. Courts must generally render decisions on
the basis of principles consistent with either precedent or statutes. See i. at 225-28. Certain
aspects of legislative history, such as committee reports, provide a basis for courts to use in
interpreting statutes consistently with their underlying principles. See id at 343.
255 See DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 159; POPKIN, supra note 127, at 482; MacCallum, supra
note 251, at 780. Delegation-assent theorists might suggest that legislators have an obligation to
either respond to or consider themselves bound by the official explanation of a bill because the
members know that courts (and agencies) use legislative history. Because every legislator has
notice of the judicial use of legislative history and an opportunity to participate in creating that
legislative history, each should be bound by his failure to avail himself of the opportunity to set
forth his views in the legislative history. See DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 159; Louis S. Raveson,
Unmasking the Motives of Government Decisionmakers: A Subpoena For Your Thoughts?, 63
N.C. L. REV. 879, 977-78 (1985). However, such an argument is circular: judicial use of
legislative history is legitimate because legislators know courts use legislative history.
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b. A Vote on the Statute Is a Vote to Make the Subjective Intent of the
Majofity the Law
In contrast to the new textualists, who believe that a vote on the statute
represents merely an expression of approval or disapproval of the statutory text,
intentionalists believe that the vote on the statute is a vote to convert the subjective
intent of the majority into law. The vote on a statute acts as a toggle switch. If a
majority of legislators share an intent, but the legislature does not enact a statutory
provision memorializing that shared intent, the shared intent can have no legal
effect 256 However, if the legislature enacts a statute purporting to memorialize that
intent, then that intent becomes binding law, even if the ordinary meaning of the
terms chosen to memorialize that intent do not reflect that shared intent.2 57 When
the interpreter concludes that the statute's "text cannot possibly reflect the actual
intent of Congress," because of a typographical error, for instance, legislative intent
rather than the text governs.2 58 Thus, once the statute passes, intent, not text, is
authoritative.2 59
2 56 See generally Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S.
495, 501-04 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (stating that in the absence of statutory language to interpret,
legislative history is without legal effect even if the intent it evidences is clear); IBEW v. NLRB,
814 F.2d 697, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("A cardinal principle of the judicial function of statutory
interpretation is that courts have no authority to enforce principles gleaned solely from legislative
history that has no statutory reference point"). On this, they agree with new textualists. See supra
note 188 and accompanying text.
257 As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote: "We are not free to say to Congress: 'We
see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before."'
Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30,32 (lst Cir. 1908); accordRosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kniep, 430
U.S. 584, 597 (1977); see also Sullivan v. Eberhart, 494 U.S. 83, 106 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[W]e... do not sit to insist that Congress express its intent as precisely as would be
possible. Our duty is to ask what Congress intended, and not to assay whether Congress might
have stated that intent more naturally, more artfully, or more pithily."); West Va. Univ. Hosp. v.
Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
258 See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc, 458 U.S. 564,571 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.) ("[I]n
rare cases the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the
intentions of its drafters, and those intentions must be controlling."); United States v. Locke, 471
U.S. 84, 120-25 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); POSNER, supra note 243, at 267-69; Breyer,
supra note 73, at 850-51. See generally 2A SINGER, supra note 155, § 47.37, at 283-90.
2 59 See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707,713 (1975); Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537,542
(1943); United States v. N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50, 53-54 (1942); Holy
Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,459 (1892). See generally 2 SINGER, supra note
155, § 45.05, at 22; HURSr, supra note 125, at 32 ("The standard criterion for proper interpretation
of a statute is to find the 'intention of the legislature."').
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c. It Is Likely That There Will Be One Subjective Intent Regarding the Statute
Shared by a Majority ofLegislators.
Intentionalism presumes that a majority of legislators will often share one
subjective intent, or would have, had a particular issue been raised. Intentionalist
courts could not use legislative intent to resolve many cases if they did not believe
that legislative majorities often share a purpose. The argument over the importance
of "intent" to interpretation would hold little significance if intent existed as seldom
as new textualists claim it does.260
Intentionalists do not address the claims that few members think intently about
bills and that legislators' votes may bear little relation to their views of a statute's
merits.261 To the extent that they address such claims,262 they rely on the
delegation-assent theory described earlier.2 63 Indeed, the methodological problems
faced by intentionalism result from intentionalists' pursuit of legislative intent
despite cogent arguments that a majority will rarely share a common intent.
260 Of course, "imaginative reconstruction" partially addresses this problem, by allowing
courts to find intent even when a majority of legislators did not form an intent regarding a
particular issue. Nevertheless, imaginative reconstruction assumes that a majority of legislators
would have agreed on the resolution of a particular issue, making it vulnerable to the same critique
leveled against the simple intentionalist view that legislative majorities frequently share an actual
intent. See supra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
261 The intentionalist could argue, in response, that we should honor the wishes of those
legislators who possess the greatest expertise and knowledge. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168,
186 (1969); FRIENDLY, supra note 195, at 216.
However, such a rationale conflicts with democratic theory. In an election, we do not give
greater weight to the votes cast by more knowledgeable citizens. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 562-63, 567-68 (1964) (establishing the one-person-one-vote principle); see also Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Property and poll-tax
qualifications, very simply, are not in accord with current egalitarian notions of how a modem
democracy should be organized."); MAYO, supra note 179, at 108-13. Similarly, agencies
possessing expertise remain subject to the control of democratic institutions. See Chevron U.SA.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984); Sierra Club v.
Costle, 657 F.2d 298,404-10 (1981); DAvID ScHOENBROD, PowER.WrmouT REspoNsmurr'
99, 100, 105 (1993); Ronald M. Levin, CongressionalEthics and ConstiluentAdvocacy in an Age
of Mistrsst, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1, 46-47 (1996). See generally J. Skelly Wright, Beyond
Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE LI. 575, 585 (1972); MAYO, supra note 179, at 94, 275-76.
262 Intentionalists do not directly address the claims of cycling and nontransitive choices
made by public choice theory.
263 See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
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2. The Intentionalists 'Methodology
a. Using Legislative History to Find Intent
Intentionalists need a method for determining legislative intent-either
legislators' actual intent or the underlying attitudes that would have led legislators
to agree upon a particular answer if a particular issue had arisen. Traditionally,
courts have relied upon both the ordinary meaning of the statutory text and
"legislative history" to discern legislative intent. Legislative history consisted of a
limited set of legislatively-produced documents-primarily, committee reports and
floor debates. That approach has evolved. Currently, courts use anything that can
help them discern legislative intent, including, in some jurisdictions, the testimony
of legislators. This evolution results from intentionalists' efforts to find legislative
intent where none exists. 264
Describing intentionalist methodology in terms that allow comparison with new
textualist methodology, intentionalist methodology's goal is subjective rather than
objective. The intentionalist seeks the subjective understanding of the members of
the legislative majority rather than the understanding of a reasonable person reading
the statutory text.
b. The Problems
Unfortunately, using legislative history to determine the subjective intent of a
majority of legislators presents serious problems. First, the use of legislative history
to determine legislative intent conflicts with the democratic principle that all
representatives are equal.
The documents that comprise traditional legislative history contain the
statements and views of few members of Congress-for any particular bill, most
legislators do not participate in committee proceedings and remain silent during
floor debate. Thus, using legislative history to discern intent introduces a bias
toward the views of representatives who express their views in a certain narrow
range of documents. The views of the many legislators who expressed their views
either in other public fora (such as in political campaigns or on the Sunday talk
shows265) or privately (to other legislators or staff members), or who never
expressed them, do not appear in the legislative history. 266 The legislative history
264 See Slawson, supra note 171, at 397-403 (citing four factors contributing to the increased
use of legislative history).
265 For example, "Face the Nation," "This Week," and "Meet the Press."
266 Even if the views of every legislator were fully known, intentionalists would then face
the additional problem of aggregating the intentions of individual legislators so as to determine an
intent of the legislature. In general, such "aggregation" problems are insurmountable. See Pildes
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also will not reflect the "intent" of members who did not formulate specific views
before the vote on the statute.
Accordingly, if the views of all legislators, those who expressed their views in
other public fora, those who expressed their views privately, those who did not
express their views, and those who did not form views, as well as those who
expressed their views in the legislative history, are to be given one intention-vote-
the legislative history will surely provide unreliable evidence of the intent of the
majority of legislators. Rather, the intent set forth in the legislative history will be
biased toward the views of those who expressed their intent.267
Second, as noted earlier, a majority of legislators will rarely share any intent.
Most legislators will not have given sufficient attention to the statute to form an
intent on difficult interpretive issues. Moreover, the legislators' votes may not
reflect their intent if, as often happens, they vote for reasons largely unrelated to
their view of the statute's merits.
Third, we do not have and will likely never have sufficient information to
determine the subjective intent of legislative majorities. At best, legislative history
provides indirect and inaccurate information regarding the views of the two types
of legislators that intentionalists should most wish to learn about: (1) the typical
majority voter, i.e., the legislators who made up the bulk of the legislative majority;
and (2) the swing voters, i.e., the legislators who cast the deciding votes. Worse yet,
the legislative that history may not provide any explanation of some legislative
compromises.
Intentionalists should arguably focus on the views of the typical majority voter
or the swing voters.268 The focus on the typical majority voter reflects majoritarian
conces-the views of such a legislator likely resemble the views of the majority
of legislators who comprise the victorious legislative majority.269 The focus upon
swing voters rests on a causation argument: the swing voters were the legislators
most likely to have voted against the bill, and if they had done so, it would have
& Anderson, supra note 121, at 2206 (rejecting notion that courts' role in interpreting statutes is
to ascertain the aggregation of the individual legislators' personal preferences); DWORKIN, supra
note 121, at 320-21; Karkkainen, supra note 172, at 416; Moore, supra note 162, at 348--49,351;
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 326.
2 67 Historians face the same problem. See DANIEL J. BOORsTIN, HIDDEN HISTORY 7-9
(1987) (discussing the biases introduced into historical works as a result of the greater durability
of written rather than oral communications); LOUIS GoTrscHALK, UNDERSTANDING HISrORY: A
PRIMER OF HISrORICAL MEmOD 45-46 (1950); see also RALPH EuLSON, THEINVismLE MAN 439
(2d ed. 1995) (1952).
268 See Easterbrook, supra note 243, at 63; Costello, supra note 243, at 40 & n.2, 61-62;
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423,
436-37,449 n.96 (1988); Starr, supra note 171, at 375-76 (questioning use of legislative history
as indicative of congressional intent).
269 See DWORKIN, supra note 121, at 320.
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been defeated-thus, in some ways, their votes determined the outcome.270
However, discerning the intent of either the typical majority legislator or the swing
legislators is a daunting task because we have little information about their views.271
Such members generally remain silent during legislative deliberations and often
either do not give great thought to the proposed legislation or do not vote solely on
the legislation's merits.
The statements by the sponsors and leading proponents of the bill may provide
indirect evidence held by the bulk of the members of the majority or the swing
voters. However, those who speak or prepare committee reports probably hold more
extreme views than either the ordinary member of the majority or the swing
legislator.272
Moreover, the legislative history frequently does not even provide an accurate
picture of the intent of those most involved in drafting and agreeing to a particular
compromise. Much that is crucial, perhaps the most crucial parts of the legislative
process, is not documented in any record, either official or unofficial. 273
270 See McNollgast, supra note 161, at 739-40.
271 Farber and Frickey suggest that judges can rely upon their "intuitive sense of the
legislative center of gravity" to reach conclusions about the views of the 'median" or "'typical'
centrist" legislator. See FARBER& FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 54.
272 See Eskridge, supra note 243, at 383-84; Mayton, supra note 75, at 144-45 & n.101;
McNollgast, supra note 161, at 711-12. To the extent that committees do not reflect the views of
the chamber as a whole, committees and their representatives on the floor, Le., floor managers, will
probably hold views that diverge from those of most legislators. See Bell, supra note 214, at 147
n.223.
273 Most political maneuvering, legislative negotiation, and compromise takes place in
circumstances where no official records are kept-at caucuses, leadership meetings, meetings with
the President and private conferences. See Reed Dickerson, Statutory Inteipretation: Dipping into
Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125,1131 & n30, 1141 (1983); Diver, supranote 52,
at 556-57; Macey, supra note 64, at 228, 239; Rodriguez, supra note 6, at 220-21; Stephen F.
Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?,
45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 575 (1992); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 200, 202 (1983); see
also Baade, supra note 86, at 1094; Garth L. Mangum, Legislative History in the Interpretation
ofLaw: An Illustrative Case Study, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REV. 281,281,298-99, 300 (noting that the
public history of the Job Partnership Training Act of 1982 did not reflect the realities of the
political process surrounding the bill's enactment and that "[t]he Committee reports may be more
accurately described as justifications to the various supporters than as explanations of
congressional intent"). But see Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative
History, 72 CORNE.L L. REV. 857, 880-82, 903-04 (1987) (suggesting that legislative history can
be accurate even when critical events take place privately).
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c. The Attempted Solutions
The courts and "intentionalisf' scholars have pursued two basic approaches in
addressing the inadequacy of traditional legislative history as a tool for determining
the subjective intent of legislative majorities. One approach expands the legislative
record or, more radically, transforms statutory interpretation from an exercise in
interpreting text into a fact-finding exercise. A second approach involves
acknowledging the inaccuracy of traditional legislative history but refusing to
consider additional information because of countervailing values. The first approach
will fail; the second is arbitrary.
The first approach seeks to increase the judiciary's sophistication in discerning
legislative intent On a practical level, courts have, over time, expanded "the record"
of legislative action, considering an increasingly wider range of materials.274
Initially, courts referred primarily to statements in floor debates and committee
reports.275 While these remain the preferred sources,276 courts now refer to a wider
range of documents, including transcripts of mark-up sessions,277 testimony at
congressional hearings, 278 and documents prepared by nonlegislators. 279 Some have
2 74 See Skeer v. EMK Motors, Inc., 455 A2d 508,512-13 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982)
(relying upon governor's press releases as aid to statutory interpretation); Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc. v. Glaser, 365 A.2d 1, 9-10 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976) (noting that courts may properly
consider "legislative history materials which may never have met the legislative eye," including
newspaper articles, letters written by nonlegislators, and outside speeches by legislators); USING
AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 162, at 121-23 ("Almost every conceivable
variety of legislative history has been accepted as bearing upon the proper interpretation of a
statute. .. .
275 See CURTIS, supra note 2, at 52; Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Lgislative
History, supra note 160, at 140 (testimony of William N. Eskridge); Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R.
Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A StatisticalAnalysis, 22
JUR ImTRcs J. 294,304 tbl.2 (1982) (inference from data).
276 See Carro & Brann, supra note 275, at 304 (inference from data); Jorge L. Carro &
Andrew R. Brann, Use ofLegislative Histories by the United States Supreme Court: A Statistical
Analysis, 9 J. LEGIS. 282, 291 tbl.2 (1982) (inference from data).
277 See Borrell v. United States Int'l Communications Agency, 682 F.2d 981,988 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Ross, supra note 273, at 575 (recommending that transcripts of mark-up sessions be
published); Wald, supra note 273, at 202 & n.56.
278 See Giles, supra note 171, at 385-88; see also Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 190-201,200
nn.44-46 (1985); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 176, 177 n.23, 179-85 (1978).
The expansion of the legislative "record" can also be seen in the Court's attitude toward
reliance upon testimony given in congressional hearings. In 1931, a unanimous Court held that
statements made to committees of Congress and by Senators who were not in charge of the bill
were entitled to no weight "[f]or reasons which need not be restated." McCaughn v. Hershey
Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1931). Currently, the Court regularly refers to testimony
provided at committee hearings. See Giles, supra note 171, at 385-88 (showing regular use of
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recommended further expansion of the legislative record, calling for the publication
of documents that currently remained unpublished. 2 80 More significantly, some
courts have begun to accept sworn statements regarding legislative intent from
legislators. 281
Consistent with these developments, but on a more theoretical level, Nicholas
Zeppos offers a rigorous and well-developed theoretical argument that legislative
intent resembles the intent of individuals or organizations, to which courts
frequently attach legal consequences.2 82 Zeppos argues that the methodology used
in determining legislative intent should resemble that used in determining intent in
other contexts. 283
This first approach of expanding the legislative record and reformulating
statutory interpretation as fact-finding will fail. While it may reduce the bias toward
the views of those who spoke as opposed to those who did not, such an approach
will surely not eliminate that bias. Nor will it solve the problems caused by
legislators' failure to give detailed thought to statutes and their frequent decisions
to vote for reasons unrelated to their understanding of a statute. Such an approach
congressional hearing testimony in the Court's opinions from the mid-1940s until 1989).
Admittedly, the Court has cited McCaughn with approval as recently as 1986, in Kelly v.
Robinson, 479 U.S. 36,51 n.13 (1986).
279 See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,743-47 (1989); Kosak
v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 856-57 &n.13 (1984); Giles, supra note 171, at 385-89.
280 See e.g., Robert M. Rhodes et al., The Search for Intent: Aids to Statutory Construction
in Florida, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 383, 405-07 (1978) (recommending filing of all "reports,
memoranda, fact sheets, and other such material which seeks to analyze, explain, 'sell,' or defend
legislation"); Ross, supra note 273, at 575 (recommending that transcripts of mark-up sessions be
published).
Some have urged a more sophisticated and critical review of existing materials. See, e.g.,
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 99-100; Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of
Construction orDestruction, 11 HARV. JL. &PUB.POL'Y43 (1988); McNollgast, supra note 161,
at 741; Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, supra note 160, at 67
(testimony of Judge Patricia M. Wald).
281 The California courts have held that swom statements of legislators should be accepted
in attempting to determine legislative intent See, e.g., Friends of Mammoth v. Board of
Supervisors, 502 P.2d 1049, 1055-56 (Cal. 1972).
2 82 Zeppos draws his noncontroversial examples from cases involving the intent of
individuals or hierarchical organizations in which there is a clear delegation of authority. See
Zeppos, supra note 185, at 1341-42.
283 See id at 1343; cf Hearings Before the Comm. on the Nomination ofDavid H. Souter
131 (1990) (statement of Judge David H. Souter) (analogizing determining legislative intent to
trial-type factfinding); Interbranch Relations, supra note 73, at 81 (testimony of the Honorable
Patricia Wald) (arguing that critics should not be concerned that judges will give undue weight to
the wrong information because "Uj]udges spend their whole lives deciding what information is
relevant in other contexts").
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does not even solve the lack of information problem. Though courts have expanded
the sources recognized as legislative history,284 they ultimately, like Alice and the
Red Queen,285 running harder and harder yet making no progress toward their goal,
seem no closer to discerning actual legislative intent.
A second approach involves acknowledging the inadequacy of legislative
history. Even if traditional legislative history does not reflect the subjective intent
of the majority, countervailing concerns require courts and agencies to limit their
attempts to discern true subjective intent. For instance, a desire to enhance citizens'
ability to ascertain the law can justify limiting the inquiry into legislative intent 286
The more sophisticated the judicial search for subjective legislative intent, the more
citizens will have to consult numerous documents, some of which may even be
unavailable.287 Concerns about the reliability of the evidence of intent could also
justify limiting the inquiry into legislators' subjective intents-the unofficial
sources of information regarding legislative intent, particularly legislator testimony,
may be too unreliable.288
Ultimately, this second approach, limiting the inquiry into subjective intent
based upon competing values, seems arbitrary.289 The approach requires the
judiciary to view subjective intent as the law, but to adopt a technique that clearly
will not uncover that subjective intent. In addition, the approach will invariably
require the courts to make questionable distinctions between documents that can be
considered and those that cannot. Moreover, the dangers posed by the use of various
categories of documents probably varies greatly depending upon the circumstances
284 See supra notes 274-81 and accompanying text.
285 See LEWS CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There, in THE
COMPLETE ILLUSTRATED WORKS OF LEWIS CARROLL 103-04 (Edward Guiliano ed., 1982).
286 See DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 195-96.
287 Some argue against judicial use of legislative history precisely because the practice
makes ascertaining the law much more difficult and expensive. See United States v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319-20 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340,
1342-43 (7th Cir. 1989); Dickerson, supra note 273, at 1139-41, 1146; Bell, supra note 214, at
112 n.31 (citing In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1342-43).
288 See DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 195.
289 Such a flaw need not be fatal. Sometimes courts cannot avoid drawing arbitrary lines,
lines that embody no coherent theory distinguishing cases on one or the other side of the line. For
instance, Professor Richard Pearson criticizes contemporary tort law because in discarding
traditional "arbitrary" distinctions, courts have found themselves forced into a detrimental
overexpansion of tort liability. See Richard N. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently
Inflicted Emotional Hann-A Comment on the Nature ofArbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477
(1982); cf SUNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 83 (arguing that the Miranda rule need not be abandoned
merely because it is not congruent with a philosophically adequate theory and thus may on
occasion be overprotective or underprotective). Nevertheless, courts should, if possible, avoid
seemingly arbitrary line-drawing. See id. at 54-56.
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surrounding the adoption of the particular statute being interpreted.290
In short, because intentionalism focuses on legislators as individuals, and thus
requires the interpreter to ascertain an intent shared by a majority of legislators,
intentionalism faces serious methodological problems. The result has largely been
an expansion of the materials courts consider in interpreting statutes. Ultimately,
however, the courts have not demonstrated an ability to convincingly identify any
actual intent of a majority of legislators. Rather, the conclusions about legislators'
intentions tend to reflect judges' policy views more than any credible factual
determination of legislators' subjective policy views.
290 Making the ascertainment of law simple is a worthy goal. In some areas of the law we
sacrifice accuracy in fact-finding to more important values. Examples of rules reflecting the
subordination of accurate fact-finding to more important values include evidentiary privileges,
evidentiary rules making offers of settlement inadmissible, and rape-shield laws. See I CHARLES
TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 268-72 (John William Strong ed., 4th
ed. 1992) (discussing the rationales underlying various evidentiary privileges); FED R. EVID. 408
(settlement offers); id. at 410 (plea agreements); id at 412 (admissibility in sex-offense cases); 124
CONG. REC. 34,912-13 (1978) (statement of Representative Mann) (discussing rape-shield law);
id. at 913 (1978) (statement of Representative Holtzman) (discussing rape-shield law).
Even by these standards, the severely trncated legislative intent inquiry, which limits judicial
inquiry to "official" documents prepared with an eye toward their examination by courts, seems
rather extreme. Such an absolute refusal to look beyond official statements (and a limited range
of official statements at that) conflicts somewhat with the courts' willingness to look beyond
official statements in reviewing administrative actions. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971) (noting that a court could require the agency to file an
affidavit explaining its decision, or in some rare cases, require an agency official to appear and give
oral testimony); KENNE CuJLP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINEsTRATVE LAW
TREATISE §§ 8.5, 8.6, at 395-96 (3d ed. 1994).
Concerns about the reliability of documents and testimony are also valid. However, we often
trust judges to sort through potentially unreliable evidence when they act as fact-finders. Many
evidentiary doctrines limit evidence in order to prevent juries from hearing evidence we cannot
expect them to process correctly, yet judges sitting as fact-finders can hear the evidence and
consider it for its worth. See McClelland v. Williamson, 627 S.W.2d 94,99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);
Peck v. Jacquemin, 491 A.2d 1043, 1054 (Conn. 1985); In re E.H., 276 S.E.2d 557,565 (W. Va.
1981); 1 MCCORMICK, supra, § 60, at 238; Kenneth Culp Davis, Hearsay in Nonjury Cases, 83
HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1362 (1970); Note, Improper Evidence in Nonjury Trials: Basis for
Reversal?, 79 HARV. L. REV. 407,412-14 (1965).
Moreover, unofficial records and legislator testimony are not much more unreliable than the
records on which courts currently rely. The records courts currently rely upon have been produced
with a conscious view toward persuading other lawmakers and citizens of the wisdom of the
legislation and influencing administrative agencies and the courts in interpreting the statute.
Moreover, the drafters of such documents know that they will never be subject to cross-
examination (except perhaps in extremely rare circumstances). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6;
Raveson, supra note 255, at 911-14. Accordingly, any sharp distinction between official and
unofficial records is exaggerated. See Zeppos, supra note 185, at 1347-49.
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IV. THE PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION APPROACH
The public justification approach rests upon three premises. First, legislatures
are institutions, not merely aggregations of individual legislators. As an institution,
the legislature has obligations apart from those of its individual members and can
act without a vote of the full membership. Second, the vote on a statute is a vote on
both its text and its justification as presented by the institution. Third, even though
a majority will not likely share subjective intentions, legislators have an obligation
to both understand the ordinary meaning of the statutory text and learn the
institutional explanation of the statute. The public justification approach seeks the
reasonable meaning of words rather than subjective intentions of those who
approved the words. It is an "objective" rather than a "subjective" approach, but
expands the text that must be interpreted to include the institutional justifications for
statutes as well as their text.
A. Premises of the Public Justification Approach
1. Congress Has Duties and Can Act as an Institution
Congress is an institution rather than merely a collection of individuals. As an
institution, Congress has obligations in addition to the duties of each of its
individual members. A duty to provide an institutional explanation of a statute is
one such obligation, and that obligation makes some legislative history legally
significant Moreover, Congress can act as an institution in ways that do not involve
formal votes of the full membership of the legislative chamber. Thus, other aspects
of the legislative process besides floor votes should be afforded legal significance.
In particular, committee actions deserve recognition.
a. Institutional Duties
The public choice and intentionalist approaches suggest a focus on individual
legislators that ignores the duties of the legislature as an institution. The individual
legislator may have obligations, such as the obligation to represent the preferences
of his or her constituents or to oppose unconstitutional legislation, but Congress
does not. For instance, we might believe that voters have a duty to vote against a
repressive or unconstitutional referendum measure, yet not view "the electorate" as
having a collective duty to reject such referenda. Only with difficulty can one view
the electorate as an institution with such collective obligations.
Congress should be viewed as an institution with obligations separate from
those of individual legislators. For instance, Congress also has a duty to enact
comprehensible laws. Congress also has a duty to oversee the operations of the
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executive branch and to inform the public of executive branch misconduct.2 91
The difference between institutional and individual obligations can be
illustrated by the early Nineteenth Century controversy regarding whether the
Supreme Court should issue opinions seriatim.292 Thomas Jefferson asserted that
the Justices should render opinions seriatim, arguing that each Justice was a
representative and had an obligation to offer an explanation for his vote on a
case.293 Chief Justice John Marshall believed that the Court should produce one
opinion.294 In Marshall's view, the Justices had no obligation, as individuals, to
justify their votes. Rather, only the Court as an institution had an obligation to
explain its decision, and thus only an opinion for the court was necessary.2 95
Ultimately, of course, Supreme Court practice has evolved into a hybrid of the two
positions- the Court has an obligation to explain its decision, and each Justice may
note any disagreement with the opinion of the Court.296
291 See supra note 46; infra note 299 and accompanying text.
292 See DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONsTTUON: A STUDY OF
RESPONsIBILiTY 88, 88-89 (1966) [hereinafter CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITTON] (discussing
seriatim and unanimous opinion controversy during the Court's early years); DONALD G.
MORGAN, JUsTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON: THE FIRST DISSENTER 168-69, 173, 175-76, 181-84
(1954) (same); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on WritingSeparately, 65 WASH. L. REv. 133,138
(1990) (discussing seriatim opinions).
293 See Michael Mello, Adhering to Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall and the
Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591, 600-07 (1995);
Ginsburg, supra note 292, at 138. Justice Story believed that it was his "duty" in constitutional
cases "to give a public expression of [his] opinions, when they differed from that of the Court,"
because "the public [has] a right to know the opinion of every judge who dissents from the
opinions of the Court, and the reasons of his dissent." Birscoe v. Bank of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Peters) 257, 329, 350 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting).
294 John Marshall is credited with forging this tradition in the Supreme Court See 3 ALBERT
J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 16 (1919); Herbert A. Johnson, Part Two of
Foundations ofPower: John Marshall, 1801-15, in 2 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE
HISTORY OFTHE SUPREME COURT OFTHEUNITED STATES 373,380-81 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1981);
Robert G. Seddig, John Marshall and the Origins ofSupreme Court Leadership, 36 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 785,796-97 (1975).
295 See Lewis A. Komhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication
in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1, 13 (1993) ('The move from the original English practice
to the American practice... involves a commitment to, and a demand for, collegial deliberation,
and supports an ideal of a multi-judge court acting as an entity, not merely an aggregation of
individual judges.).
296 See Ginsburg, supra note 292, at 134; Marshall, supra note 18, at xvi-xx. A similar
difference in perspectives, individual versus institutional, can be seen with respect to congressional
consideration of constitutional concerns in enacting statutes. See CONGRESS AND THE
CONSTi'UON, supra note 292, at 155-56. Each individual member of Congress undoubtedly has
an obligation to consider the constitutionality of pending statutes. See id at 155, 348-49. Indeed,
in taking the oath of office, each member of Congress swears to uphold the Constitution. See 5
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We can now apply these observations to the legislative context. By focusing
upon individual legislators, one could conclude that the only obligation to explain
statutes is that of each individual legislator to discuss his actions with his
constituents. Of course such an obligation exists. But while such explanations might
aid the legislator's constituents in deciding whether to re-elect him, they may be
useful for little else. If every member'of the legislature presents his own reasons for
voting for the measure, or even if we look at varied statements of many legislators,
we still may lack a sense of the legislature's rationale for adopting the statute.
297
A rationale that can fairly be ascribed to the legislature as a collective entity
would be far more useful. We will have one relatively coherent rationale rather than
numerous varying rationales. 298 Moreover, collective rationales are at least likely
to have a continuing influence on further legislative efforts that go beyond the
present membership of the legislative body.
b. Institutional Actions
Congress undoubtedly acts as an institution when it enacts statutes. However,
U.S.C. § 16 (1994). See generally Abner J. Mikva & Joseph R. Lundy, The 91st Congress and the
Constitution, 38 U. Cli. L. REV. 449,449,497 (1971). However, viewing the obligation to comply
with the Constitution as an institutional obligation of Congress is also helpful. One can suggest that
the House and the Senate, as institutions, should ensure that constitutional issues are identified,
analyzed, and presented to members. See CONGRESS AND THE CONSTrrUTION, supra note 292, at
155,349-60.
2 97 A less severe instance of this problem is the plurality judicial opinion. When Supreme
Court Justices focus on individual statements and attempt to gain votes at the expense of clarity,
opinions for the Court become unclear. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 18, at 35, 40-41. Goldstein
argues that:
Opinion-writing must become a process of infonning for a vote. It must be a process
of clarification characterized by candor. It must not be a process of obfuscation characterized
by disingenuousness. The votes that [i]ustices get or are denied, should be based on a shared
understanding of what an opinion means, not just on the bottom line, not just on the result
To vote otherwise can only lead the [J]ustices, individually and collectively, to forget We the
People for whom and to whom they are expounding the Constitution.
Id. at 40-41.
298 The likelihood of legislatures producing coherent institutional rationales depends on
one's view of the potential for agreements among a wide range of legislators. Those who see
legislators' preferences as exogenous and immutable will doubt that a legislature can ever adopt
a coherent rationale for a statute. Civic republicans, on the other hand, believe that there is great
potential for agreements between legislators on the underlying policies that statutes are to
implement, and that dialogue allows people to take a broader and more common perspective with
respect to the appropriate course of action. Congress appears able to formulate relatively coherent
explanations for policies underlying statutes.
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Congress can act even when its full membership is not voting on the floor of the
relevant legislative chamber. Legislatures often delegate work to committees. For
instance, legislative oversight an institutional function, is conducted by committees
rather than by floor vote.299 More importantly for our purposes, legislatures often
establish committees to analyze and develop legislative proposals, including
justifications for those proposals, and provide information regarding those proposals
to the legislative body. Thus the members of Congress have established a system
in which standing committees develop information regarding prospective bills in
certain subject areas, craft particular legislation, and then provide a rationale for the
committee proposals. 300 Accordingly, Congress, as an institution, produces
explanations of statutes301 even though the text of those explanations arguably
never become subject to a formal vote.302
However, while some actions taken by small groups of legislators or individual
legislators count as institutional actions, others should not.30 3 An action should
qualify as "institutional" only if it satisfies three criteria. First, the action must be
made known to all members of the legislature. Second, the action must be subject
to reversal by the full membership.304 Third, members must view the action as
authoritative-something other than the expression of an individual or a group.
In short, legislatures have institutional obligations. Legislatures owe the
populace not merely clear statutory commands, but a public justification of those
commands. As we shall see, this public justification obligation, and the fulfillment
of this obligation through committee reports or other documents, legitimates
legislative history without reliance upon the flawed concept of legislative intent.
2. A Vote on a Statute Is a Vote on the Text and the Explanatory Materials
The concept ofpublic justification offers an alternative view of the duties of the
individual legislator as well as the duties of the legislature as a whole. Collective
actions and responsibilities, such as those of a legislature, have meaning only if
individual members of the collective have duties. Thus, the responsibility of the
legislature structures the responsibilities of individual legislators. I will first discuss
299 See OLESZEK, supra note 133, at 301-02.
300 See Correia, supra note 6, at 1156-58.
301 See DWORKiN, supra note 121, at 343 (noting potential usefulness of formal committee
reports or unchallenged statements by a bill's manager).
302 See Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1560 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring) (noting that legislative history cannot be amended or modified on the floor); 128
CONG. REC. 16918 (1982) (statement of Senator Armstrong); CHARLES TIEFR, CONGRESSIONAL
PRACnCE AND PROCEDURE 182 (1989); Zwim, supra note 195, at 326.
303 See DWORKIN, supra note 121, at 343.
304 See Correia, supra note 6, at 1157; MacCallum, supra note 251, at 785.
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the impact that the legislature's duty to provide understandable commands has upon
individual legislators' responsibilities in voting on a bill. I will then discuss the
implications that the duty of public justification outlined above has for the
responsibilities of individual legislators when they participate in debate and voting.
A legislature can satisfy its duty to provide understandable commands to
citizens only if each legislator has a corresponding obligation in casting his vote.
That corresponding obligation consists of expressing assent or dissent, in the form
of his vote, to the meaning of the proposed statute (i.e., the command) in customary
English usage. An example will illustrate the point. Assume a ten member
legislative body, in which each of the ten legislators use the term "motor vehicle"
to communicate different concepts, none of which relate to the customary meaning
of the term "motor vehicle." A statute passed by such a legislature prohibiting motor
vehicles from entering a park would mean nothing if the legislators' only obligation
were voting based on their own subjective use of the term motor vehicles. In effect
there would be no "meeting of the minds"--each legislator could insist that the
courts interpret the language as she understood it because she had no duty to
consider the ordinary meaning of the statutory text 305 The statute could have
meaning, regardless of the legislators' differing understandings of the term "motor
vehicle," if legislators had a duty to assent or dissent, in the form of their votes, to
the statute's customary meaning. Even if no legislator understood the term "motor
vehicles" to mean motorized means of transport, the term 'motor vehicle," as used
in the statute, could be given that meaning. Such an interpretation would be justified
because the legislators should have based their vote on the customary meaning of
the statutory text, even if they did not. In short, the legislators constructively
assented to banning "motorized means of transport," and only such objects, from
the park. Such constructive assent makes legislators' actual intent in assenting
irrelevant. The legislator who objects to a court honoring the customary meaning
of the statutory language rather than that legislator's subjective use of that language
can be told that he should have either sought to amend the statute or voted against
it. His decision to vote for the statute based on his own subjective belief was
irresponsible.
Now the implications of the legislature's duty to provide public justification can
be explored. Because under the public justification approach the duty of the
legislature is broader, the duties of each individual legislator are broader. The
legislature has an obligation to provide a public justification. Each legislator has an
obligation to participate in the creation of both the statutory text and the public
justification. The legislature can provide a public justification only if individual
305 For instance, when such a multilateral misunderstanding occurs in the formation of a
contract, the contract is declared void because there was no meeting of the minds. See 2
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 201 illus. d (1981); 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNswORTH ON CONTRACrS § 7.9, at 248 (1990).
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members vote on the basis of that public justification. Thus, once that public
justification is promulgated, each legislator has a duty to express assent or dissent,
by means of her vote, to both the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the statute
and the public justification provided for it. If a legislator votes for a statute while
holding a subjective view of the statute's rationale that differs from the public
justification offered by the legislature, she is not entitled to have a court honor her
subjective view of the statute's rationale any more than she would be entitled to
have a court honor her subjective use of the terms in the text of the statute. Rather,
the legislator who asserts that her own subjective view of the rationale should
govern the statute's interpretation can be told that she should have expressed her
objection to the rationale provided by the legislature. Her duty as a legislator makes
her act of voting for the statute without expressing her disagreement with the
publicly-offered rationale irresponsible-the statute need not be interpreted under
the assumption that legislators act so irresponsibly.
The duty of the legislator to express assent or dissent regarding each statute's
public justification now provides the missing element to the argument of the
intentionalists who pursue a delegation-assent approach. 306 Under the delegation-
assent argument, legislators assent, by voting for a statute, to the explanation of the
statute provided by the committee that reported the proposal. The argument rests on
a kind of constructive assent-a member's vote constitutes assent to the legislative
history, whether or not the member actually intended to assent to that legislative
history. If the individual legislator has no responsibility for the legislative history,
and the legislature has no duty to provide public justification, it is difficult to
construe the legislator's vote as constructive assent to anything other than the
ordinary meaning of the words of the statute. The member should have felt no
obligation to disavow the legislative history.307
3 0 6 Seesupra text accompanying notes 251,254-55.
30 7 See Tiersma, supra note 97, at 17, 20-22. Silence can assume significance only if one
presumes that the silent person is interacting with another. See id. If such an interaction does not
exist, the silence of the recipient of a message can either indicate consent or a refusal to engage in
conversation. Thus the recipient's silence in response to a statement means nothing if the person
who made the statement had no right to expect or demand a response. See hl at 22. In other words,
for silence to constitute consent, the silent person must have a duty to engage in the interchange.
Because there is no such requirement if the only significant part of the legislative process is voting,
silence cannot be viewed as significant If the development of public justification by means of a
committee proposal and full-chamber review is a part of the legislative process in which legislators
have an obligation to participate, a legislator's silence can be accorded significance. See id at 321
("[D]rawing inferences from conduct and particularly silence often depends on social norms
reflecting how people ought to behave.); see also id at 33-34 (stating "behavioral norms" are
needed to allow one to draw from silence the inference of consent rather than other competing
plausible inferences). Interestingly, while civic republicans assume that governing largely involves
engaging in dialogue, see Michael A. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on
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The public justification concept provides the basis for constructive assent-
each legislator has a responsibility to express assent or dissent to both the customary
English usage of the words in the statute and the explanation of the statute. Given
such a duty, one could say that the legislator should have responded to the public
justification provided and that his failure to do so, whether because of agreement,
indifference, or inattention, constitutes constructive assent to that explanation.
A modified version of the Founders' Park hypothetical can illustrate the
argument above. In this modified hypothetical, the ordinance's history prior to city
council debate and its text remain unchanged. But now assume that the debate on
the ordinance had been different that it focused on concerns about road safety and
whether the preceding road accidents justified the limitations on road ttaffic. Thus,
under the modified hypothetical, during the council debate no one mentioned
limiting traffic in off-road areas, removing the immobilized jeep, or limiting
boating. A legislator who believes that the term "motor vehicles" covers all
motorized modes of transport, including motorboats and immobilized jeeps, has a
duty to object to the limited nature of the "statutory" justification offered by the
legislative committee and its chairperson. If the legislator assents to the statute
based upon the customary meaning ofthe term "motor vehicle" and does not dissent
from the institutional rationale, he should be viewed as having constructively
assented to that rationale. He should not be heard to complain if a court concludes
that the text is indeterminate and relies on the public justification, which the
legislator did not contest, as an aid in construing the ambiguous language. The
legislature (i.e., the city council) had a duty to, and did, justify the legislation, and
the individual legislator thus had a duty to address that justification.
3. It Is Unlikely That There Will Be One Subjective Intent Shared by All
Legislators-But So What?
The strength of the new textualist attack on the concept of "legislative intent"
rests upon the cogency of the new textualist assertion that a subjective intent shared
by a majority of legislators rarely exits. Under the public justification approach, the
likelihood that there will be no such shared intent can be acknowledged but ignored.
With respect to most statutes, as noted earlier, it is unlikely that a majority of
legislators were aware of the text of the statute and shared a common understanding
of its language. The new textualists could disregard this problem, we presumed,
because of their conception of legislators' duties-legislators have a duty to read the
words of the statute and understand their customary English usage. Thus,
Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE LJ. 1651, 1651-52, 1654-55 (1988); Frank Michelman, Law's
Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493, 1503, 1528 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1575, public choice
theorists assume that governing is an individualistic expression of preferences. See, e.g., FARBER
& FRICKEY, supra note 66, at 45.
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legislators' votes signify their assent to the text in the customary English usage,
regardless of whether they had actually read the statute and actually understood the
customary English usage of the words employed.
Under the public justification approach, a similar argument can be advanced
with respect to the legislative history that comprises the statute's public justification.
The absence of a shared subjective intent is unimportant. A public justification is
available to each legislator, as is the text of the statute. Just as each legislator has a
duty to make herself aware of the statutory text and its meaning in ordinary English
usage, under the public justification approach each individual legislator also has a
duty to make herself aware of the public justification offered for the statute, and to
vote on the basis of that public justification. Accordingly, if the legislator votes for
the statute without dissenting from the public justification, she should be viewed as
constructively assenting to that public justification. The legislator who fails to
familiarize herself with the public justification for a statute, or fails to challenge a
public justification that she privately considers inaccurate, has not acquitted her duty
as a legislator. Her actual views of the statute's rationale are irrelevant because she
failed to meet her obligation to address the statute's public justification.30 8
B. Public Justification Methodology
The public justification approach requires the interpreter to examine both the
statute's text and public justification. Commentary outside the public justification
should not be considered binding.309 The text of the statute must be interpreted in
light of the public justification provided. Thus, although the public justification
should be honored by the court, it should be accorded less weight than the statutory
text.
308 Indeed, this differs little from legislators' duty to learn judicially-created clear statement
rules, which courts and new textualists use in construing statutes. See supra note 217.
309 The court may want to consider such documents in arriving at the most efficacious
interpretation of the statute once it determines, after examining the text and public justification, that
the statute is ambiguous. If interpretation is viewed as a two-step process-the first involving law
discovery (determining what the statute means) and the second involving law creation (deciding
cases where the statute does not provide answers), see DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 13-32; Gary
Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Pro cess: Agency Duties ofExplanationfor Legal Conclusions,
48 RUrGERS L. REV. 313, 328-31 (1996)-a court should be restricted to the public justification
in the law discovery process, but should be free to use all aspects of legislative history, as well as
matters outside the legislative history, in the law creation process. See DICKERSON, supra note 4,
at 169. (One need not distinguish the elements of the interpretive process as sharply as suggested
to believe that different sources can be consulted depending on which of the following two
questions a court seeks to answer: (1) how should a court best conduct itself as an agent of
legislative will, or (2) how should a court construe the statute if it cannot or will not act as an agent
of the legislative will.)
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The court must identify the materials that constitute the statute's public
justification. Because this public justification reflects an institutional approach, the
materials that comprise the public justification must be attributable to the legislature
as an institution. As suggested above, three criteria should be employed to
determine whether particular material is attributable to Congress. First, only
material available to all legislators may be considered a part of the public
justification. Each legislator has a right to participate in the development of the
public justification, so each must have access to that justification.310 If some
members lack such access, the justification is not that of the institution, but of the
limited group that has access. Moreover, a member can have no duty to respond to
statements regarding a statute if he lacks access to those statements. Reports of
congressional committees and statements made on the House and Senate floor
satisfy this requirement. Committee reports must be available to all members of
Congress,311 and all members may attend floor proceedings or obtain a copy of the
CongressionalRecord.312 On the other hand, documents not readily available prior
to floor vote, such as party caucus documents,3 13 transcripts of committee mark-up
sessions,314 transcripts of committee hearings,315 and public speeches outside
Congress,316 should not be considered part of the public justification. Treating such
3 1 0 See supra text accompanying note 304.
311 See Brudney, supra note 75, at 27 & n.104; Correia, supra note 6, at 1157; OrFLSzEK,
supra note 133, at 205.
312 See Senate Manual § 906 [Senate Doc. 102-1]. The Congressional Record includes all
speeches made during floor proceedings and is distributed daily. See THOMAs B. CURTIS &
DONALD L. WESTERFIELD, CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 20, 55 (1992).
313 It would also exclude other communications that members sometimes use in determining
how to vote, such as whip advisory notices, "Dear Colleague' letters, and circulars from
specialized caucuses, see TEFER, supra note 302, at 180 n.98.
314 See Davidson, supra note 197, at 107; Wald, supra note 273, at 202. Though the rules
of the Senate require .'a complete transcript or electronic recording adequate to fully record.' all
committee proceedings, a majority of the committee may waive the requirement. See Davidson,
supra 197, at 107 (quoting and discussing Senate Rule XXVI, cl. (5)(e)).
315 See Brudney, supra note 75, at 27 & n.103. But see CURTIS & WES.ERFIELD, supra note
312, at 20.
316 Members of Congress increasingly attempt to mobilize public attention to influence
legislative consideration of legislation. See Organization of the Congress: Final Report of the Joint
Comm. on the Organization of Congress, H.R. REP. No. 103-618, at 187 (1993); TIMOTHY E.
COOK, MAKING LAWS AND MAKING NEWS: MEDIA STRATEGIES IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 167 (1989); OLESZEK, supra note 133, at 47, 325. Statements made to the
public outside the legislative chamber and committee proceedings should not be considered part
of the public justification used to interpret statutes. The locus of deliberation should be
congressional proceedings, which are intended to enhance deliberation and produce coherent
policy. Thus, the courts' interpretive technique should encourage legislators to assert, in the
legislative process, the arguments they make to the public generally, so as to ensure full legislative
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documents as expressions of Congress, rather than as expressions of individuals or
groups, would be inappropriate.
Second, material may become a part of a statute's public justification only if
members can respond to the material before casting their votes. Documents that
members can amend during floor proceedings would obviously satisfy this
requirement Presumably, however, in most legislatures members can amend only
statutes during floor proceedings. For instance, reports filed by congressional
committees cannot be amended.317 However, a document should qualify as an
institutional document even if members cannot amend it during floor debate, so
long as members can disavow the document, in whole or in part, before voting.
Though members cannot formally amend a committee report; a legislative majority
can disavow committee reports in several ways.318 Members may certainly express
disagreement with the committee report on the floor of the legislature.319
Ultimately, however, this second requirement excludes little except post-enactment
materials, because during debates members of Congress can express disagreement
with any document that discusses the statute.
Third, only material considered authoritative by the legislators themselves
deliberation.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has similarly distinguished legislators' "legislative' activities from
their "political" activities in addressing legislators' immunity under the Constitution's Speech and
Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. Legislators are immune from liability for statements
made when conducting legislative business-acts that are a part of the deliberative process by
which members participate in committee or congressional proceedings. See Doe v. McMillan, 412
U.S. 306, 313-19 (1973) (distinguishing Congress's members' legislative duties, namely those
responsibilities that are a part of the deliberative process by which members participate in
committee or congressional proceedings, from their political duties); Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 606, 625-26 (1972); TRIBE, supra note 13, § 5-18, at 291-93; Raveson, supra note 255, at
892. Legislators are not immune from liability for statements made in connection with their role
as members of Congress that are not a part of their participation in committee or congressional
proceedings, such as statements made in press releases and public speeches. See Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 123-33 (1979) (press release); Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1332
(1975) (public speech); TRIBE, supra note 13, § 5-18, at 291-93.
317 See supra note 302.
318 See Zwim, supra note 195, at 326.
319 In the House of Representatives, however, special rules often severely limit debate.
Though these rules are adopted by majority vote, see OLESZEK, supra note 133, at 138, 150-51,
165, an individual may lose any realistic opportunity to comment on a bill's public justification
or anything else. This should be a concern with respect to reliance on public justification, but there
is a similar problem with respect to the ability to amend bills, which may be lost by majority vote
for a special rule. See id. at 142-51 (discussing closed rules that prohibit floor amendments and
special rules governing debate in general). The size of the House and the difficulty in managing
it requires compromising individual legislator's ability to amend statutes and comment on public
justification, but the statutory text and public justification merit respect nevertheless.
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should gain recognition as a part of a statute's public justification. Material that
legislators themselves customarily rely upon as an exposition of statutory meaning
(particularly when casting their votes) meet this standard; material that members
regard as an expression of the views of one particular legislator or group of
legislators do not. Committee reports and floor manager statements have attained
such authoritative status. Senators and Representatives, for example, rely upon
committee reports and floor manager statements as authoritative expositions of
statutory meaning. If a member wants an authoritative explanation of a statute, he
(or his staff) consults the committee report or questions the floor manager during
the debate on the bill.320 Congress delegates to committees the task of both
reporting statutory text; in the form of a bill, and providing an explanation of the bill
that members can consult in deciding how to vote. Thus, a committee report is
required by the rules of the House321 and customarily provided in the Senate.322
Conference reports must be published in the Congressional Record and made
available to each Senator or Representative before they vote on the corresponding
bill.3 23 Indeed, members have come to rely on committee reports so heavily that
they often do not consult the text of the statute 24 Moreover, members of Congress
surely realize that courts, members of the public, and agencies find such documents
authoritative.325 On the other hand, statements made at hearings, made outside
Congress, or set forth in party caucus documents do not appear to have gained the
same respect. They are seen as expressing only the views of individual members,
not that of Congress as an institution. This reasoning may appear somewhat
circular-the public, administrative agencies, and legislators may have begun to
rely on committee reports and floor manager statements because courts began to
rely on such materials, and in turn the widespread reliance on such material is now
being used to justify continued judicial reliance upon it 326 However, even assuming
that judicial practice produced widespread reliance on such documents, Congress
could have expressed disapproval of the trend or even enacted a statute precluding
the consideration of legislative history.327 So while the courts may have provided
320 See Thomas F. Broden, Jr., Congressional Committee Reports: Their Role and History,
33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 209,210,212 (1958) (discussing the important roles that committee reports
play in the legislative process).
321 See H.R. Res. 5, supra note 48 (House Rule XI, cl.2(e)(1)(A)).
322 See Broden, supra note 320, at 215-16; OLESZEK, supra note 133, at 206; Zwim, supra
note 195, at 322.
323 See OLESZEK, supra note 133, at 289.
324 See supra notes 195, 209 and accompanying text.
325 See supra note 73.
326 See supra note 255.
327 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991) (setting forth portions
of legislative history that courts may refer to in deciding whether the statute was retroactive); 5
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the initial impetus for reliance upon committee reports and floor manager
statements, the continued reliance upon such documents may be attributed to, at a
minimum, Congress's acquiescence.
Ultimately, the categories of material considered part of the institutional
justification of statutes must be limited somewhat so that legislators' duty to
respond to that justification does not become overwhelming. In other words, we
should not require members of Congress to review and publicly comment upon
numerous documents on pain of being found to have assented to all the statements
therein, because acquitting such a duty would deprive members of needed time to
engage in other legislative activities.328 However, if the legislative process is to be
a discussion of policy rather than a registration of preferences, legislators should
have a duty to review the limited number of documents discussing statutory
rationales produced by authorities within the institution.
With respect to the United States Congress, the "public justification!' of statutes
consists of: (1) committee reports (of both conference and standing committees),
(2) statements of the floor manager-who shepherds the bill during floor debate
(and who is often the chair of a relevant committee or subcommittee),329 and (3) the
statement of a sponsor of an amendment, when that amendment has not been the
subject of committee consideration. The final category takes into account situations
in which the Senate or the House adopts an amendment proposed by a member that
changes the bill recommended by the relevant committee.330 Proposal and adoption
of such amendments typically occur during floor debate.
Thus, members of Congress have a duty to familiarize themselves with the
explanations contained in these three types of documents. They also have a duty to
object to the explanations with which they disagree. However, requiring every
member who disagrees with a statement in a public justification to express that
disagreement is unnecessary and unwise. If several legislators disavow the
offending statement, a member who agrees with them should not need to express
his disagreement with the public justification as well. Such a requirement would
U.S.C. § 801(g) (West Supp. 1998) (providing that courts may not draw any inference from
Congress's refusal to exercise its power to "disapprove" a regulation under the new statute
governing congressional review of agency rulemaking); Note, Interpretive Directions in Statutes,
31 HARv. J. ON LEGiS. 211,213-17 (1994) (discussing statutory provisions that direct courts in
their interpretation of statutes).
328 See Davidson, supra note 197, at 98-100 (describing the time constraints members of
Congress face).
329 See SMrrH & DEERING, supra note 144, at 130 tbl.4-2. See generally id. at 129-31.
330 For examples of such cases, see Church of Scientology v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1987);
North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 524-27 (1982). Some argue that such floor
amendments greatly increase the probability that statutes will become meaningless gibberish. See,
e.g., Statutory Interpretation and the Uses ofLegislative History, supra note 160, at 54, 65; Breyer,
supra note 73, at 873-74.
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needlessly extend debate. Thus, if several legislators argue that the statute's
rationale is broader, narrower, or simply different than that identified in the public
justification, other members need not add their voices in support.331
However, such an expression of disagreement will probably provoke a
discussion and clearer resolution of the issue. The floor manager may provide a
more complete explanation of the statute. That explanation may convincingly
demonstrate that thd floor manager's initial statement or the committee report
provides the best explanation of the statute. Alternatively, the legislative body might
consider amending the text of the bill. The Founders' Park example again can serve
as an illustration. If several members argued that the "motor vehicles" ordinance
addresses the problems caused by road and off-road vehicles, the court should
question the validity of any statement whether included in the committee report or
uttered by the committee chairperson during floor debate, indicating that the
ordinance covers only road vehicles.
In short, a court interpreting a federal statute should interpret the text in light of
committee reports, floor manager statements, and sponsor statements, but abandon
reliance on apparently relevant aspects of those documents if floor debate reveals
a substantial controversy regarding those aspects of the documents. A court should
not consider itself bound by other aspects of legislative history (although these other
aspects of legislative history may be used as persuasive authority if a court, after
examining the text in light of the public justification, concludes that the statute is
ambiguous).
This approach is objective, relying on the customary meaning of text. In this
respect it resembles the new textualist approach and differs from the intentionalists'
subjective approach. However, under the public justification approach, the relevant
text is expanded to include not just the text of the statute, but also the text of certain
additional documents. A recognition of the duty of the legislature to explain statutes
and of the individual legislators to react to the public justifications justifies this
expansion of the relevant text.
V. APPLICATION OF THE PuBLIC JUSTIFICATION APPROACH
Examination of two ongoing interpretive debates further illustrates the
usefulness of the public justification approach. The first debate involves judicial
331 Nevertheless, the statement of one legislator should not lead the court to question the
public justification. The statement of one legislator does not suggest substantial disagreement with
the public justification. The public justification should be questioned only if several members
disavow it, as such a vocal dissent may suggest a significant difference of opinion within the
legislative chamber. However, the interpreter should not accept the position stated by those
challenging the public justification. Rather, the existence of such a dispute means only that the




interpretation of unexplained statutory provisions that appear to address
controversial issues. The second involves application of general statutory language
to situations that the enacting legislature did not contemplate.
A. The Dog That Did Not Bark
Supreme Court Justices have debated whether congressional silence regarding
a questionable application of an ambiguous statute justifies limiting the reach of the
statute. The text of a statute, read literally, may appear to require a questionable
treatment of an issue even though nothing in the applicable legislative history
addresses the issue.
An amendment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965332 presented the Court with
such a situation in Chisom v. Roemer.33 Initially, the statute prohibited any "voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure" that
resulted in a denial of the right to vote on account of race or color.3 34 Based on this
initial language, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must prove intentional
discrimination to establish a Voting Rights Act violation.335 Congress then amended
the Voting Rights Act, adding section 2(b), to allow plaintiffs to establish a Voting
Rights Act violation merely by showing the discriminatory effect of a statute,
without showing discriminatory intent3 36 Specifically, section 2(b) provided that
plaintiffs could establish a violation of the Voting Rights Act by proving that
members of a minority group "have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate... to elect representatives of their choice." 337
The Chisom Court had to determine whether the word "representatives"
included candidates for elective judicial offices, and thus whether litigants could
rely upon the section 2(b) "effects" test (which required no proof of discriminatory
intent) to challenge rules governing judicial elections. Justice Stevens, writing for
the majority, argued that the word "representative" encompassed all elected
officials, even judges.3 38 He offered several reasons for his conclusion, but only one
332 79 Stat. 437,445,446 (1965) (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973p (1994)).
333 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
334 79 Stat at 437; Chisom, 501 U.S. at 391.
335 See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 393 (discussing Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)).
336 See id. at 393-95; Pub. L. No. 97-205,96 Stat. 134 (1982).
337 Chisom, 501 U.S. at 398 (quoting White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973)) (emphasis
added).
338 The use of the term'representative' to encompass judges may seem odd. The term could
be used to refer only to people elected to multi-member bodies. However, even the dissent did not
argue for so limited a definition. See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Such a
definition would exclude elected executive branch officials, and it is unlikely that a majority ofthe
legislators who voted for section 2(b) intended the term "representative" to exclude executive
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merits discussion here. Justice Stevens argued that Congress would not have
differentiated judicial elections from all other elections without noting that intent or
without many members of Congress expressing opposition.339 In particular, before
the amendment of the Voting Rights Act identical standards governed judicial and
nonjudicial elections; the ambiguous term "representative" should not be viewed as
requiring the standards for judicial and fionjudicial elections to diverge.340 In setting
forth his reasoning, Justice Stevens referred to a Sir Arthur Conan Doyle story in
which Doyle's famous detective, Sherlock Holmes, determined the murderer's
identity by noting that the victim's dog did not bark on the night of the murder.341
In that story, Holmes relied upon the dog's silence to infer that the murderer was
someone with whom the dog was familiar. Congress's silence regarding the
divergence of the standards for judicial and nonjudicial elections, when amending
the Voting Rights Act had significance, just as the silence of the "dog that did not
bark" had significance in the Holmes story.342
Justice Scalia objected to Justice Stevens's reasoning. First he argued, Justice
Stevens's argument relied on the erroneous proposition that "Congress cannot be
credited with having achieved anything of major importance by simply saying it in
ordinary language, in the text of a statute 'without comment' in the legislative
history."343 The word "representative" clearly did not include judges, and Congress
did not have to "call its shot"344 that is, explain the significance of the textual
change it was making. To Justice Scalia, the text of the statute clearly provided
different standards for non-judicial elections, in which "representatives" are chosen,
branch officials. (Indeed, Congress borrowed the language of section 2(b) from a court opinion that
discussed the right to elect legislators, and Congress substituted the word "representative" for
'legislator?' See id at 398.) Justice Stevens interpreted the term representative to mean any official
who served in an elective office, including executive branch officials and judges.
339 See id. at 396.
340 See id. at 395-96.
341 See id. at 396 n.23 (noting the incident occurred in The Silver Blaze).
342 Stated differently, one who asserts that an ambiguous statute has changed "settled law"
has the burden of establishing Congress's intent to make such a change. Thus, in Green v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521 (1989), the Court rejected the plaintiffs' literal
interpretation of a statute because plaintiff had not carried its burden of showing that Congress
intended the change suggested by the statutory text. See id. The Court offered no basis for
imposing such a burden. Perhaps the approach is based on a preference for the status quo.
Alternatively, it could rest upon the Court's perception of congressional practice. Perhaps the
Court believes that legislative majorities rarely take significant action without announcing that they
are doing so or sparking considerable legislative controversy.
343 Chisom, 501 U.S. at 406 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
344 This is a reference to the rule in some pocket billiards games that shooting a ball into a
pocket does not count unless the shooter has first indicated both the ball that he will "sink" in a
pocket and the pocket into which the ball will go.
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and judicial elections, in which officials who do not "represent" constituents are
chosen. Second, Justice Scalia argued that he could not assume that everything of
significance will be noted in legislative history or spark legislative debate.345
In several cases, the Justices have debated the propriety of interpreting statutes
based on the absence of an express announcement of an intent to change the law and
a lack of controversy over a provision. Often the Court affirms the legitimacy of the
argument,346 but on at least one occasion it has not.347 Indeed, the Supreme Court's
most recent use of this technique, in Department of Commerce v. United States
House ofRepresentatives,348 produced dissention among the Justices.
When using this "dog that did not bark" approach, the Court implicitly
envisions legislative intent as a fact awaiting discovery. Thus, the Court derives its
most prominent analogy for such reasoning from the technique used by detectives
in attempting to determine a fact-the identity of a murderer.349 For the Court,
legislators' apparent belief that they need not explain a particular statutory change
and the absence of controversy about the statute's meaning provide two "clues" to
legislators' subjective understanding of the statute. Any inferences from legislative
silence rest on certain assumptions about legislative behavior, namely that when the
legislature takes significant action it will explain the significance of its actions, or
at least individual legislators will contest the controversial action during legislative
consideration of the relevant bill.350 Of course, even assuming that this is invariably
true, the Court would nevertheless need to determine whether the issue before it is
one that members of Congress believed significant.
Viewing arguments based on Congress's silence as factual is problematic; the
Supreme Court rarely cites any facts in support of its conclusion that a particular
change would either have been explained in the legislative history or provoked
controversy. Clearly, not every change that a statute makes requires explanation or
provokes discussion; members of Congress have limited time to debate issues.
345 See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 406 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
346 See, eg., id. at 396 (Stevens, J.); United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers ofinwood Forest Assoc.,
484 U.S. 365, 380 (1988) (Scalia, J.); Church of Scientology v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 17-18 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J.) (referencing Silver Blaze); Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40,61 (1947) (noting that
mute legislative actions should be viewed skeptically).
347 See Harrison, 446 U.S. at 592 (Stewart, J.); Chisom, 501 U.S. at 406 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
348 119 S. Ct. 765 (1999).
349 See Harrison, 446 U.S. at 595-96 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (commenting that an effort
to determine intent is better entrusted to a detective than ajudge); cf. LEIF H. CARTER, REASON IN
LAW 66 (4th ed. 1994) (describing the quest for legislative intent as "detective work," requiring
"sleuthing techniques" to gather "hard evidence").




Thus, to draw inferences from Congress's failure to explain or the lack of legislative
controversy, the Court must conclude that the particular change in the law, allegedly
made merely by the enactment of certain statutory text, was sufficiently salient to
members of Congress that it would have led them to explain their actions or
provoked discussion. However, probative evidence of Senators' and
Representatives' views of the significance of a particular change rarely exists. Thus,
the Court most often merely asserts, without citing any evidence, that if Congress
had envisioned a particular interpretation of the statutory language there would have
been some indication of such an intent in the legislative history, or at least some
debate.351 It is almost as if Sherlock Holmes had inferred the identity of the
murderer from the victim's dog's silence knowing only that ordinarily the dog's
master familiarized the dog with important people in his life, surmising that one of
the suspects was probably someone the master considered important, and reasoning
that therefore the dog knew that particular suspect. This is hardly the sort of
inference Holmes was likely to draw, at least without obtaining more specific
evidence.352
.Justice Scalia's challenge to such reasoning is reminiscent of his challenge to
the use of legislative history in general.353 He argues that changing the text of a
statute should suffice to change the law. Interpretation based on silence is flawed,
argues Justice Scalia, because due process does not require that "legislation... be
supported by committee reports, floor debates, or even consideration, but only by
a vote.")354
Justice Stevens's and Justice Scalia's opposing positions correspond to the
351 Chisom is a perfect example. The Court cites no evidence showing that if Congress had
intended to exclude judicial elections from the "results" test ofthe amended § 2, it would have said
so explicitly, or, at least, some members would have objected vocally. See Chisom, 501 U.S. at
396. The Court merely notes the "unusually extensive legislative history ofthe 1982 amendment."
Id.
This lack of factual inquiry is also evident in other cases. See American Hosp. Ass'n v.
NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 613 (1991); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 162 (1990); Church
of Scientology, 484 U.S. at 17-18; United Say. Ass'n, 484 U.S. at 380; Fishgold v. Sullivan
Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785,791 (2d Cir. 1946).
352 Indeed, most legislators may fail to envision a particular application of the statute, even
though the language of the statute clearly suggests such an application, because they have given
little thought to the statute and its potential applications (both obvious and non-obvious). Thus (at
the risk of extending the analogy to the Doyle story too far), because most members do not give
detailed thought to all applications of a statute, drawing an inference from the lack of controversy
over a statute may be likened to inferring the identity of the murderer from a dog's silence vithout
knowing whether the dog was muzzled, drugged, or somewhere far from the scene ofthe murder.
3 53 See notes 187-92 and accompanying text. However, Justice Scalia has himself at least
once used this form of argument. See United Say. Ass'n, 484 U.S. at 380.
354 Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 133 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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general views of intentionalists and new textualists outlined earlier in this Article.
The approach I suggest rests on the principle that legislatures should justify statutes
and that courts should interpret unexplained legislative actions cautiously. The
Scalia approach is deficient because it does not acknowledge the role of public
justification. Even though the Due Process Clause does not create a judicially
enforceable requirement that legislatures provide a justification for statutes,
legislatures should (and do) explain statutes, and courts should interpret statutes in
light of this unenforced legislative obligation. Thus, courts should accord
significance to the absence of any assertion that a statute covers a controversial
situation when interpreting ambiguous statutory language.
However, the Stevens approach is deficient in characterizing interpretive
questions as factual issues involving "legislative intent." The deficiencies of the
"legislative intent" concept have been discussed earlier.355 Instead of attempting to
determine whether members of Congress would have viewed a potential application
of the statute as sufficiently controversial to warrant vocal opposition or explanation
in the legislative history, the Court should determine whether a particular
application of the statute is questionable given its own view of the public
justification offered for a statute and the corpus of the law. If the proposed
application of the statute is questionable356 and no mention is made of such an
application of the statute in the "public justification" (committee reports, statements
of floor managers, and statements of sponsors), then the Court may appropriately
construe the statute to exclude that situation.
Thus, in Chisom, the Court properly considered Congress's failure to suggest
that voting rights standards should diverge for judicial and non-judicial elections.
However, the Court erred in relying upon some unsupported (and ultimately
probably insupportable) inference about legislative intent. The Court should have
considered whether the more general purposes of the Voting Rights Act would have
been served by such a distinction, and whether other federal voting rights laws
distinguished judicial and non-judicial elections. The Court may have concluded,
after pursuing such an analysis, that distinguishing judicial and non-judicial
elections would not have furthered the elimination of discrimination in voting and
that any countervailing principles (such as the principle of preserving local
governments' freedom to establish the voting rules) apply no differently in judicial
and non-judicial elections. The Court could then have concluded that judicial and
non-judicial elections should not be distinguished, based on ambiguous statutory
355 See notes 265-73 and accompanying text.
356 A statute cannot be limited in its effect just to those matters specifically contemplated by
the legislature at the time the statute was enacted. See DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 22, 80;
DWORKIN, supra note 121, at 19. The use of general words in the statute suggest that the statute's
application should extend beyond the precise situations specifically contemplated and discussed
by members of the legislature.
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language, unless Congress at least sets forth such a policy in its justification of the
statute.
In any event, legislative justification of statutes is important and courts
ordinarily should not conclude that Congress has commanded a significant change
in the law without explanation. The requirement of justification supports the
requirement that Congress "call its shot" when statutory language is ambiguous.
B. Holy Trinity: General Words with Unexpected Applications
The approach presented in this Article may also change our view of the
interpretive enterprise in situations where a statute uses general words that extend
beyond any justification offered for the statute. Professor William D. Popkin refers
to the problem created by such statutes as the problem of"generality"-"generality
refers to language which appears to cover a range of facts even though some
applications may seem strange." 357 Holy Trinity Church v. United States358
provides a classic example of this type of problem.359
The statute at issue prohibited anyone from assisting or encouraging the
immigration of any foreigner who had, before immigrating, entered into a contract
to "perform labor or services of any kind."360 The United States sued Holy Trinity
Church, which had hired an English cleric as it rector and pastor. The central issue
was whether such employment constituted the "performance of labor or services of
any kind" under the immigration statute. As the Court noted, the text of the
provision seemed to apply to such employment.361 However, the Court focused on
congressional intent, asserting that it did not "think Congress intended to denounce
with penalties a transaction like that" between a church and a rector.362 The Court
explained: "It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention
of its makers. '363 The Court held that the statutory phrase "labor or services of any
kind" meant only manual labor, relying on its general knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the statute's enactment, the problems that prompted
357 POPKIN, supra note 126, at 401; see also DICKERSON, supra note 4, at 51-53.
358 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
359 The Holy Trinity Court itself noted that the interpretive problem it faced resulted from
congressional attempts to address a particular problem by using general language that
encompassed situations Congress did not envision. See id at 459, 472.
360 Id. at 458.
36 1 See id at 457-58. The plain meaning argument was strengthened by the statute's explicit
exemption of some professionals, including actors, artists, lecturers, singers, and domestic servants.
See id.
362 See id. at 459.
36 3 Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
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Congress to act,364 and the statute's legislative history, which focused on
immigrants who engaged in physical labor.365 The Court noted that the relevant
Senate committee realized that the text of the statute could be read to include even
those immigrants who did not engage in manual labor and refused to amend the
statute to limit its reach to manual laborers.366 The Committee had explained that
it did not wish to delay the bill's enactment by redrafting it and expressed its
confidence that the courts would interpret the bill to bar only manual laborers.367
The Court also expressed concern about the statute's impact on religious freedom
were the statute interpreted literally, and said it did not believe Congress meant to
inhibit the practice of religion.368
Though no Justice dissented in Holy Trinity, Justice Anthony Kennedy
criticized the Holy Trinity Court's approach in his opinion in Public Citizen v.
United States Department of Justice.3 69 Justice Kennedy argued that legislative
materials possess no authority. He also asserted that the judicial practice of
"rummag[ing] through" legislative history does not further "democratic
exegesis." 370 Finally, he argued that determinations of legislative intent are
generally so deficient and based on so little evidence that a court's conclusion as to
legislative intent really reflects the views of the judges rather than those of the
enacting legislature.371 Justice Kennedy even analogized the attempt to determine
legislative intent to a seance.372
How are we to approach this dispute between those who believe in limiting
364 See id at 463-64. The Court explained that the statute could be interpreted in light of the
"evil" it was designed to remedy. See id. In identifying that "evil," the Court could properly
consider "contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the
attention of the legislative body." Id. at 463 (citing United States v. Union Pacific R.R., 91 U.S.
72, 79 (1875)). In the Court's view, the problem Congress sought to remedy was big business's
use of imported labor to reduce the wages of native American laborers. See id.
3 65 See id. at 464-65.
3 66 See id. at 464.
3 67 See idj at 464-65.
368 See id at 472. This portion of the Court's argument resembles the types of arguments
based on legislative silence discussed in the previous section. In support of its view that Congress
would not have enacted a statute making contracts between churches and foreign clerics illegal,
the Court did not discuss any statement made in Congress, but rather generally canvassed the role
of religion within the United States from the settlement of North America until 1892. Cf.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 87, 89 (suggesting a similar approach).
369 491 U.S. 440,467 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
370 Id. at 473.
371 See id. at 473.
372 See id at 473 (After noting the focus, supported by Holy Trinity, on the spirit of the law,
Kennedy notes that "[t]he problem with spirits is that they tend to reflect less the views of the
world whence they come than the views of those who seek their advice.").
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general words by the legislative history and those who do not? Justice Kennedy
offers telling criticisms of the use of legislative history to the extent that it is used
to determine the actual subjective intent of a majority of the enacting legislature.
The factual basis for a conclusion that most representatives in the Congress that
enacted the immigration bill intended the statute to apply only to manual laborers
does not seem fully convincing and may reflect the views of the judges more than
any serious factual inquiry.373 Certainly, historians, journalists, archaeologists, or
others concerned with history, would find unpersuasive the factual inquiry
conducted by the Holy Trinity Court.374
On the other hand, the new textualist approach, as exemplified by Justice
Kennedy's argument in Public Citizen, inappropriately discounts the importance of
public justification. Because a majority vote on the general text is not the only
relevant part of the legislative process, Kennedy's view is too restrictive. The public
justification for the statute is an appropriate source to use in determining the scope
of the statute. Judges must acknowledge that they are not conducting a factual
inquiry into "intent" when attempting to construe a statute. Rather, courts must
determine the proper scope of the statute in light of the "public justification"
provided for it. The scope of the statute will broaden or contract depending on the
public justification. Although, given the use of general language in a statute's text
such a statute clearly cannot be interpreted to cover only the specific matters or
situations addressed in the public justification.375 Thus judges will have to
acknowledge discretion; they will have to admit that their interpretation is not
merely the one they are forced to accept by some "legislative intent" but rather one
that is chosen based on the court's interpretation of the text of the statute and the
public justification provided.
3 73 See MacCallum, supra note 251, at 778 ("While judges and administrators obviously
utilize evidence of the intentions of various individual legislators, they make no serious attempt
to discover the actual intentions of the voting majorities. .. ).
374 Perhaps, however, historians and lawyers study the past for different reasons. See LAURA
KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 168-71, 180-90 (1996); H. Jefferson
Powell, Rules for Oiginalists, 73 VA. L. REv. 659 (1987). Kalman notes the differences between
historians' and lawyers' view of history: While historians focus on nuance and complexity, and
emphasize the differences between the present and the past, lawyers focus on simplicity and
clarity, and on the similarities between the past and the present See KALMAN, supra. To illustrate
her point, Kalman notes historians' unfavorable reaction to civic republicans' claims that their
approach embodies the views of the Framers of the Constitution. See id. at 174-76; see also S.
Martin Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523
(1995).




In many ways the conventional approach to interpreting statutes, reading text
in the context of limited portions of legislative history, is a sound approach in need
of a supporting theory. As we have seen, justifying the use of legislative history
based on the concept of legislative intent has produced two consequences. First,
when scholars, from Max Radin to the new textualists, began to argue that the
legislature could only be treated as the sum of individual legislators, the notion of
legislative intent became untenable. Even when scholars who found legislative
intent useful argued that a legislature should be viewed as an institution in which
authority is delegated to certain institutional actors subject to expressions of assent
by the entire chamber, they did not provide a convincing normative reason for
viewing the vote on the statute as an endorsement of the explanatory statements
provided by the institutional actors. Second, the concept of "legislative intent," in
conjunction with both the argument that the legislature is merely the sum of
individuals and the documentation of more of the legislative process, has produced
serious methodological consequences. Interpretation of statutes has almost become
a factual inquiry into subjective intent in which courts either lack the most probative
evidence or seem to arbitrarily refuse to pursue all the relevant evidence.
The public justification approach addresses these problems. It provides a basis
for asserting that legislatures have a duty not merely to enact statutes, but to explain
them as well, and that accordingly legislators have a duty to respond to the
institutional explanations of those statutes. The public justification approach allows
courts to examine legislative history without conceiving of the interpretive task as
a factual inquiry into subjective intent and provides something of a guide to
distinguishing documents that should be given weight in the interpretive process
from those documents that should not.
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